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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis presents a critique of the increasingly popular post-Keynesian stock-flow 
consistent (SFC) approach to macroeconomic modelling. With the Godley-Lavoie (2007) 
textbook taken as the paradigmatic treatment, it explores the claims of SFC to provide both 
a complete and coherent means to analyse and model any modern economy.  
It finds that the presence of uncertainty in firms’ decision-making renders the system 
inconsistent with either rational behaviour on the part of firms, or SFC’s wider claims to 
rigorous consistency conditions being met. Once uncertainty of this kind is introduced, we 
find a line of transmission from the real economy back into the monetary system that 
conventional SFC models cannot cope with.  
Building on this, the thesis presents the role of capital and initial financing as fundamental 
problems within the SFC framing, resulting also in monetary imbalances. We suggest that 
drawing on the classical political economy and its understanding of the hoarding of money 
with the circuit of accumulation can help resolve some of these difficulties. The thesis 
concludes with an exploration of the shadow banking system in light of the preceding 
discussion.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The crisis in macroeconomics since the Great Recession of 2008-9 has been fundamental. 
After a nearly decade, over which the tremors at the start of the millennium associated 
with the dot.com crash appeared to have faded to a distant memory, and the 
macroeconomics profession could reassure itself that the “New Consensus” (Arestis 2009) 
had resolved all major theoretical and policy difficulties, the crash came as an ugly shock. 
For all the increasing mathematical sophistication of the neoclassical mainstream, the 
dominant paradigm of “representative agents”, rational-optimising behaviour, and market 
clearing settings (with the occasional “New Keynesian” deviation) looked to be seriously 
out of step with reality. Mainstream models, overwhelmingly, did not predict and did not 
expect the crash. 
An intellectual and practical failure of this scale was bound to give a new lease of life those 
critics who, in the years of the New Consensus, had been marginalised or excluded from 
academic discourse. The traditions of the heterodoxy – increasingly forced to the edges of 
academia – appeared suddenly to offer potentially convincing challenges to the 
neoclassical mainstream, despite their comparative lack of institutional support. 
In keeping with heretics throughout history, however, the ranks of the heterodox may not 
have entirely grasped this opportunity themselves. Years, stretching into decades, of 
something approaching intellectual isolation had both thinned their numbers absolutely, 
and reduced the remnants to a selection of apparently mutually-incompatible (and 
frequently mutually hostile) alternatives: post-Keynesians, Marxists, institutional 
economists, environmental economists, the Austrian School , neo-chartalists, evolutionary 
economists: the list can be extended for some distance, without gaining any greater clarity. 
As against the exceptional (if ultimately futile) coherence of the neoclassical orthodoxy, 
with its claims of rigour and high technical standards, the heterodoxy lacked a systemic 
intellectual means to organise itself. 
It is within the last few years, however, that this lack of coherency may have started to 
breakdown. Ably promoted by its supporters, the stock-flow consistent (SFC) approach to 
modelling has moved, as Wynne Godley and Marc Lavoie suggest in their seminal Monetary 
Economics¸ from a fringe concern to a potential alternative to the New Keynesian paradigm. 
8 
 
The growing popularity of the techniques is evident: to pick some examples, Wynne Godley, 
pioneer of much of modern stock-flow modelling, was the subject of a New York Times 
profile just before the current paper was completed (Schlafer 2013); the Institute for New 
Economic Thinking, established with private funding to promote alternative approaches to 
the neoclassical mainstream, including SFC models; and the Levy Institute at Bard College 
has been central to promoting and disseminating stock-flow consistent and flow-of-funds 
methods.1 The glimmerings of a mainstream academic recognition are beginning to stir, 
with Paul Krugman amongst the recent neoclassical commentators – if only to (largely) 
dismiss the approach as “old-fashioned” (Krugman 2013), apparently in the belief that a 
lack of microfoundations cause SFC models predict secular stagnation. 
Nonetheless, it is fair to argue that stock-flow consistency has increasingly come to inform 
alternative approaches. One of its merits, as the next chapter explores briefly, is its 
seeming openness: as a method of organising an economic model, it can provide (its 
supporters argue) a structure that is both open enough to allow many different behavioural 
and structural relationships to be tested, empirically or analytically; and yet, simultaneously, 
it can provide a sufficiently robust theoretical armature to ensure the coherency and 
stability of models over time. In this way, not only could the (now-dominant) post-
Keynesian variant of stock-flow modelling, with its concerns of endogenous money, credit 
creation, imperfect competition, and so on, be incorporated in SFC, so, too, could a 
neoclassical version. James Tobin and his collaborators, early on, explored the possibility of 
SFC as a means to resolve some of the lacunae inside the neoclassical, general equilibrium 
system. This line of research has, however, now very largely fizzled out, and we explore 
some of the reasons for this in the next chapter. 
This leaves the post-Keynesian, and similar, overtly heterodox approaches as the dominant 
tendency within the development of SFC. It is the claim of generality that interests us 
most– of SFC as an organising principle for otherwise competing theoretical schools, akin to 
that of general equilibrium for heterodoxy. It is this claim, we suggest, that is distinctive for 
SFC in the post-Keynesian variant that has come to dominate. The success or otherwise of 
the theoretical claim stands or falls on this generality, imposing two sets of questions: first, 
is SFC internally coherent and consistent? Second, on the basis of this coherency (or lack), 
can it be used to describe the evolution of an economy over time?  
                                                          
1 The two terms are virtually interchangeable as a description of the modelling methodology. We use stock-flow consistent 
(SFC) throughout to refer to this methodology; flow-of-funds is only used when referring to the empirical data. 
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We take these two questions as the over-riding concern. Our particular strategy to answer 
both is to assess the degree to which the framework represents a general rather than a 
particular frame for a monetary economy, and then to check for its own internal 
consistency. The general framework of SFC, at least in its post-Keynesian variant, is not only 
an exercise in the construction of a set of abstract matrices, with behavioural relationships 
as described by the modeller.  It also, as Godley, Lavoie, and others correctly indicate, 
involves the necessity of some theoretical claims about the world.  
At the centre of these claims is a certain conception of money and its role within the 
economy. In stark opposition to the neoclassical paradigm, SFC models an overtly monetary 
economy: one in which economically relevant transactions between agents are conducted 
in money terms, and with money. This, in turn, requires SFC models to take an unusually 
(relative to the neoclassicists) clear position on the creation and use of money in the 
economy. In close parallel, it forces any modeller to approach time not (as in the general 
equilibrium case) a mere index of events, but as a real structure in the economy that 
compels a particular logic on behaviour: the economy, in SFC, is a sequence of events 
taking place over time, and these events an internal coherency and logic. Taking these two 
elements, we explore the relationship between them, developing a particular 
understanding of the place of uncertainty which, as we will see, post-Keynesian accounts 
have placed great store by, but which SFC (we suggest) somewhat neglects. 
To the question of uncertainty, we develop, in turn, a particular critique of SFC, based in 
large part on the work of political economists writing in a broadly Marxist theoretical mode. 
We isolate the (related) treatments of uncertainty and financing as central to the 
coherence and explanatory power of the SFC model, and develop on this basis an approach 
to uncertainty and financing that we think can begin to resolve some of the problems here. 
This involves, in parallel, a development of some of the Marxist approaches to credit and 
finance, where these had otherwise treated uncertainty as an afterthought. We draw on 
Marx and later writers because, with some refinements, it appears to offer the best means 
to integrate the issues of sequencing, coherency, and aggregation that post-Keynesian SFC 
models place centre-stage. 
This is the research strategy in the whole paper. It involves, of necessity, the exclusion of 
much that is of interest: we do not consider, for example, the question of behavioural 
relations in any great depth; nor do we approach the issue of pricing, and we only touch, 
indirectly, on the behaviour of firms. There are no simulation models or other empirical 
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exercises, although we offer the development of the shadow banking system, in a 
concluding chapter, as an empirical anomaly that SFC alone (to say nothing of the 
neoclassical school) has some trouble accommodating itself to.  
These exclusions, all of them containing great potential for future research, are necessary 
to maintain what we hope is the clear focus of the paper on the structural considerations of 
SFC – its coherency and completeness – ahead of the particular uses to which it might be 
put. We offer a further structural element – that of uncertainty as a social fact within an 
economy organised on competitive lines, and using money as a means of exchange and 
unit of account. This structural element is introduced with the claim that it is both 
singularly important for a convincing account of a monetary economy; and, at the same 
time, helps us resolve some of the inconsistencies that can appear in SFC models. 
 
The existing literature and an alternative paradigm 
The chapter immediately following this introduction is a critical review of the literature of 
stock-flow consistency. It reconstructs the separate strands that fed into the current 
modelling methodology, drawing on the “monetary theory of production” and circular flow 
theorists from Quesnay onwards; the creation of national income accounting; and the 
introduction by Copeland of flow-of-funds methods to national income accounts. 
It presents SFC as both the progressive development of these separate parts of economic 
theory, but further suggests SFC emerged in particular as an attempt to resolve what had, 
by the no later than the mid-1970s, become evident problems within the mainstream of 
macroeconomic thought, itself heavily influenced by a variant of Keynes. It shows both how 
SFC was used in a neoclassical setting by the Yale school, and how the method was taken in 
a very different direction by economists closely associated with Cambridge, England, 
Wynne Godley outstanding amongst them.  
SFC, in this reading, as it has developed especially over the last decade, is an attempt to 
both continue and resolve some of the tensions and issues within post-Keynesian economic 
thought. It is not, we will argue, completely successful, since core issues of the empirical 
and theoretical relevance of SFC models remain unresolved. Nonetheless, a survey of the 
recent literature suggests a viable alternative methodology can be constructed. We close 
by suggesting that the work of Godley and Marc Lavoie in drawing together and 
systematising the separate elements within SFC, constructing what amounts to an anti-
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neoclassical alternative paradigm, are now central to the coherency of the SFC paradigm as 
such. 
Chapter three introduces the stock flow consistent model through a discussion of the 
problems that emerge in the alternative modelling paradigm of general equilibrium theory. 
We aim to show that, first, general equilibrium ignores gross financial flows in favour of net, 
and thus obscures potentially important economic behaviour; second, this treatment of net 
assets results in an internal inconsistency, thanks to the presence of inside money; third 
that the use of inside money leads to an empirically poor and generally inconsistent 
treatment of the banking and financial systems.  
We propose SFC as a means to resolve these problems, and briefly introduce some of the 
key concepts – the use of balance sheets, the centrality of the two consistency conditions, 
and the treatment of money as endogenous and finance as more than intermediary.  
 
Time and inconsistencies in SFC 
The next chapter, number four, forms a central part of the whole argument. It proposes, in 
outline, that the treatment of uncertainty as it affects real production is not satisfactory 
within the canonical Godley-Lavoie model, producing either internal inconsistencies, or a 
failure of coherence, which in turn have particular economic impacts.  
It starts, via a discussion of Steve Keen’s arguments for continuous-time methods, with the 
argument that the properly economic approach to time within a stock-flow consistent 
setting must be through the use of discrete time periods. This opens a discussion of the 
approach to income as the form of flow that arises on the basis of a stock. We note that 
income can be considered in an “accounting” sense, as the backwards-looking net flow, or 
in an “economic” sense, following Hicks (1946), in which it is the value that can be taken 
from any given economic unit without affecting the expected value of the of the unit’s 
assets. This is clearly forward-looking; the distinction matters, since these two amounts can 
differ, and the differences have behavioural implications. 
We move on to a discussion of the treatment of inventories within the textbook Godley-
Lavoie (2007) model. Inventories act as both the result of failed expectations in firms’ 
production targets, and as a hedge against the possible future failure of those production 
targets. In other words, they combine both a backward- and forward-looking element. We 
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claim that this is a confusion of concepts that in turn confuses the presentation in the SFC 
matrix: the treatment inconsistently claims inventories are valued at cost of production, 
when all other elements are valued at market price.  
No rational firm, however, would treat its inventories in this manner; resolving the issue by 
valuing inventories at expected future income, however, causes the matrix to become 
inconsistent. Currently, the SFC presentation can either be consistent with itself, but 
inconsistent with rational firm behaviour, or inconsistent with itself, but consistent with 
firm behaviour. This inconsistency, the product of the effect of uncertainty on firms’ 
production decisions, in turn produces a financial effect, in altering the valuation of firms’ 
assets, and that, in turn, causes the SFC matrix to fail to close and the money market fail to 
come into balance. 
We show that the system can be closed only in the neoclassical case of factors being paid 
their marginal products. This resolves the imbalance in the matrix and brings the money 
market back into equilibrium. However, without a specification of agent optimisation or 
some other method to bring factor payments in line with their marginal products, we view 
this outcome as inherently unlikely. Far more likely is that factors are paid less than their 
marginal product, resulting in an excess supply of money relative to demand. Critically, it is 
the uncertainty that firms face that motivates the inconsistency. Resolving the treatment of 
this uncertainty is central to our critique.  
 
The stock of capital 
Chapter five looks at the concept of capital. We examine the issue of capital as a stock that 
produces an income at a very high level of generality, before moving on to the particular 
issues for valuation and pricing this causes. We find that attempt to move directly from 
physical outputs to market prices, “smoothly” in the words of Godley and Lavoie, in fact 
disguises a problem of inconsistency highlighted by Piero Sraffa (1960). The issue of factor 
payments, particularly if they are paid their marginal products, leads to a discussion of the 
Cambridge controversy, and we attempt to show that the issues this raised are of a concern 
to any economic theory that attempts to include an account of production over time, and 
of the presence of accumulated capital.  
This leads directly to a discussion of the treatment of capital within SFC models. We show 
that the treatment of capital gains is, in general, not consistent. We argue that the need for 
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initial financing of investment creates the need for additional financing. We show that 
capital is not reducible to a form of inventory, and that (due to the issue of valuation of 
both) these two elements cannot be simply summated on a balance sheet, as is done in 
practice: only one or the other can be consistently entered without some external pricing 
mechanism being introduced. We suggest that SFC in fact ends up with a retrograde 
concept of capital as an “accumulation of commodities”, akin to that proposed in Ricardo, 
but without the necessary external theory of valuation – the labour theory of value, or 
general equilibrium theory could equally work here.  
 
Initial financing and the sequence of events 
Chapter six returns to the question of initial financing, opening with a discussion of 
entrepreneurs’ motives to want to invest and – critically – to fail to invest, and to hoard 
financing. This opens up a discussion of Keynes’ “financial motive” for holding additional 
money balances to meet the initial demand for finance. We argue that this cannot be 
simply reduced to a further element in the demand for money, but has to be treated as a 
necessary part of production in capitalist economy.  
This opens up, in turn, to a discussion of the “circuitist” school, with its focus on the need 
for initial financing to commence a sequence of production. The “paradox of profits” is 
discussed, along with some proposed resolutions. We suggest, however, that the 
introduction of uncertainty – and therefore of a requirement to hoard – can provide the 
means to resolve the paradox, since additional money balances are brought into circulation 
flexibly from the stocks of hoarded money, as needed.  
 
Credit, money, and uncertainty 
Chapter seven is lengthy, and builds on this notion of hoarding to discuss the creation, on 
this basis, of a market for credit. We introduce, via Marx and Marxian writers, the notion of 
the hoard as a barrier to uncertainty of a structural kind within the circuit, and that 
therefore this can become the basis for a credit system. The presence of these money 
hoards creates leaks from the circuit, and therefore any representation of the economy via 
balance sheets alone is unlikely to be a complete representation of economic processes, 
despite the SFC claims. It is money hoards that provide the initial basis for the credit system 
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as such, and the credit system which then can transform hoarded money into money-
capital capable of circulation: the two (money and money-capital) are distinct elements 
within the system as a whole. We note that, although Keynes held a theory of hoarding, the 
notion of uncertainty was (by the General Theory) left undernourished on the monetary 
side, Keynes preferring to present his case by reference to the standard quantity theory. 
SFC models have in general ended up with a similar failure to distinguish money in different 
forms, precisely because the whole representation has to take place on a single set of 
balance-sheet and transaction matrices.  
 We suggest that this implies the quantity theory of money, with money determining prices, 
may not hold and that therefore we should be looking, as in Marx, to an anti-quantity 
theory of money, with prices determined by production conditions driving changes in the 
supply of money. We explore some of the implications of this: the need for a determining 
“law of reflux” and the requirement for money to act as a real rather than symbolic store of 
value. The anti-quantity theory, in turn, helps illuminate some of the contradictions we 
have developed within the SFC system, most notably the appearance (as a result of 
systemic uncertainty) of a “monetary excess”. It is this excess, we suggest, that helps 
regulate the system as a whole, given uncertainty in particular, and note the role of world 
money in providing this function. 
Chapter eight is a more empirical chapter that looks at what we argue is one of the major 
contemporary forms of money hoarding, outside of the conventional credit circuit, in the 
creation of off-balance sheet, non-depository banking institutions – the “shadow banking 
system”. As previously suggested, the presence of uncertainty creates an imbalance in the 
money market, except in conditions of general equilibrium that are inherently unlikely. This 
imbalance has emerged as the exceptional demand for liquidity, given the needs of 
investment, alongside enormous concentrations of non-invested wealth. Together this has 
created the shadow banking system. 
We draw on and attempt to provide some more empirical details for the discussions that 
have been introduced on uncertainty and the role of banks and credit money. We suggest 
that the complex tangle of processes developed inside the off-balance sheet, non-
depository banking system can be understood as a system itself, but that we need to place 
this complexity within a macroeconomic framing capable of organising it: SFC, with its 
single-money form of representation and its (necessary) exclusion of leaks within its circuits 
of monetary flows may not be well-placed to do this. We conclude the chapter with an 
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assessment of one recent attempt, in a broadly SFC frame, to account for the processes of 
the shadow banking system and their relationship to the financial crisis. 
The paper concludes with some suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a survey of some recent work in stock-flow consistency (SFC). It 
attempts, however, to place this within a broader framework of economic thought, seeking 
to show how SFC developed from specific parts of economic thought and in response to 
specific challenges. We do not want to treat it, then, as the unmediated expression of how 
the economy “really is” – as, on occasion, its enthusiasts have done – but as the particular 
development of a particular set of theories. 
The aim is to both introduce the important literature, and indicate some of the main lines 
of criticism. We start with Keynes’ circular flow of income, as the original development 
from which all subsequent SFC work follows, and note that this places SFC within a 
particular set of economic thought outside the mainstream. National accounting was 
developed, and then given economic content through early research on SFC, leading up to 
the arguments around the Cambridge school in the 1970s. We suggest that a neoclassical 
SFC is possible, as the work of Tobin and others showed, but that this has been largely 
abandoned due to the perceived ability of SFC to begin to resolve some longstanding issues 
within the post-Keynesian literature.  
There is a critique of this line of thinking that draws out the major problems within SFC. The 
chapter concludes with an overview of these issues in the light of recent literature. 
 
I. CIRCULAR FLOWS 
Keynes’ circular flow of income 
Stock-flow consistency is incomprehensible without Keynes, and his 1936 General Theory in 
particular. Although not unique in doing so, this popularised the case for treating the 
concerns of economic policymaking for the whole economy as separate to those of 
individual markets: of the existence of a macroeconomy, whose rules could be quite 
different to those prevailing at a micro level. The development of this line of thinking 
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became known as Keynesianism, and SFC is in general best (although not necessarily) 
conceived of as an extension of a particular kind of Keynesian thought.  
The barebones Keynesian case can be stated quite easily. The simplest plausible model for 
the economy includes two sectors, households and firms. This is a direct descendent of 
Keynes’ “circular flow of income”, introduced in the General Theory, in which a supply of 
incomes from firms to households, in payment for labour supplied, returns back to firms as 
a flow of earnings from sales revenues. In this sense, it is clear that every expenditure by 
one sector must be an earning by the other, giving a final expenditure national income for 
the whole economy as Y=C+I, where C is consumption spending by households and I is 
investment spending by firms – here including their expenditure on wages. Looking at the 
flow of income from the point of view of earnings gives us the same total. If households 
earn wages wN and firms, holding capital, earn the return rK, we have for factor incomes 
Y=wN+rK. Ex post, both the income-derived and the spending-derived national incomes will 
equate. Where savings by households occur, this will be equal to Y-C=S. It can immediately 
be seen that, ex post, savings must equal investment, S=I. This is the critical balancing point 
of the entire Keynesian system: it ensures that the whole system can be closed. 
Things become more complicated with the introduction of a functioning money asset. If 
money is earned for the supply of labour by households, and then spent on goods supplied 
by firms, households always have the option to fail to spend: they can withdraw money 
from circulation, and hold money balances as a savings. They may have incentive to do this 
for reasons Keynes, famously, identified in the general theory: in addition to the 
transactions motive for holding money, necessary because money is the only valid means 
of payment; if money can also act as a store of value, there appears in addition the 
precautionary motive to hold positive money balances, since money can act here as a form 
of hedging against an uncertain future. In particular, unknown future demands for 
payments can arise, and so households have an incentive to hold money in the present. If a 
functioning asset market also exists, there can emerge a speculative demand for holding 
money, in anticipation of making future gains with interest rate rises, or avoiding future 
losses in the event of their falls. 
Stock-flow consistent modelling builds on that barebones framework to attempt to show 
not just the flows arising from transactions, but also the balance of the stocks of assets and 
liabilities held within the economy. These stocks, in turn, engender flows of income 
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between sectors and agents; it is the duty of the modeller to attempt to capture these 
movements and these relationships as best as possible.  
The requirement of consistency in this relationship can be stated formally. Following Siegel 
(1979), Patterson and Stephenson (1988) provide a formal  definition of stock-flow 
consistency as where a pair of variables, x(t) and y(t), indexed by time, have the following 
relationship: 
∫  ( )   ( )   
 
  
 
Or, equivalently y(t)=x(t)/dt. This is a continuous-time conception of the stock-flow 
relationship, in which (as can be seen from the integration), the cumulative value of the 
flows y(t) to time t are the same as the value of the stock x(t), plus some arbitrary constant 
that can here be thought of as past, unmodelled history. This relationship is “consistent” 
because the value of any given stock at any point in time is equal to the value of past flows 
into the stock (plus history); alternatively, the rate of any given flow at any point in time is 
the rate of change of the stock. As chapter three covers in more detail, the question of 
continuous versus discrete time period modelling becomes an issue once the requirement 
of consistency between stocks and flows is introduced, since (as Foley (1975) demonstrates) 
in flow-flow systems, of the kind modelled in general equilibrium, the choice of 
periodisation is irrelevant.2 
The requirement of consistency has two direct economic implications, built in to the whole 
system. As Wynne Godley, arguably the dominant theorist in SFC economics, neatly 
phrased it, the system in the aggregate will be one with “with no ‘black holes’ – every flow 
comes from somewhere and goes somewhere” (Godley 1996:7). The two economic 
consequences of this are, first, in common with the mainstream of economics, that budget 
constraints are binding on sectors: it is not possible for any sector in the aggregate to make 
use of more flows than it has access to within a period. Requirements for consumption 
spending, for example, above current incomes necessitate the creation of loans – a flow 
arising in the banking sector, moving to households, and attached to an increasing stock of 
loans and deposit holdings. This familiar requirement will probably not be controversial.  
More unusual is the second constraint, that of the double entry accounting principle: every 
stock held as an asset has a liability as its counterpart elsewhere in the system, and (of 
                                                          
2 Foley also shows that a flow-flow system, showing only the relationship between end period flows, is equivalent to a stock-
stock system, showing only the relationship between start-of-period stocks, if general equilibrium obtains. 
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course) vice versa. This is not a constraint generally considered by the neoclassical 
mainstream, which deals (as we shall argue in the next chapter) exclusively with net flows 
of wealth, and therefore can ignore the gross position of assets and liabilities. It is a 
position not, however, without its own problems. Together, these two requirements 
impose a constraint on the entire modelled system that we refer to throughout as the zero-
sum condition: each row, and each column, within the balance sheet should sum to zero, 
with (sometimes) the single exception of net wealth. This requirement is absolutely critical 
to the successful functioning of stock-flow models; nonetheless, it is not, itself, 
uncontroversial. 
 
The “underground” history of circular flows 
In emphasising the necessity for an economy to exist as a circular flow of transactions 
between entities, rather than a fundamentally static equilibrium, stock-flow consistent (SFC) 
approaches to macroeconomic questions are usually part of what Graziani (1982) has called 
the “underground” tradition of economic thought that stretches from the SFC and flow-of-
funds work of Godley, Lavoie, Dos Santos and others, through Keynes himself , taking in 
Joseph Schumpeter and Rosa Luxemburg (Luxemburg, Tarbuck et al. 1973; Bellofiore and 
Passarella 2009), and then back to Karl Marx’s “reproduction schemes” in volume two of 
Capital (Marx 1894). These were themselves strongly influenced by Francois Quesnay’s 
presentation of a recognisably circular flow of income in his Tableau Economique (Quesnay 
1969), the first time such a representation was attempted. Central to all of these 
conceptions of the economy is the importance of money as the means by which the 
separate units within the economy are brought together. This buried tradition, then, stands 
in stark contrast to that of the dominant neoclassical school within economics, with its 
stress on static equilibrium analysis, its stress on real (rather than nominal) factors within 
the analysis, and its general belief in the neutrality of money itself. 
Such “social accounting matrices” (the coinage is Richard Stone’s) of wealth fed directly 
into the development of national income accounting in the 1920s and 1930s. Simon 
Kuznet’s pioneering work for the US national accounts, with the first complete set 
published in 1934, was preceded by the work of Ernst Wagemann and the Institute for 
Business-Cycle Research in Germany. Wagemann had developed a notion of the circular 
flow of income as early as 1923, and the Institute was by the end of the decade able to 
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make detailed statistical cases in support of an increasingly interventionist state (Tooze 
1999; Tooze 2001). As Geoff Tily notes, however, these early efforts at complete sets of 
national accounts, incorporating all relevant parts of economic life themselves had a long 
intellectual prehistory in the incomplete and partial attempts to measure “national wealth”. 
William Petty’s sketches in the 1660s, and Gregory King’s work, completed in 1696, are 
outstanding in this case, King building both an income and a consumption measure of 
national income for the UK, France, and Holland (Stone 1984: 118). That work had been 
slowly built upon during the 19th century by Alfred Flux, Arthur Bowley and Josiah Stamp, 
amongst others, (Tily 2009: 331) but it was not until statistical and survey techniques had 
developed sufficiently to allow consistent recording of data that the first true national 
accounts could be published. Developments in statistical accounting here marched in 
parallel with the development of macroeconomics as distinctive discipline within the wider 
field of economics, a development inseparable from the publication of Keynes’ General 
Theory (1936) and the subsequent systematization of its insights.  
Benjamin Mitra-Kahn traces this intellectual lineage in his account of the development of 
the “economy” as an object of social and political concern (Mitra-Kahn 2011). His argument 
that the tools, in some sense, created the economy bears some resemblance to the 
performativity theories of Michel Callon (Callon 1998; Callon, Millo et al. 2007) and Donald 
MacKenzie (MacKenzie 2006; MacKenzie, Muniesa et al. 2007). This is not a resemblance 
explicitly identified by Mitra-Kahn, and of course the stress on knowledge itself as the 
product of a given history, and of power relations, should bring to mind the Nietzscheanism 
of Michel Foucault : the notion of set of theoretical practices as definitive of its own object 
of study immediately recalls Foucault’s dispositif  (Foucault 1980). We do not, here, need to 
accept the entirety of his historical thesis; but the notion that accounts are created, and 
that accounting has a history, can act as a useful corrective to the – recurrent, if generally 
unstated – belief that national accounts are simple expressions of economic truth. Much of 
the work that this chapter surveys contains this unexamined assumption: that the 
accounting matrices, if based on the national accounts now published in standardised form 
globally, are in fact identical to the state of the economy, containing all relevant economic 
information. This may be the case; but we cannot guarantee that it is the case, if any 
degree of reflexivity in the construction of the accounts is allowed for. Much of the thesis 
that follows will end up exploring some of the implications of this problem. 
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In any case, the techniques of national accounting were given an immense boost by the 
Second World War. Its overwhelming demands for a total mobilisation of economic 
resources, combined with the necessity to refine planning techniques, created an immense 
incentive to improve the collection and production of accounts. Richard Stone’s 1948 
memorandum introduced double-entry accounting to national income, allowing a properly 
financial record of assets and liabilities to be presented. By 1952, the UN’s System of 
National Accounts offered an internationally-recognised standard for the production and 
publication of nation income statistics. The “social accounting perspective” was by this time 
a well-established methodology for the presentation of economic statistics. 
 
II. NATIONAL ACCOUNTING AND “NEW CAMBRIDGE” 
From national accounts to stock-flow consistency 
However, to move from this treatment of the accounts as economic datum, and towards a 
treatment of the accounts as a determining factor in economic theory, required the 
introduction of dynamics: the production, not just of static balances, but of some indication 
of flows of funds throughout the system. The key breakthrough here was provided by 
Copeland (1949), who extended the social accounting matrix to explicitly include 
movements of money and funding throughout out the system. This, in turn, transformed 
the static double-entry accounting principle, familiar from standard company accounts, 
into the dynamic quadruple-entry accounting: since one unit’s inflow of funds is also 
another’s outflow, the standard double-entry account is itself doubled: assets produce an 
inflow and outflow; liabilities produce a parallel inflow and outflow. This feature, of 
quadruple-entry accounting, is now at the heart of any SFC system, directly reflecting the 
consistency and coherency claimed for the methodology. 
This breakthrough, however, did not have an immediate impact on economic theory as 
such. Copeland’s “certainly had an influence on economics”, but this was “mainly as source 
of financial data” (Caverzasi and Godin 2013: 5). The possibility of using this insight to 
disrupt economic theory, and to begin – more practically – to relate real and financial flows 
in a systematic fashion, breaking with the supposition of neutrality, was not convincingly 
taken up at the time – or for decades afterwards (Cohen 1972).  
The development of modern stock-flow approaches can be traced back to the 
disintegration of the “Keynesian” consensus in macroeconomics from the 1970s onwards. 
22 
 
From the development of the Hicksian synthesis (Hicks 1937) onwards, through the 
formalisation of the basic principles in the work of Samuelson (1948) in particular, a wide 
agreement had developed in post-war economics as to the core elements of understanding 
the economy. These were, first, national income determination in the national income 
identity; second, the presence of the multiplier effect and therefore of a rationale for 
sustained government intervention; third, the empirical existence of the Philips Curve 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment that would allow different policy mixes to 
be rationally considered. 
For almost thirty years, governments in the West could win elections, as Britain’s Harold 
Macmillan did in 1955, on variants of the slogan, “you’ve never had it so good”. This 
Golden Age (Hobsbawm 1994) of economic growth had its direct theoretical expression in 
the development of “Keynesian macroeconomics”, creating what Meghnad Desai has 
accurately described as (Desai 2002: 216) an “Age of Keynes”. It was only as both the post-
war boom fizzled out, from the late 1960s onwards, and as the “Keynesian” techniques of 
demand-management appeared to break down, that a serious intellectual challenge was 
made to the hegemony of Keynesianism. This emerged, principally, in the reassertion of the 
virtues of free markets, and technically sophisticated arguments for their primacy, 
particularly in developing the notions of rational expectations (Muth 1961) and the need 
for “microfoundations” to provide consistency in macroeconomic models (Lucas 1976). A 
“counter-revolution” (Johnson 1971) in economic thought appeared to be taking place, 
overturning the consensus, and replacing it with variants of the earlier “classical” school – 
Keynes’ own description for the pre-war consensus view on the macroeconomy.  Concerns 
that had been shunted to the margins of economic theory were given new interpretations 
and brought back into the core of the mainstream theory (Friedman 1968). 
However, the consensus in the mainstream had also clouded over other, different voices. A 
particular tradition of broadly Keynesian thought had developed, associated principally 
with the economics department at Cambridge, England, that stressed the continuity of 
Keynes’ own thought between the Treatise on Money and the General Theory, emphasising 
particularly the radicalism of the latter. The mainstream would be dismissed as “hydraulic” 
or even “bastard” Keynesianism (Robinson 1975), stripping the insights of Keynes and 
reducing them to a bland set of theoretical propositions. An approach that explicitly 
opposes itself to the conventional model is that of the post-Keynesian school. This line of 
23 
 
thinking, growing particularly from the work of Hicks (1980), Kaldor (1977) and others in 
the later 1970s, has based itself on a re-interpretation of Keynes’ own writings. 
Against the neoclassical interpretation, as developed notably by the younger Hicks (Hicks 
1937), pre-war, and Samuelson (1948) after WW2, post-Keynesianism has built on what 
they identify as Keynes’ key concerns, throughout his life and work, with risk, uncertainty, 
and expectations. Conventional presentations of the “neoclassical synthesis” of Keynes’ 
work, typically through the use of the IS-LM standard macro model, develop a deterministic 
view of the macroeconomic world. The principal macroeconomic relationships can be 
described by a few linear (or linearisable) equations relating in consistent fashion the 
propensities to save, invest, consume and hold money. Within the loosely-defined group of 
post-Keynesians, it was the work of Wynne Godley, especially, that did the most to lay the 
foundations – and then subsequently develop – a specifically post-Keynesian interpretation 
of macroeconomics that placed the stock-flow identity at its centre. 
Distinctively, these developments initially took the form of what became known as the 
“New Cambridge” approach to macroeconomics (Dos Santos and Macedo e Silva 2010). 
Separately from direct claims about stock-flow consistency, authors associated with 
Cambridge and the Department of Applied Economics developed the “three balances” 
approach to macroeconomic issues. Sharing a family resemblance to Kalecki’s (1971) well-
known reconfiguration of national income, noting that profits are the sum of capitalist 
investment, capitalist consumption expenditures and the government deficit, minus 
workers’ saving, the three balances approach related (in an open economy setting) private, 
public, and the current account via the national income identity. 
We can extend the basic national income identity to include government and the rest of 
the world: 
        (   ) 
Note, importantly, that this is an identity: it will of necessity hold for any set of values for 
each variable. With C as private sector consumption by households, I as private sector 
investment by firms, G as government spending and (X-M) as the balance of trade. This 
implies a division of the economy into three parts: private (households and firms), public 
(government) and the rest of the world, seen here through the current account. Each of 
these sectors makes payments to the others, either as direct transfers (say in the form of 
taxes and subsidies), or as payments for services (say for labour). With T as the net taxes 
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paid to government (that is, net of transfer payments from government), Tpe as the net 
payments from the private sector to abroad, and Tge as the net payments of government to 
abroad, we have: 
                    (   )          
This can be rearranged to show the key New Cambridge relationship: 
            (       )  (           ) 
In other words, the net financial balance of the private sector (on the left-hand side) is 
equal to the (negative of the) government deficit plus the current account. This simple 
rearrangement immediately implies both the strong case for government deficit 
expenditure as a driver of private sector growth, and the need to avoid persistent current 
account deficits: both policies closely associated with the New Cambridge school, and 
Wynne Godley in particular. The appearance of persistent current account deficits in the 
UK, worsening and then becoming apparently permanent from the mid-1980s, was a 
particular source of concern for the school. It should be noted that this is already an 
economy based on cashflows, in Hyman Minsky’s sense, with economic activity determined 
by and around movements of money income rather than real balances. In Minsky’s words, 
these cash flows “are the result of (1) the income-producing system, which includes wages, 
taxes and non-financial corporate gross profits after taxes, (2) the financial structure, which 
is composed of interest, dividends, rents, and repayments on loans, and (3) the dealing or 
trading in capital assets and financial instruments.” (Minsky 1975: 118). Relatedly, we can 
see from this balance that Michal Kalecki’s well-known definition of aggregate profits will 
hold, as Godley and Lavoie indicate (2007: 37): that profits “must, by definition, be equal to 
the sum of gross investment, plus the fiscal deficit, plus  the trade surplus, plus capitalists’ 
consumption, minus workers’ savings.” (Kalecki 1971: 82-3). 
 
Stock-flow consistency, in versions derived via Cambridge rather than Yale, has these sets 
of identities at its heart. The three balances provide the rationale, in economic theory, for 
the presentation of the whole economy as the set of relationships developed between the 
three sectors: private, public, and external. They provide the rationale for describing the 
economy as consisting of these sectors since, if we follow the Keynesian logic of income 
flows, every expenditure by one sector is necessarily a source of income for another. Post-
Keynesian stock-flow consistency, then, extends this underlying (and strongly Keynesian) 
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structure with the addition of Copeland’s “moneyflows” – an explicit treatment of the 
sources and volumes of the flows of financing that relate the separate elements of the 
macroeconomy. Once these flows are included, the SFC model is complete: it should 
specify both the holdings of stocks (in the form of financial assets and liabilities, registered 
on the balance sheet) and the volumes and sources of the flows, in the form of transfers of 
funds. It is this completeness of the representation that marks the post-Keynesian SFC 
theory: rather than relying on the assumption of individual optimisation driving the 
economy back towards an equilibrium, the presumption of completeness means that, at 
any point in time, the economy is “solved”: there are no imbalances across the balance 
sheets and the matrices, and the whole economy has no unexplained “leaks” from the 
system. Godley and Cripps’ 1983 textbook, Macroeconomics, was seminal in beginning to 
demonstrate how a complete SFC model could be constructed in a broadly Keynesian 
setting, building on prior work. 
 
Model closure and behavioural functions 
One great merit of the SFC system, and certainly one claimed by its supporters, is its high 
level of generality. If, given the basic structure of the accounts and the flow relationships, 
the zero-sum conditions are observed, any set of behavioural relationships amongst the 
sectors can be used to close the system. The presence of (1) binding budget constraints and 
(2) double-entry accounting determines the whole system must be closed; and that, this 
being the case, it is overdetermined: in an SFC system of n equations, those up to (n-1) 
must be specified but n-th equation will be closed by the system itself. This implies, 
therefore, a high degree of generality to the system, if those two conditions hold. 
The selection of behavioural functions, then, can look somewhat arbitrary – there are no 
necessary constraints on the functional form beyond the need to observe the two binding 
constraints present for the whole system. Backus, Tobin and others closer to the 
neoclassical school than the post-Keynesians have tended to stress portfolio choice, agents 
like households basing current choices about asset holdings on “long-run target asset and 
wealth positions, based on current and expected interest rates, incomes and other relevant 
variables. Actual positions are then adjusted towards these targets. Transitory factors, like 
windfall gains and losses, will also influence these adjustments.” (Backus, Brainard et al. 
1980: 273). The strong implication, at least, is that some variant of rational expectations 
could form an appropriate portfolio-selection rule – that agents have strongly forward-
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looking behaviour. Godley, Lavoie, and others closer to a broadly post-Keynesian school 
have instead tended to emphasise rule-of-thumb decisionmaking, and adaptive 
expectations, in common with far earlier (and allegedly less theoretically robust) Keynesian 
model-making. There are alleged empirical benefits to this selection (Godley and Lavoie 
2007), and on the grounds of tractability the model becomes easier to solve, although it 
should be noted that the expectations formations provided in Godley and Lavoie’s textbook 
are strongly backward-looking. 
 
III. FRAMING DIFFERENT THEORIES 
Neoclassical stock-flow consistency 
We will return the post-Keynesian shortly. But this was not the only somewhat 
subterranean tradition latterly buried by the swing to microfounded models and rational 
expectations. Nor was it, necessarily the only available interpretation of the twin theories 
of Keynesian economics, and social accounting. Other options were open. A line of research 
that had identifiable roots in Keynes’ work on national income, but that rejected (explicitly 
or implicitly) much of the post-Keynesian interpretation of the General Theory system was 
also taking shape from the mid-1960s onwards.  
The consensus view, by the late 1960s, laid great store on developing a set of relationships 
within the macroeconomy centred on a development of Hicks’ IS-LM interpretation of the 
original General Theory. The focus was on equilibrium positions and the use of comparative 
statics (Samuelson 1948), combined with time-series econometric work to enable the 
parameterisation of models. But this had, as James Tobin’s Nobel lecture identified a 
number of “serious defects” that were in need of “repair”. (Tobin 1982: 172). He gave 
these as an imprecision about time, by collapsing everything into equilibrium analysis; a 
failure to fully identify relationships between stocks and flows; a failure to account for 
multiple assets, with different rates of return; and a crude approach to monetary policy in 
which the stock of money was held to be a variable under the more-or-less direct control of 
policymakers.  
As Davis (1987: 112) put it, “the equilibrium solution to a traditional flow-based 
macroeconomic model implies values for the rates of changes of stocks that the model 
takes as given... The movements of these stocks through time may change [considerably] 
the short run equilibrium itself, and the associated prices and flows. Omission of these 
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stocks from a model may therefore lead to false predictions of the consequences of policy 
changes or of exogenous shocks to the system.” By omitting to include revisions to stocks 
of (different) assets, the traditional IS-LM analysis was obscuring potentially important 
macroeconomic outcomes. A revision to this framework, incorporating flows alongside the 
stocks, could therefore in theory rescue the whole structure. Building on his earlier work in 
Brainard and Tobin (1968),  (Tobin (1969) and Backus, Brainard et al. (1980)), Tobin here 
proposed stock-flow consistency and the construction of social accounting frameworks not 
as an alternative to the existing IS-LM framework but as necessary improvement on that 
theoretical frame. 
 
This can be seen most starkly in his insistence that the necessary conditions to close the 
model – those of the budget constraint and double-entry accounting – were equivalent to 
“Walras’ Law” (Tobin 1982: 173). Walras’ Law, in Tobin’s wording, states that the “excess 
demand functions of an economic agent must sum to zero for every vector of the variables 
that are arguments in any of the functions.” It is a development and a generalisation of 
Say’s Law to multiple, interdependent markets, and it forms the absolute dead-centre of 
any neoclassical attempt at model-building, since it guarantees that a system of 
decentralised, autonomous decision-making over the distribution of commodities can 
achieve a competitive equilibrium. Here, however, the claim is being made that the 
achievement of a position in which excess demands sum to zero for the sectors does not 
depend on the optimising behaviour of agents; we have, in fact, said nothing of agents’ 
behaviour. Rather, the appearance of this strong equilibrium condition is tied to the 
presence of a budget constraint that acts as a real constraint on behaviour, and to the 
accounting convention of double-entry bookkeeping. By introducing stock-flow consistency, 
and therefore imposing the zero-sum rule on the matrices representing the economy, 
Tobin is offering a kind of short-cut to equilibrium: that the desirable conditions of general 
equilibrium modelling can be achieved without the need to specify inherently unknowable 
utility functions, or detail at length optimising behaviour. 
This represents a distinctive take on SFC, compared to the (now dominant) post-Keynesian 
variant, and came to be known as the “Yale school” (Caverzasi and Godin 2013: 7). Godley 
and Cripps (1983), in an early attempt to synthesise the post-Keynesian case, made the 
larger claim that SFC should be treated as a general set of conditions for any 
macroeconomic modelling procedure, arguing that SFC is “macroeconomic theory” (1983: 
44) – without the SFC conditions in place, macroeconomics (at least as far as the two 
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authors are concerned) cannot be performed. Tobin’s claim is tighter: that SFC is, in effect, 
a representation of a neoclassical system but one “only loosely linked” to optimising 
behaviour of agents (Tobin 1982: 174) and (for that matter) to formal general equilibrium 
(Tobin 1982: 176). The explicit recognition of stock-flow relationships immediately implies, 
however, the recognition of explicit dynamics in the model, constituting a sharp break with 
the usual IS-LM treatment. The modelling of those dynamics, however, was in line with the 
general equilibrium process (first formulated by Leon Walras) of “tâtonnement” (Brainard 
and Tobin 1968), agents being assumed to apply a partial-adjustment factor to current 
state variables until an equilibrium was once again achieved. This is an overtly neoclassical 
treatment, in that it implies both the presence of meaningful equilibrium towards which 
agents gravitate as a result of their optimising behaviour; and, further, that the treatment 
of time within the model is similar to that within general equilibrium models more general. 
Time is simply an index of events, rather than a necessary sequence: the tâtonnement of 
agents is, in this sense, indifferent to time and to the presence of prior events: each grope 
towards the equilibrium is a discrete event taking place in continuous time. Later papers by 
Tobin and his collaborators at least hinted at a break with this concept, suggesting that for 
reasons of “convenience” it was worth imagining events occurring sequentially. The 
distance, nonetheless, from the post-Keynesian SFC tradition is still substantial. 
Likewise, the absence of any specification of firms’ production and pricing decisions within 
Yale School models sets them very directly apart from those Keynesian SFC systems that 
draw on heterodox theories of the firm. Backus, Brainard et al. (1980) has no explicit 
account of firm behaviour: the entire focus of the model, which is otherwise very 
substantial, is on asset allocation decisions by households. Tobin (1982: 179) proposes a 
net investment equation that is tied to a “natural” rate of accumulation, determined by 
“growth rate of its exogenous resources as augmented by technological progress.” This 
leaves model without independent investment dynamics of the kind that post-Keynesian 
SFC research has tended to stress. 
Further, there is no explicit pricing function for firms, this being assumed to be set via the 
competitive process and therefore arriving at the usual neoclassical condition of factor 
returns being equal to factor productivities. Tobin here provides three variants of price and 
output rules: a “Keynesian” model in which output is endogenous, but price predetermined; 
a “classical” variant where output is exogenously given by the capital stock, but prices are 
endogenous; and a “mixed” version, dependent on an exogenous Philips Curve inflation-
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output trade-off. In all these cases, the underlying economy remains neoclassical, since 
even in the “Keynesian” case of endogenous Y, the long-run rate of growth and dynamics of 
the economy are determined purely by the supply-side. The endogenous Y here reflects 
merely the “hydraulic” Keynesian case, familiar from IS-LM analysis, in which an economy 
at a less than full employment equilibrium can expand output to the full employment 
equilibrium, and therefore is short-run demand-determined. At the long-run, full 
employment output, output is entirely supply-side determined.  
 An interesting paper, broadly within this approach, is provided by Patterson and 
Stephenson (1988), who adopt a specifically neoclassical approach to developing a stock-
flow consistent accounting framework for the UK economy. They argue that asset 
revaluations have important subsequent effects on income, but that conventional national 
income accounting frameworks are “poorly suited to capturing such changes, primarily 
because they are not constructed on the basis of stock-flow consistency.” (1988: 787). 
Using a definition of income derived from Hicks (1939), which in turn followed the work of 
Haig (1921), they argue from the basic Hicksian principle that a flow can be considered as 
income if it keeps net wealth intact.  
They use this framework to propose a stock-flow consistent account of the holdings of 
assets and liabilities across the usual macroeconomic sectors. The model is motivated in a 
later paper by Patterson (1990), where it is used to provide stock-flow consistent measures 
of income by UK corporations – which therefore included revaluation of assets. These two 
papers are akin to extension backwards from Tobin’s neoclassical SFC system: they move 
further away from the economic propositions contained in Tobin and Backus et al. in favour 
of providing a more robust accounting framework for the assessment of economic units. 
This illustrates something of a difficulty within the Yale approach to SFC. By focusing very 
sharply on holdings of assets and liabilities, and ensuring that flows between their holders 
were consistent, they step away from a consideration of economic issues directly. They can 
approach the same problems that more conventional general equilibrium models have. The 
accumulation of financial liabilities, and the expansion of balance sheets, may not (as 
Minsky warned) simply represent the history of an optimal series of decisions by rational 
agents. Rather, the status of balance sheets themselves can have an economic impact – 
there can be a transmission mechanism from the stock, into the flow, and then (as a 
second- or higher-order impact) back into the stock. Richard Koo’s “balance sheet recession” 
is one version of this (Koo 2008), in which the presence of highly indebted companies and 
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households forestalls recovery from the recession, but other, more complex interactions 
can be envisaged. Neoclassical models ignore this, focusing on flows only, and on net flows 
at that. The neoclassical SFC frame provided by the Yale school, while identifying a far more 
complex set of interactions amongst the different assets and liabilities that make up a real 
economy, move too far in excluding the dynamics of excess indebtedness, financial fragility, 
and so on, that have formed key parts of post-Keynesian theorising. 
This is one of the sense in which SFC provides a “natural” continuation of earlier post-
Keynesian theory. It allows the direct explication of complex interactions amongst different 
stock elements within the economy, and relates them directly to observed flows of income 
amongst sectors and agents. It is entirely possible to build a neoclassical version of this, 
losing some of the depth of these interactions but (relative to the “representative agent” 
paradigm) gaining, as Tobin suggests, a richness of asset classes and interactions amongst 
different asset-holders. However, the gains from following this research strategy do not 
seem as significant as those to be found in making a more substantive break with 
neoclassicism.  
 
Post-Keynesian dilemmas 
The relationship between SFC and post-Keynesianism has always been close, Victoria Chick 
describing SFC as one of the school’s principal achievements (Chick 1995). Godley and 
Lavoie (2007), for their part, noting the Luigi Pasinetti’s claims of a post-Keynesian “failure” 
to establish a “permanent winning paradigm” (Pasinetti 2005: 839) in opposition to the 
neoclassical mainstream, offer SFC as the means to organise the many (otherwise 
somewhat disparate) strands of post-Keynesian thought. Pasinetti’s own description of 
post-Keynesian merits tended towards highlighting the research methodology, rather than 
on the content of the theoretical research itself (Pasinetti 2005: 841-844). Similarly, Sheila 
Dow’s appeal for an “open” approach to the study of economics, this marking it as a 
distinctively post-Keynesian approach (Dow 2007), or the research focus of Tony Lawson 
and others in epistemological and philosophical questions (Lawson 1988), all tended to 
demarcate post-Keynesianism not as theoretical alternative to neoclassicism, with a hard 
core of robust and defensible claims about the world (Lakatos, Worrall et al. 1983), but  
more as a loose affiliation of related, philosophical questions about the nature of 
economics as such.  
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Arestis (1996), in an optimistic vein, has argued that, after moving beyond an initial critique 
of the neoclassical orthodoxy, post-Keynesian economics was now approaching a 
“coherence”. He identifies three major traditions that post-Keynesianism has drawn from. 
The first is a focus on uncertainty, which determines the appearance of the institution of 
money (Minsky 1975; Davidson 1978). The second is “essentially Kaleckian”, and most 
closely associated with Joan Robinson. It emphasises “effective demand failure”, with 
investment driving the economy. It introduces a heterogeneity of agents, determined by 
their relationships as classes of asset-owners (or non-owners). And, as Arestis notes, it 
follows a line of thought right back to Marx’s reproduction schemes. The third strand is an 
institutionalist line of thought that owes much to Thorstein Veblen, stressing the 
predominant role of institutions in shaping economic behaviour, and a closer attention to 
strictly microeconomic issues than perhaps appear in Kalecki and others (Arestis 1996: 113-
114). 
Arestis argues all three can, with more-or-less stretching, be brought into alignment within 
a coherent post-Keynesian system. The starting point of a monetary production economy 
(rather than a neoclassical barter system) immediately pushes money centre-stage; the 
treatment of history and time as meaningful in the development of the economy, with 
economic processes modelled as strongly non-ergodic, is another. Others have followed 
Arestis’ lead, proposing reconciliations between post-Keynesianism and the circuitist school 
(Fontana 2000),  or the presence of institutions in shaping expectations (Dunn 2000), 
amongst others. This may not, however, have been completely successful. Walters and 
Young, attacking post-Keynesianism in toto, record it as a failure: an excessive (and 
ultimately unproductive) concentration on the faults of neoclassicism helping disguise an 
internal incoherency. There is no “specific unit of analysis” in post-Keynesianism. There is 
no “distinctive theory of economic agency”. Its striving after coherency is itself just a poor 
attempt to ape the “comprehensiveness” of the mainstream. It lacks a consistent 
methodology, and its appeals to “realism” are not sufficient to develop a theoretical 
organisation of the empirical evidence (Walters and Young 1997). Arestis, Dunn, and 
Sawyer, responding, attempt to deal with this broadside, but end up conceding much 
ground to their critics: defining post-Keynesianism by its distinctive concern with monetary 
effective demand, they end up favouring a “relatively narrow” interpretation of post-
Keynesianism that excludes the neo-Ricardians and only partially includes the work of 
Kalecki (Arestis, Dunn et al. 1999: 545). This “relatively narrow” interpretation, however, 
allows for an apparently wide range of opinions on the single thing post-Keynesianism is 
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most identified with, theories of money (Arestis, Dunn et al. 1999: 539). It is hard, given 
this, to escape the impression that post-Keynesianism, by the turn of the millennium, had 
developed itself to the point of a critique, but had been unable to progress much further. 
Dunn’s proposal that the “open systems” approach could be treated as the distinctive post-
Keynesian claim appeared to pose more questions than it answered: that the post-
Keynesians failure to provide definite methodological or theoretical claims was itself the 
definition of post-Keynesianism; a somewhat unsatisfactory conclusion (Dunn 2000). 
 
IV. SFC AND POST-KEYNESIANISM 
SFC as the resolution of post-Keynesianism 
It is in this context that the role of post-Keynesian SFC becomes clear. SFC can certainly be 
presented as a robust alternative to critique, in seeking to identify at the centre of post-
Keynesian thought a set of both techniques of analysis and commonly-accepted claims 
about the world that provide a distinctive research methodology. Godley and Lavoie’s 2007 
textbook is written with something like this purpose in mind, akin to that provided by 
Samuelson (1948) for the post-war neoclassical synthesis variant of Keynesianism.  We will 
be using it heavily throughout this thesis, treating it as the synthesis of a great mass of 
existing work by both authors into a single, comprehensive system. Godley, as mentioned, 
has written on SFC issues since at least the late 1970s (and touched on them prior to that), 
with Godley and Cripps (1983), Godley (1996), Godley and Lavoie (2005) and Godley and 
Lavoie (2007) leading amongst his prolific output. Marc Lavoie has been active for a less 
extended period, but the major contribution prior to the Monetary Economics textbook can 
be found at Lavoie and Godley (2001), while Lavoie (2009) usefully summarises the state of 
play in relations between post-Keynesianism, the mainstream, and SFC. 
It does not quite seem to follow, then, as Dos Santos (2006), that SFC was the “natural” 
outcome of this style of Keynesian thinking: there is a need to win the case for the 
construction of SFC, along broadly post-Keynesian lines, that does not follow automatically 
from the acceptance of a post-Keynesian set of methodological or epistemological 
principles. The sheer intellectual effort applied by post-Keynesian enthusiasts for SFC 
suggests as much. Godley and Lavoie note “alternative closures” to the SFC model in an 
appendix, including the neoclassical case of exogenous money as a basically special case 
(2007: 129-130). They prefer to present their own post-Keynesian variant of SFC as a kind 
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of general theory of the economy, under which particular theoretical cases can be 
presented. The view the SFC conditions of coherency and consistency as unbreakable, but 
(given that these constraints are met) alternative “closures” and “causalities” can be 
specified – a “closure” being the complete specification of endogenous and exogenous 
variables within the system, and the set of relationships proposed amongst them. Within 
the SFC framework, different closures are available, including the Tobinesque neoclassical 
closures. Indeed, Godley and Lavoie acknowledge their debts to Brainard and Tobin (1968) 
in providing the stepping stones towards their own treatment of household portfolio 
choice (2007: 15) 
The allegedly “natural” relationship between post-Keynesianism and SFC can be seen most 
clearly in the treatment of the credit-creation process. Although not obligatory, specific 
inclusion of a banking sector and the direct treatment of monetary flows and stocks within 
the balance sheet lend themselves to treating money as endogenous. Money, in these SFC 
models, is created within the balance sheet and then circulates – typically as the result of a 
bank creating a deposit while it creates a loan, although direct government (“fiat”) money 
can also be modelled for. This follows a clear line of thought in post-Keynesian research 
that the money supply should not be treated as an exogenous factor, but brought directly 
into the economic analysis and treated as subject to economic (rather than policy) impacts. 
Joan Robinson (1956) claimed as much in the 1950s; Nicholas Kaldor suggested the same, 
arguing strongly for “reverse causation” of interest rates (1970); and Basil Moore (1988) 
presented the classic “horizontalist” case for endogenous money supply, even if not all 
post-Keynesians entirely accepted his conclusions. Godley and Lavoie view endogenous 
money as one of the outstanding features of their own textbook SFC presentation (2007: 
127-8), and preferable to alternative “mainstream” specifications.  
In a similar vein, while Kaleckian mark-up pricing is not obligatory in SFC models, it has 
come to be closely associated with them as the most obvious means to introduce 
production motivated by monetary considerations within the balance sheet framework. 
Godley and Lavoie, again, synthesise their own and others’ past work to present the case 
for treating firms as profit maximisers who respond passively to demand, but establish 
their own prices. This allows them, following Felipe and McCombie (2006), to treat the 
neoclassical production function as an “artefact” – an unhelpful relic within economics – on 
the basis of its empirical failings, and then to propose Kaleckian firm behaviour as a viable 
alternative (Godley and Lavoie 2007: 20). 
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Indeed, to the extent that SFC follows “naturally” from any post-Keynesian approach, it 
perhaps is closest to the “three balances” of the New Cambridge school in emphasising the 
closed and complete nature of the major macroeconomic relationships: everything is tied 
to everything else, with the balance sheet then providing levels of disaggregation away 
from the three core sectors of private, public, and the external balance. This is to adopt, it 
would seem, quite a different set of concerns from those more associated with Dow, 
Lawson, Davidson (1978), and other authors identifying post-Keynesianism as a 
methodology or epistemology for theory, rather than a theory as such. Concerns like 
uncertainty, or the status of economic facts in relation to the real world, do not enter and 
are not explicitly dealt with: in terms of Arestis’ categorization, SFC is close to the second, 
Kaleckian strand, but has relatively little to do with the others. Without necessarily making 
the line of descent as clear as those circuitist school (Graziani 1995), the treatment of the 
economy as fundamentally a closed circuit of monetary events is very obviously related to 
Marx’s reproduction schemes, and Schumpeter’s flows of income, in addition to Keynes’ 
own “circular flow” (Keynes 1936). The problems within post-Keynesianism are resolved by, 
rather akin to Arestis et al., a process of exclusion from the corpus. 
There have, nonetheless, been attempts to integrate these different elements of post-
Keynesian thought within SFC modelling. Dafermos (2012) provides an SFC version of 
liquidity preference theory alongside a treatment of uncertainty, both being tied into the 
“the decision-making process of households, firms, and commercial banks.” (2012: 773). An 
exogenous rise in “perceived uncertainty”, indexed with a single variable, can be a “root 
cause of a recessionary process” (ibid.). However, the treatment of uncertainty here is a 
little unsatisfactory: first, it is wholly exogenous, quite contrary to the treatment suggested 
within post-Keynesianism of uncertainty as endogenous to a competitive economy 
(Davidson 1996); second, it is a purely additive element within decision-making: it is not the 
basis on which decisions are made (as in the more usual post-Keynesian treatment), but 
something closer to the neoclassical version of uncertainty, that of “risk”: an additional 
stochastic element within the economy that depends, ultimately, on our lack of knowledge 
about the future, rather than on the presence of uncertainty as such. Neither condition is 
ideal, and nor is the appearance of uncertainty as an index, clearly breaching the usual 
post-Keynesian claim of a kind of inherent uncertainty, irreducible to a number. It implies 
that we could change the name of Dafermos’ “perceived uncertainty” variable to some 
other exogenous influence – sunspots would be traditional, following Jevons – and 
generate results that would have a similarly valid economic interpretation.  
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The issue that SFC runs up against here is that tension, buried in post-Keynesian thinking, 
between the alleged empirical “realism” of a model, and the need for theoretical 
coherence. It has, as Walters and Young rather suggest, something that has never been 
wholly resolved by post-Keynesians who, while rejecting the anti-realism of Friedman’s 
classic methodological statement for neoclassical economics (Friedman 1953), do not then 
have a watertight account of their own methodology. Appeals to mixed methods and to 
“open systems” (Dow 2007) are insufficient, in the eyes of post-Keynesianism’s critics, to 
resolve what appear to be significant gaps in the post-Keynesian account of economics. The 
proposal that SFC is the “natural” development of this putative research programme, or 
(less strongly) that it can start to resolve some of its dilemmas have to be seen in this light. 
It is not, however, so clear that SFC in practice has actually provided a particularly definitive 
answer. 
 
 
Solving the models 
 
This can be seen when attempts are made not just to develop the outline of a 
macroeconomy on SFC principles, but to develop formal solutions to the whole system. As 
Caverzasi and Godin (2013) point out, there are “two mains ways of solving an economic 
model: numerically and analytically”. For the neoclassical school, while there may be 
significant issues involved in either – most notably as model complexity increases – there is 
an obvious order of priority. A model should first be solved analytically, demonstrating the 
desirable property of stability over time, and then this can be treated as the baseline case 
for simulations. It is, of course, possible to try and develop models backwards, using 
“atheoretic” empirical techniques (say an unrestricted vector autoregression), but it is 
precisely the potential openness of such methods that is treated as a problem: the sets of 
relationships that an atheoretical, backward-looking empirical model presents need not, it 
can be argued, hold for the forward-looking model that we wish to develop. Better, in the 
neoclassical case, to develop first a model, detailing the expected relationships between 
variables, and the restrictions needed to be imposed, and then test this model against 
reality than try to coax reality into the shape of a model. Of course, huge problems may still 
present themselves – supposedly cutting-edge Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) models are notoriously difficult to fit against real-world data, model development 
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(for all its scientific pretensions) being still something of a black art. There is, nonetheless, a 
clarity of method, and an ideal to which researchers can aspire. 
For SFC, this clear relationship between empirical data and analytical claims does not exist 
– and, we would argue, to a great extent cannot exist. There is no obvious hierarchy of 
research approach between numerical solutions and the analytical, but the two embody 
different forms of knowledge and research methods. Numerical solutions can now be 
relatively quickly divined, even for very complex models, using a computer; Caverzasi and 
Godin (2013: 8) give a brief outline of the method: find the parameters; calibrate the model 
and find the steady state; with a steady state established, run numerical simulations. They 
claim that, since there are effectively no restrictions on the complexity of the model built – 
the number of sectors, variables included, proposed relationships amongst them, and so on 
– more “realistic” models can be created. 
This is, however, a questionable realism. SFC models, of necessity, embody two strong 
theoretical claims about the world: first, that the relationships they describe are the best 
available representation of the relationships that obtain in the real world; second, that 
consistency applies across the whole matrix, with the zero-sum rule applying throughout. 
These are not theoretically neutral propositions: the claim that the behavioural 
relationships within a model are the best possible representation of the relationships that 
obtain in the real world means that other plausible relationships have been excluded. 
Where these relationships and their parameterisations have been obtained through 
econometric estimation, this process of exclusion is explicit. Second, as we have touched 
on (and as we will return to), the belief that consistency is a necessary condition for a 
monetary economy is not, in fact, correct; for now, we shall note only that this, too, 
contains a clear theoretical claim about the world – in particular, that the rules of 
accountancy provide the best representation of the allocation decisions of those within an 
economy.  
Neither of these things are theoretically neutral. We are not approaching the data blind, or 
in an atheoretic fashion. At the same time, we are not restricting the model to a significant 
extent, which leads into the kinds of problems (Lavoie and Godley 2001: 296) indicate – we 
cannot know for sure if any given point of stability in the model is global, or merely local. 
Dos Santos and Macedo e Silva (2009), in presenting a model of financialisation in SFC form, 
indicate that the sheer mathematical complexity of even a fairly minimal SFC model (the 
backwash from the quadruple-accounting rule) can be prohibitive. The logic of simulation 
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will not be immediately clear, in the absence of an analytical solution, and the path to any 
point of stability determined numerically may not be clear – even if the point is itself 
relevant, given the possible presence of other locally stable points. Starting parameters 
themselves may be arbitrarily selected and, given the demands of calibration and the 
requirement to build stable models, may become increasingly arbitrary as the model 
develops – subject to revision on ad hoc basis. 
All of these issues point back in the same direction: that numerical solutions to SFC depend 
on an appeal to empiricism, but that – in practice - the pure appeal to empiricism is 
compromised by the dependency on some theoretical claims. The needs to observe 
coherency and to find points of stability, thus rendering the model tractable, themselves 
create barriers to a purely empirical approach. It cannot be guaranteed, from numerical 
simulations alone, that any proposed set of results derived from an SFC model are 
especially robust – a problem that will only magnify with increased complexity.  
This is the problem with appeals to “realism”: without following Friedman’s strongly anti-
realist claims about the methodology of economics, it should be clear that merely 
reproducing reality does not help a greater understanding of that reality. A map on a scale 
of 1:1 would be useless; and while SFC does build in some minimum conditions to allow its 
own internal coherence to function, this is both a deviation away from the appeal to pure 
empiricism (as conducted in an atheoretical VAR) and, at the same time, neither baseline 
condition by itself is enough to allow the reliable exclusion of any given set of relationships 
or parameters.  
If we turn instead to analytical solutions, we have (as might be expected) the obverse of 
these issues. An analytical solution will generally be, of necessity, derived from a smaller 
and less complex model than those obtainable through numerical methods, but this should 
not necessarily be confused with a reduction in “realism”. It is exactly the combination of 
(some) theoretical restrictions and the (plentiful) complexity of results that poses a 
challenge for the interpretation of numerically-solved SFC models. It is not clear what 
“realism” would obtain if it is not possible to be certain any given stable point or observed 
set of dynamics emerges from any particular set of relationships. Analytical solutions, by 
their nature, avoid this issue: it is perfectly reasonable to argue that greater “realism” can 
obtain as a result. 
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However, any SFC model contains within itself two direct appeals to empiricism – first, that 
the presentation in the balance sheets and transactions matrices directly reflects the actual 
balances of stocks and flows in the economy; second, that the restrictions applied in the 
zero-sum constraints are in fact realistic accounts of economic behaviour, a claim that is 
particularly empirical in the case of the accounting rules. The analytical solutions provided 
work within that set up. The claim for SFC’s superiority over alternative methods is that it 
embodies particular empirically observed features of the world: that the balance sheets we 
see in front of us are the best possible representation of the economic reality, and that 
there would be no other better system available for its analysis. This is a strongly empiricist 
claim – it says, at root, that the economic data we have is not just reasonably good, but 
must be the best possible system for representing the economy. Any errors appearing will 
be contingent, rather than systemic. In the case of an analytical solution, we do not use 
direct values; rather, we would be operating with their algebraic ghosts within the SFC 
system. An unexamined empiricism would here turn into an unexamined set of theoretical 
claims – about the completeness of the representation in particular. 
In neither case are the underlying problems with the post-Keynesian approach successfully 
resolved. We can see them re-emerging in one of the most ambitious recent attempts to 
apply the SFC approach to a real-world economy, the Levy Institute’s ongoing modelling of 
the Greek economy (Papadimitriou, Zezza et al. 2013). This is an SFC model of Greece, 
estimated from quarterly data over the last three decades, and derived from the Levy 
Institute’s US modelling. It builds in the New Cambridge results concerning the three 
balances, and adds alongside them holdings of assets and liabilities across the major 
macroeconomic sectors. It consists of 68 equations in total – an enormous number, clearly 
well beyond the reach of an analytical solution, and therefore dependent on simulation 
methods. This is, however, where some difficulties appear: the simulation results appear 
robust, and have delivered stark results about the impact of EU/IMF/ECB austerity on 
Greece. But as the authors note, breaks in trends and the weakness of Greek data more 
generally have meant the whole system has to be treated with some caution. This is deeper 
than simply a data-collection problem: since the model is solved numerically, and since it is 
so complex, either of those features could be producing spurious results somewhere within 
the simulation: and a simple process of path-dependency would be enough to turn a 
misspecified structural break, or a plain accounting error, into a seemingly permanent 
economic feature. In the absence of an analytical solution, it is difficult to distinguish 
interacting parts of the whole model. 
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Of course, this is not to deny the potential utility of an SFC model over and above the more 
conventional modelling strategies that work in general equilibrium settings. Events since 
the financial crash of 2007-8 – and indeed the crash itself- have exposed some of their 
particular inadequacies and in a number of decisive respects (to be explored more 
thoroughly in the following chapter) SFC represents an advance. A post-crash survey of the 
macroeconomic literature (Bezemer 2009) credited Godley and his collaborators as 
amongst the very few economists who both anticipated the crisis and detailed its 
proximate causes, in the build-up of household indebtedness, and provided a formal model 
to demonstrate this (Godley and Zezza 2006). Likewise, similar flow-of-funds arguments 
have been applied for the eurozone, suggesting a more prolonged crisis than conventional 
models would point towards. Kinsella and Aliti (2012) used a stock-flow consistent 
methodology to simulate the impact of sharp austerity measures in Ireland, their model 
correctly predicting that the shock would be far greater than general equilibrium models 
implies. Khalili and Kinsella (2011) have presented a model of contagion effects for a small 
open economy, that allows the interactions between indebted households and firms’ own 
decisions’ in the event of a crisis to be presented in a natural fashion. Similarly, Dos Santos 
(2005) exploration of income and distribution effects, through a disaggregation of the 
household sector, allowed a more convincing description of the inequalities associated with 
financialisation than has been obtainable using general equilibrium methods. Barwell and 
Burrows (2011) have used flow-of-funds data to show that, for the admittedly extreme 
case of the UK, the immediate causes of the crash were the gross imbalances that emerged 
on financial actors’ balance sheets, and the relationship between these balances and the 
productive economy.  
However, Kinsella (2011) elsewhere has argued that stock-flow consistent models are best 
treated as “thought exercises” largely due to their lack of microfoundations. Caversazi and 
Godin (2013), in their own literature review, have followed a similar line of thought, 
suggesting that recent efforts to include agent-based modelling (ABM) techniques within 
stock-flow models could present a beneficial line of research enquiry, claiming that the 
“combination of the flexibility of agent-based modelling with the consistency between 
stocks and flows of the system provides a framework that ensures the compatibility of 
real and financial variables” (2013: 12). The focus of this paper, as we get into more 
detail in the next chapter, is on the criteria of stock-flow consistency themselves, not 
on the behavioural relationships within the model, so we will not be considering 
whether ABM can viably resolve some of the difficulties SFC runs into in its behavioural 
40 
 
specifications, and generate plausible-seeming results. Seppecher (2012) provides one 
sophisticated example of ABM within an SFC frame, finding that labour market 
flexibility is not associated with improved macroeconomic performance.  
Our concern here, however, is whether the alleged structure of stock-flow consistency 
can be considered genuinely consistent and internally coherent; nonetheless, whilst 
ABM methods have an appeal and, given the theoretical crisis of representative agent 
models, and the proliferation of computing power, are becoming increasingly 
fashionable, they appear to offer a step away from the deep insight of post-Keynesian 
SFC that the macro informs and structures the micro (Pasinetti 2005). Whether the two 
paradigms can be usefully matched to each other remains an open question, and one 
beyond the limits of the current paper. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an historical and critical introduction to SFC models, attempting 
to show how the current, post-Keynesian, treatment of stock-flow consistent principles is a 
development of three separate strands of prior research: the circular flow models of 
(classically) Schumpeter, Marx and Keynes; the procedures of national income accounting, 
as extended by Copeland’s “flow-of-funds”; and, most distinctively for post-Keynesians, the 
treatment of money supply as endogenous and not merely a veil on real transactions.  
We attempted to show that this background in theory has helped drive current SFC 
research in particular directions, most especially following the publication of Godley and 
Lavoie’s Monetary Economics in 2007, which this paper will treat as providing the paradigm 
model. The line of intellectual travel taken, however, has still left a series of unresolved 
theoretical dilemmas and inconsistencies within SFC modelling. The next chapter, 
nonetheless, seeks to demonstrate the superiority of SFC over general equilibrium 
modelling. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM AND STOCK FLOW CONSISTENCY 
 
Introduction 
Marc Lavoie has elsewhere argued that SFC fulfils one of Pasinetti’s “constructive features” 
of the Cambridge Keynesian school – “the need for internal consistency” (Lavoie 2008), 
333).  The possibility of organising the otherwise significantly variegated schools of 
heterodox economics around a single framing device is, of course, highly appealing. When 
set against the apparent rigour and obvious uniformity of the dominant neoclassical 
paradigm, the lack of cohesion in heterodoxy looks like both a serious intellectual and 
political weakness. 
But to what extent does SFC constitute a genuine alternative to the dominant paradigm of 
neoclassical macroeconomics? Research, although as we have seen now gathering pace, 
remains in practice at an early stage, and in any case constitutes only a tiny fraction of the 
immense volumes of neoclassical work now being produced – both inside academia and 
out. Nonetheless, it is useful at this early stage to examine closely some of the strong 
claims made for SFC modelling, with a view to suggesting refinements (or rejections) of 
particular lines of thought as needed. 
This chapter starts by developing a simple, theoretical general equilibrium model of the 
macroeconomy, of the kind used to construct more complex Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) models. A number of problems within the model are highlighted. A 
simple SFC model is then developed to show how some of these features can be excluded. 
The aim is to both introduce the core SFC model and its claims, but also to show that whilst 
SFC ditches some of the more obviously unpalatable features of general equilibrium 
modelling (and neoclassicism more generally), it retains more similarities than perhaps 
some of its proponents would wish.  
 
I. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELLING 
General equilibrium and the macroeconomy 
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The idea of the macroeconomy – of the whole economy organised as a system of related 
institutions – only re-entered the mainstream of economic thought from a combination of 
factors: the publication of Keynes’ General Theory helped systematise for a mainstream 
theoretical audience some of the key relationships between aggregate variables, 
particularly following explicatory work of John Hicks (1937); the construction of increasingly 
functional national accounts from the mid-1920s onwards, and the publication of Kuznets’ 
1934 national accounts for the US in particular helped provide the empirical foundations on 
which theoretical work and policy prescriptions could be based; the Second World War, 
with its demands for effective planning and national accounting further accelerated the 
drive; and the steady progress of mathematical techniques in economics, helped further 
define the subject. By the mid-1960s, at least, economics was divided into two branches – 
that of microeconomics, concerned with the relationships amongst agents, and 
macroeconomics, concerned with the relationship amongst aggregates. The latter was 
dominated theoretically by a variant of Keynes’ General Theory system, the “Hicksian 
synthesis”, combined with some econometric specifications of key aggregate relationships, 
most notably the Philips’ Curve employment-inflation trade-off. 
This sharp distinction between the micro and the macro, however, came under pressure as 
the macro models themselves appeared to lose their explanatory capacity. The crises of the 
late 1960s onwards helped popularise a series of revisions to the basic Keynesian structure, 
the notable amongst the first being Milton Friedman’s expectations-based adaptation of 
the basic Philips Curve, resulting in a long-run “natural rate of unemployment”. These 
modifications had a general tendency to reintroduce the concerns of microeconomics with 
market clearance and (following Muth) the rationality of expectations. They were given a 
more systematic treatment in the Lucas Critique (Lucas 1976). This is the classic statement 
of the inadmissibility, in macroeconomic modelling, of behavioural variables not defined by 
strict rationality. Any rational agent, observing a model in use, would be able to adapt their 
behaviour to the assumption in the model so as to maximise their own utility. It is therefore 
not possible to use macroeconometric modelling consistently on anything other than a 
strictly microfounded basis. Correlations that were observed in the past may turn out to be 
spurious for future events, particularly given the presence of the Critique. 
 
Microfoundations and models 
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It was this line of thinking that helped steer macroeconomics, over the last few decades, 
towards its preference for analytically microfounded models based on the axiom of rational, 
forward-looking intertemporal maximising behaviour, and market clearance – with greater 
or less deviations from the latter, depending on preference. Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) became something approaching the gold standard – irrespective of 
well-known difficulties in calibrating and using the models (Buiter 2009). 
Policymaking, within this environment, began to be thought of as a kind of game for 
policymakers, in which decisions they made had to be accounted for (like any other game) 
in the decisions of other agents, all operating with a common knowledge assumption 
(Kydland and Prescott 1982). The net result of this was to, first, help shift macroeconomic 
policymaking away from directly interventionist methods, and towards the development of 
a passive government model, given theoretical expression in the New Consensus in 
Macroeconomics (NCM) (Arestis 2009). Second, it helped reinforce the tendency within 
macroeconomics towards a focus on strictly theoretical concerns: developing and refining 
the model, rather than providing fresh policy insight, in the belief (as expressed by himself 
in his 2003 American Economics Association Presidential address) that “the problem of 
depressions has been solved. Macroeconomics should move on to other subjects.” Having 
solved essentially all the major questions, orthodox macroeconomics had little more to 
offer policymakers beyond short-term forecasting and some general prescriptions 
concentrating on the supply-side. 
The fatal conceit of microfounded models was that the Lucas Critique, which depended on 
the inherent instability of observed parameters, arising from the act of their observation, 
could be solved by attempting to build models around unobserved parameters: the 
underlying structures of tastes that existed somewhere inside the rational agents’ heads, 
these preferences then driving their observed behaviour. Subsequent attempts to resolve 
the issues of calibration that arose, often by introducing, in somewhat ad hoc fashion, 
deviations from strictly rational behaviour (Weber 2000); more recently, the rich body of 
literature developing around “behavioural economics” has driven more consistent efforts 
to align the strict requirements of rationality conceived as a dynamic programming 
problem, to the “rationality” of actual human beings (Akerlof and Shiller 2009). 
As Robert Solow has suggested, however, this is asking for corrections to a view of the 
world that is a “simple, extreme… and irrelevant special case” (Solow 2008). The belief that 
choices about fundamentally unobserved parameters, based on a particular mode of 
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deductive reasoning, could reasonably or consistently be applied to heterogeneous 
economic agents, is fundamentally flawed: it lacks any reasonable methodological or 
epistemological grounding. 
Indeed, the situation is somewhat worse than this since, as we have suggested earlier in 
covering the post-Keynesian literature, the economy is beset by a fundamental category of 
uncertainty. This is distinct from the “risk” that the DSGE models otherwise focus on, in the 
sense that it is precisely not an additive stochastic forecasting error that, if aggregated 
across individuals, can approach an expectation of zero over time. Rather, it is constitutive 
of the economy itself: it is structured into both what it means for individuals to make 
decisions, and for how economic institutions – most especially, as the post-Keynesians 
argue, that of money – actually organise themselves. In particular, DSGE models are only 
“dynamic” in the weak sense that they allow for the adjustment over time of agents to 
random “shocks”, here conceived as deviations from a fundamentally stable underlying 
structure – itself derived from assumptions about agents’ behaviour. Within this 
framework, whatever deviations are introduced to that behaviour – and however 
consistent they may appear to be with some results derived from experimental psychology 
– the modelling will never function correctly. Systemic shocks with multiple impacts, like 
the crash of 2008, will appear solely as an edition of an exceptionally rare, exceptionally 
large exogenous impact: rather than, as the evidence suggests, a surprisingly (and 
increasingly) frequent occurrence globally (Claessens 2013: 26). The focus on individual 
behaviour disguises the aggregate. 
Yet those aggregates cannot be so easily excluded. The most elementary accounting for a 
representative agent’s behaviour will include a budget constraint. This will be dependent 
on both the agent’s wealth, and their income, and will provide the hard barrier against 
which the optimisation is specified: the dynamic problem the agent needs to solve is 
precisely the maximisation of a (given, unobserved) utility function through a series of 
decision about the amount of labour supplied and holdings of forms of assets. 
By itself, this is an open-ended question: it implies no further alterations to any other 
agents’ sets of balances and, indeed, given the nature of a “representative agent” 
modelling procedure, no other agents actually exist. Yet, as SFC insists upon, all forms of 
financial transaction necessarily involve the movement of both assets (on one side) and 
liabilities (on the other). This is how financial objects exist in the economy – including credit 
or fiat money. By ignoring, in practice, the double-sided nature of these transactions, DSGE 
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implicitly presents the economy as a system of net rather than gross flows of financial 
assets. Assumed, beneath the representative agent modelling, is the presence of a 
completely passive contrary balance sheet that allows the agent to make her decisions over 
the types and range of any particular asset class that exists. 
This is a problematic representation, for two reasons that we will cover in more detail 
shortly. For now, however, the system as presented is left open and underdetermined, with 
no restrictions on the dynamic path of the economy over time. Closure is provided by the 
assumption of competitive factor markets, in which factors of production are paid their 
marginal products, and in the assumption that all firms are owned by households. The 
combination of both restrictions acts to ensure that, in this real-terms economy, all flows of 
real output return back to the factors of production – and then, ultimately, back to the 
household that, in turn, allocates available resources.  
Buried underneath this, of course, is a development of Say’s Law: the assertion that, since 
markets clear, demand must equal supply: since all suppliers are owned by all purchasers, 
and all purchasers are owned by all suppliers, Say’s Law (or, more technically, Walras’ Law) 
must hold in all states of the world. The system is both closed, and – via optimisation – 
finds an equilibrium steady-state. Over time, it will be ergodic: mean-reverting around a 
trend.  
 
A bare-bones general equilibrium model 
We can, then, see the problems involved by using a rudimentary DSGE-type model, derived 
from the textbook presentation in (Blanchard and Fischer 1996: ch.4). For a single, 
representative household, with Ramsey saving behaviour, selling its labour-power and 
holding a single asset other than money, the household faces an optimisation problem to 
maximise its own utility given asset holdings over time. 
Money is incorporated via the short-cut of presenting it directly in the utility function. This 
is standard procedure in these exercises, and can be presented as functionally equivalent 
to a more comprehensive specification of money as a necessary technology to facilitate 
exchange (Feenstra 1986), as in applying the Clower constraints to the objective function 
(Clower 1967). Note for now, however, that this is a weak specification of money as both 
solely outside money – outside the banking system, which does not exist in the model – 
and with money acting fundamentally as a means of exchange and little else. Based on 
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(Sidrauski 1967), the key maximisation problem for the economy is that faced by the 
“representative agent” household. In the absence of a government, with c and m as 
consumption and real money balances per capita; r and w as the real rates of interest and 
wages respectively; and C, K, M and N as the nominal consumption, nominal capital stock, 
nominal money balances, and the population,3 we have the following objective function: 
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This can be solved as a problem in linear optimisation, although more complex, non-linear 
specifications of the u(.) utility function may involve some linearisation of the underlying 
function, perhaps through taking logs.4 On the basis of optimising decisions taken by the 
household, confronting a series of (clearing) markets and holding an allocation of resources, 
the model can be closed by assuming competitive factor markets and a constant returns to 
scale technology accessed by firms. The production function gives us national income: 
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And, with constant returns to scale, we can normalise to per capita terms via 
Y=F(K/N,1)=f(k) to gives us these optimality condtions: 
    ( ) 
   ( )     ( ) 
That is, factors are paid their marginal products in equilibrium. This is, by definition, a 
stable and complete specification of an economy. Critically, here, we can see already that 
the limited conception of money (as outside money, and as a direct component of the 
utility function) allows that no monetary crisis can exist: there can be no breakdown in the 
functioning of the money system. Fluctuations, in practice, occur solely on the real side. In 
the so-called “New Keynesian” extensions of this basic model, imperfections are introduced, 
creating the possibility of deviations, over extended periods of time, away from trend as a 
result of failures of market to clear. But these (often ad hoc) additions to the underlying 
model do not change its core features in any meaningful way. 
 
                                                          
3 Population here treated as interchangeable with the labour force, given a constant participation rate. 
4 This introduces further difficulties in that much of the complexity of the potentially non-linear relationships are assumed 
away to ensure a stable equilibrium point is reached. This difficulty is not, however, central to the argument that follows. 
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Net versus gross balances 
It can be seen immediately that the above is strictly a net representation of asset holdings. 
Even with the simplified, single-asset presentation as here, the structure of the model 
concerns solely discrete choices over stocks of assets. It does not capture the flows of the 
different forms of wealth, ignoring the gross balance of assets held. 
This is an omission, because the same net holdings of assets may in fact cover for quite 
different gross holdings, showing quite different underlying financial flows. By, in effect, 
disguising these gross holdings and gross flows, netting off assets and balances can lead to 
peculiar results, as Victoria Chick has noted. The argument that “only net private sector 
wealth is relevant to private sector spending *the net wealth doctrine+… contains a fallacy,” 
since existing debt “will discourage consumption (encourage saving) in order to accumulate 
money to pay it off, but it is precisely in order to spend that one goes into debt.” The first 
part relates to portfolio holdings at the start of the period; the second relates to within-
period changes to holdings, with the stock of “outstanding non-money claims” at any point 
in time being seen as liabilities by the issuer, but assets for those holding them. “If the 
burden to the debtor cancels the positive value to the holder, the net wealth doctrine 
predicts that no expenditure will take place; net wealth has not increased.” But this then 
“begs the question” as to why anyone would contract debt in the first place, if changes in 
debt produce no changes to net wealth and therefore no changes in consumption. This is 
precisely an issue in which the distinction between stocks (held at the start of a period) and 
flows (changes within a period) matter greatly, and where it is therefore necessary to 
examine gross holdings of assets. (Chick 1977: 79-80) 
This relates directly to the concept of equilibrium employed within general equilibrium 
theory. As Foley (1975) neatly demonstrates, with an assumption of “perfect foresight on 
average”, there is no distinction to be made in asset markets between stock and flow 
equilibria. In rational expectations models, then, there is no difficulty in constructing 
equilibrium models around only stocks or only flows, since equilibrium in one implies 
equilibrium in the other. As Foley and Sidrauski put it earlier, in describing Arrow-Debreu 
equilibrium: 
“in this situation each individual knows all future prices in all contingencies, 
and these future prices actually occur. Each firm or household can choose a 
path for investment or consumption, and the choice of path simultaneously 
49 
 
implies a portfolio of assets at each instant. Under these strong hypotheses 
there is no need to distinguish… between stock decisions and flow decisions, 
because they are always mutually consistent” (Foley and Sidrauski 1971: 4). 
Under these circumstances, neither stocks nor flows matter greatly – should equilibrium 
hold. Now, we can argue that, for any given person at any given point in time, the actual 
distinction between a stock and a flow may not matter too much: their immediate holdings 
of money balances, for instance, will appear to be a stock if held in their pocket (or their 
deposit account), but a flow the instant they are moved into transaction. This flow of funds 
would immediately move back into being a stock once the remaining cash is returned to 
their pockets, or the debit card returned to a wallet. The lack of a clear stock-flow 
differentiation may appear trivial from the point of view of a single agent at any given point 
in time, given precisely the ability of money (to which we will return) to move flexibly 
between the two states. 
However, the triviality of this problem translates into a fairly dramatic fallacy of 
composition for any scale larger than the individual household or firm. The most obvious 
(because the largest) example of this is in the international flows of financing between 
states. The Great Moderation engendered enormous flows of financing between different 
states which, on a net basis of financing, appeared to represent an immense imbalance 
between the developed and the less-developed world – or, more precisely, between the US 
and China. These directly related, it seemed, to imbalances on the balance of trade (visibles 
and invisibles), with the US current account deficit running to 2 per cent of world GDP by 
2006. Fast-growing developing countries, led by China, on the other hand ran immense 
trade surpluses, balancing the deficits out elsewhere, but also promoting colossal capital 
inflows that emerged particularly (and perhaps notoriously) in China as foreign reserve 
accumulation by government. Although some bravely argued, during the good times, that 
this seemingly stable imbalance was “Bretton Woods II”, given the relative stability of 
exchange rates, the onset of crisis provoked a reconsideration.  
On the basis of the observed imbalances, Ben Bernanke has been vocal amongst those 
arguing that the crisis was the product of excess savings by fast-growing countries in the 
developing world (Bernanke 2005). A “global savings glut” emerged, the product of a 
confluence of independent factors that nonetheless then contributed directly to the 
excesses of financialisation in the US and elsewhere. But as (Borio and Disyata 2011) have 
convincingly argued, this is a case that can only hold if net rather than gross flows of 
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financing are considered. The excess savings case is not consistent with the evidence on 
interest rate movements, which rose in the US between 2005 and 2007 without denting 
capital outflows in China, and improvements in the current account since 2008 have been 
accompanied by declines in the interest rate (Borio and Disyata 2011: 4) As the US current 
account began to deteriorate from the 1990s onwards, global savings also fell, implying no 
clear causality as predicted in the excess savings model.  
Instead, Borio and Disyata note the distinction between savings (conducted in real terms) 
and financing (conducted with financial assets and liabilities). The two, as they correctly 
state, need not be identical in the aggregate for a monetary economy with even a 
minimally sophisticated financial system. For the globe, they can clearly be quite distinct: 
and it is this distinction that means the correct focus, globally, is on the flow of gross 
financing. “The same volume of saving can go hand-in-hand with widely different changes 
in financial assets and liabilities.” (Borio and Disyata 2011: 7). Financial flows will typically 
“greatly exceed” savings, since there are multiple ways in which final expenditure can be 
financed.  
 
On this basis, the US emerges as an immense exporter of financing to the rest of the world, 
in gross terms, as well as a major importer, with both flows rising astronomically since the 
1980s. The bulk of financial inflows did not, as the gross accounts make clear, originate in 
China, East Asia, or other developing parts of the world: they came from Europe (Borio and 
Disyata 2011: 15). On this basis, the authors trace the expansion of finance (and its crash) 
far more back to purely US domestic policy issues, and to the “excess elasticity” of the 
financial system, than to underlying shifts in the balance of real funding across the globe. 
The gross picture is completely different from the net. 
 
The same applies to national economies, even in the closed country case – as we will be 
focusing on in this paper. A recent Bank of England research paper shows that a 
concentration on net funding aggregates by policymakers during the Great Moderation 
may have blinded them to emerging fragilities that would have been apparent in a gross, 
flow-of-funds setting (Barwell and Burrows 2011). By imposing a distinction between assets 
and liabilities, and making explicit the gross flows of financing through the economy, SFC 
allows a richer (and, we argue, more accurate) description of how a macroeconomy 
functions than do general equilibrium models.  
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Outside versus inside money 
Aside from the empirical evidence, the failure to distinguish net from gross flows 
contributes directly to a theoretical contradiction in the model .The standard neoclassical 
presentation relies on the modelling of outside money: money created outside of the 
banking system and held as a rotating stock. Net of other liabilities, it is therefore an asset 
of the private economy. “Under the gold standard, gold coins were outside money; in the 
modern fiat money systems currency and bank reserves, high-powered money or the 
money base, constitute outside money.” (Blanchard and Fischer 1996: 193). Generally, this 
is allied to (if rarely explicitly modelled as) a conception of the relationship between the 
supply of high-powered money as directly related to the reserves available to banks, 
through a money multiplier process. The result is that the money supply is exogenous to 
the system – that all money functions (in effect) as outside money, since the relationship 
between the money base and the outside money is completely mechanical: given banks’ 
fractional reserves, a stable money multiplier exists.  
This is (as we shall see later in the paper) deeply problematical. The presence of purely 
exogenous supply of money – often mediated, weakly, by the presence of a Taylor-type 
rule to link interest rates back to output – imposes on the whole system a set of deeply 
unconvincing outcomes. The immediate outcome is that the banking system, to all intents 
and purposes, does not exist: it is a pure intermediary with no existence independent of 
the central banks’ own policy rule. This can, as we shall show, be revised, but the revisions 
are fundamentally corrections against this initial specification. 
 
Ponzi issues 
However, by not defining clearly the roles of the banking system, and leaving (therefore) 
money as a purely exogenous stock, a critical issue is created for the model’s coherence. 
We have touched on the optimisation problem for the household earlier. Under the 
conditions of free capital market, and given no satiation point in the utility function, the 
optimisation problem for the household becomes trivial: it is simply to borrow an 
increasing amount over time, using current borrowing to repay previous debts and so 
maximising consumption. Net indebtedness per capita will be rising at a rate of (r-n), 
forever. This is obviously not plausible.  
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The solution generally applied is to arbitrarily deprive agents of the opportunity to choose 
this path, through creating a transversality condition for the optimisation problem, often 
referred to as the “no-Ponzi game” condition. For the model above, we can define a as the 
per capita stock of wealth, giving us (for debt as negative wealth): 
   
   
      ∫ (    )     
 
 
 
In other words, that the rate of household debt cannot increase asymptotically faster than 
the interest rate, as a natural constraint on household behaviour. With a positive marginal 
utility, it can hold as a simple equality. There is – or appears to be – an obvious intuition 
lurking behind this: clearly no household can actually go out and, in order to finance both 
current consumption and debt repayments, simply demand more credit from the bank. Or, 
if they can repeat Charles Ponzi’s trick, they can, like the maestro, only do it for a short 
amount of time. 
But this is dubious on a number of levels. The first problem is exactly its arbitrariness: while 
it is true that we usually observe that households cannot borrow at an increasing rate 
forever, this is as a result of the operation of credit markets – precisely the sector of the 
economy a real-side model such as this ignores. It is possible to include credit constraints in 
models such as this but this does not remove the need for a transversality condition within 
the optimisation problem.  
This leads to the second issue: the arbitrary selection of a condition that allows the 
optimisation problem to become bounded is determined by the need, given optimisation, 
to impose a boundary condition on the underlying function. The transversality condition is 
a necessary condition for the solution of optimisation problems where either the terminal 
state for the planning horizon, or the terminal time at which it arrives, are variable. In order 
to close the problem – specify a single, dynamic solution path over time – an additional 
condition must be introduced. Since the optimisation problem in solving DSGE models is 
open-ended, in the sense that the whole economy is presumed to be infinitely-lived, agents 
rationally account for this, and that therefore the planning period of interest is infinite, a 
transversality condition has to be used (Chiang 1992: ch.5). This may bear some 
relationship to an economic problem - households cannot borrow at an increasing rate 
forever – but the condition itself is not resolving that. Rather, it describes the condition 
that must be satisfied at the end of the time period – that is, beyond the effective planning 
horizon.  
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This is fundamentally not the same problem: the problem of the conditions the whole 
economy may or may not be required to satisfy (either in reality, or as a modelling 
requirement) cannot, in conditions of decentralised decision-making (as is assumed with 
DSGE) be the same as the conditions any optimising agent may or may not be required to 
satisfy. There is a mathematical requirement for the transversality condition to exist, or 
optimisation fails. But that mathematical requirement cannot be simply read straight into 
the economic condition facing any individual household. The no-Ponzi game condition, in 
other words, is an illegitimate leap from the micro level of rational decisionmaking by 
economic agents, into the macro level of the whole economy: it blurs the distinction 
between the micro level of decision making that model states is occurring, with the macro 
level of optimisation that the model presumes to solve for. The issue here is the presence 
of a “representative agent”: if the agent is truly “representative” of households, the agent 
cannot simultaneously act as if they represented the whole economy. The entire purpose 
of DSGE modelling is to grant macro models the assumed necessary microfoundations. We 
seem, instead, to have introduced a macro outcome via the backdoor. 
It is the absence of a convincing specification of the financial system that generates this 
failure. That failure to specify the financial system properly, in turn, derives from a failure 
to specify the functioning of money properly. It is here that the problem of money’s outside 
status is most acute. With all money essentially functioning as outside money – that is, 
outside the banking system – it appears as net wealth for the economy as a whole. Inside 
money – that generated inside the banking system – does not have this feature, appearing 
as both an asset (for households and non-banks) and a liability (for banks). Increases (or 
decreases) in the supply of money have no impact on net wealth, since the balance sheets, 
by definition, balance.  
Outside money does not behave like this. As the money supply expands, net wealth, in 
effect, increases. While it can be argued that this has no real welfare implications (Fischer 
1972), it impacts directly on the no-Ponzi condition. If all money held by households is 
outside money, constituting net wealth, it constitutes a stable means to repay prior debts. 
But the no-Ponzi condition holds that debts cannot explode: they must be conditioned to 
grow no faster than the rate of interest payable. A household holding a source of net 
wealth, however, driven by borrowing, could simply net off this wealth against their 
borrowing. All borrowing made in any monetary form, if that monetary form is outside 
wealth, could be used to overcome the implicit restrictions of the no-Ponzi condition.  The 
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fact that they are not allowed to do this is inconsistent with either the existence of the no-
Ponzi condition, or with the presence of outside money. The model can be solved 
mathematically, but its economic interpretation starts to look a little dubious.  The 
assumption underlying the no-Ponzi condition is that there is nothing, ultimately, outside of 
the financial economy: debts cannot be magically repaid, at the end of the planning period, 
from an external source. But the assumption of outside money is precisely that money does 
constitute such a source external to the financial economy and therefore could, in theory, 
repay the debts. 
The specification of money commonly used in DSGE, then, undermines the conditions by 
which analytical solution to the model can be provided. By failing to correctly specify the 
function of money, standard DSGE models render themselves internally inconsistent: 
mathematical solutions arrive at the expense of economic interpretation. 
 
Abstraction and mediation 
The overriding issue is that of levels of abstraction. The claim that DSGE-type models are 
“microfounded” obscures the necessary difference between the different levels of 
abstraction at which an analysis may claim to operate. There is no plausible reason offered 
– beyond the (basically circular) justifications of axiomatic consumer behaviour – for the 
representative agent, or even a set of such agents, to correspond to any particular feature 
in the economic reality. The problem is not that the description at the macro level is not 
microfounded: it is that the elision from agent to macro is impermissible, given the 
different the presence of an economy that is, in practice, mediated by money and 
commodities – an economy that does not, in contradistinction to the neoclassical claims 
more generally, partition neatly into “real” and “nominal” sides. All economic activity is 
necessarily mediated by the presence of money and commodities; this mediation is not 
simply a veil, but changes the form of the activity, both at the level of the activity itself and 
– more pertinently for the discussion here – at the level at which these features can be 
discussed. 
Money has an inherently social character: it is wholly meaningless to speak of a private or 
individual money; and even where theorists have, on occasion, proposed the existence of a 
privatised money, this done with the explicit purpose of allowing the privatised money 
market to find a better form of the social money than it is to provide literally 
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“individualised” form of money. It is this inherently social character of money that imparts 
the necessary levels of abstraction in considering the functioning of the economy: the 
totality of the actions of the separate individuals and institutions that constitute the 
economy will be mediated by the presence of economy-wide structures, of which the 
decisive structure is money itself. Even where economic activity can be performed 
separately from money as such – as is suggested, for instance, in “efficiency wage” theories 
that imply a social, non-monetary character to the performance of effort within a labour 
contract (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) – they can only be performed strictly as an adjunct to 
the already-existing social form of money. 
The clash between the representative agent, which may not be able to borrow infinitely 
and forever, the need to close the system on the basis of that agent’s presumed optimising 
behaviour, and the impossibility of these conditions existing alongside outside money that 
is held to characterise the money form inside the standard neoclassical macro model, is 
one (and perhaps the strongest) example of the failure of the “microfoundations” to match 
in reality the presence of macro structures that actually create economic and social life. 
Nor is it the case that such microfounded models proved to be any more consistently 
reliable than earlier, arguably cruder “Keynesian” models. Paul Krugman argued, over a 
decade ago, that “microfounded models have not lived up to their promise” (Krugman 
2000: 24), while after 2008 these complaints have multiplied. An assessment, post-crash, 
by the US Federal Reserve found that DSGE models were “very poor in forecasting” (Edge 
and Gurkaynak 2011: 17). 
 
II. STOCK FLOW CONSISTENT MODELS 
The challenge from stock-flow consistency 
SFC models present a distinct challenge to this version of economic reality, in that they very 
explicitly pose the existence of social structures as their starting point, and then work from 
this towards the behavioural relationships amongst the structural elements. The three 
critical features of SFC modelling are, first, the presence of money considered as inside 
money – that is, credit-money generated and contained within the financial system – and, 
second, the double-entry bookkeeping identity between assets and liabilities. This latter is 
then combined with hard budget constraints for each of the sectors of the macroeconomy 
under consideration, and it is the combination of the latter two conditions that then 
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creates SFC as a complete representation of the economy: that is to say, within the scope of 
the real economy that is presumed to be modelled, all possible flows and stocks of value 
are assumed to be modelled, since all flows most arrive from somewhere and exit to 
somewhere, and all sectors are constrained by their own budget balances. 
This inversion of the major neoclassical precepts – that the macroeconomy must be 
microfounded; that behavioural “rationality” must prevail throughout the model – is 
performed on the basis of a strict adherence to the entirely conventional presentation of 
the national accounts, familiar since the 1940s. The direct descendants of today’s SFC 
models are, as we have seen, Richard Stone and the Social Accounting Matrices, as steadily 
improved by statisticians of national income (see chapter 2). It is the sweeping nature of 
this challenge, of course, that makes SFC such an appealing alternative to a mainstream of 
macromodelling that appears, on a number of substantive questions, to be incapable of 
providing reliable or even coherent answers. 
In Marc Lavoie’s account, SFC consists of:  
“... essentially four things… First, as mainstream authors usually insist, agents 
or sectors face budget constraints, and these must be explicitly taken into 
account. Secondly, as part of the budget constraints, there are financial 
constraints, so that an explicit and complex financial sector must accompany 
the production sector. Third, all sectors of the economy are intertwined with 
one another, and the links between these sectors must be explicitly recognized. 
From this arises the saying: everything must come from somewhere and go 
somewhere, without black holes. Fourth, the evolution of the entire system 
can be characterized as saying that at the beginning of each period, the 
configuration of stock variables (tangible and financial) is a summary 
description of past history. From there, transactions plus capital gains yield the 
stock variables of the next period.” (Lavoie 2007: 1) 
The critical elements, for this paper as for other authors, are the accounting and budgetary 
constraints that mean (in Lavoie’s words) “everything must come from somewhere and go 
somewhere”. The accounting constraint is that of double-entry bookkeeping: for the book 
to balance, each entry as an asset must be balanced by its appearance as a liability; in 
parallel, each entry as a use of funds must be matched by its appearance as a receipt of 
funds. This is a pure accounting convention: it does not, by itself, have a direct economic 
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meaning, but it must be attached to a behavioural specification to do so. This behavioural 
function will specify the relationship, for that sector, between its accounted flows of funds 
and other sectors and entries within the system, given the parameterisation of the whole 
system. It is only when the accounting identities have also a behavioural element attached 
that they become properly economic considerations, showing how the behaviour of 
different elements within the system is matched to the disposal and use of funds. 
The budget constraint is a different issue. The budget constraint represents a real 
constraint on the activities of a sector or unit within the economy: no sector or unit can 
spend more than they receive (or have access to) in any one point of time. This follows 
from the presence of money as the necessary means of payment within a transaction, and 
from the definition of property rights, in which assets and liabilities held by others are not 
assumed accessible. (Theft can, obviously, take place, but it cannot be systematically 
organised.) Budget constraints therefore bind actions, and so have a direct economic 
meaning.  
 
The textbook case 
Wynne Godley and Marc Lavoie have provided what amounts to the textbook for SFC in 
their Monetary Economics: an integrated approach to credit, money, income, production 
and wealth (2007). The “classical” (Michell and Toporowski 2012: 174) SFC system they 
develop involves three matrices, intended to indicate the system of assets and liabilities 
held, and movements between them, for the whole economy. 
The principal one of these matrices is the “transactions matrix” shown in Table 3.1 below, 
which is based on Godley and Lavoie’s Table 11.3. This records all (potential) real and 
monetary flows of funds taking place within the economy and can be thought of as an 
abstract version of the flow-of-funds accounts published by most developed countries. 
Each column represents a different sector within the economy, which, following national 
income accounts, is typically divided into households, firms and government, but with the 
addition of banks and central banks. Each row indicates the use of funds within the system 
for a particular purpose: consumption by households, investment by firms, and so on. The 
defining feature of the whole transactions matrix is that each row and each column must 
sum to zero. For each row, the principle involved is that of double-entry bookkeeping: 
every flow of funds within the economy must come from somewhere, and go to 
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somewhere. It is for this reason that the principle of observing gross, rather than net, flows 
is so critical to the whole representation. On the other hand, each column sums to zero 
because it is assumed that each sector faces a budget constraint, out of which it cannot 
break. Both these justifications for the zero-sum rule, then, have an economic justification: 
later chapters will explore whether either can be justified in practice. Throughout, a 
positive entry represents a receipt of funds; a negative entry represents a use of funds, in 
line with obvious accounting principles. 
In general, the analysis that follows will be reduced still further from this closed-economy 
case to consider solely the private sector. We will drop government and central banks, and 
instead present something closer to Wicksell’s “pure credit economy” (1934), in which 
private banks supply the financing needed initially to ensure production and the circulation 
of commodities takes place. In reduced form, this matrix is then: 
Table 3.1: Transactions flow matrix 
 Households Firms Banks Total 
  Current capital current capital  
Consumption -C +C    0 
Investment  +I -I   0 
Wages +W -W    0 
Firm profits +Ff -Ff    0 
Bank profits +Bf   -Bf  0 
Deposit interest +rd.D-1   -rd.D-1  0 
Loan interest  -rl.L-1  +rl.L-1  0 
Change in 
deposits 
-ΔD    +ΔD 0 
Change in loans   -ΔL  +ΔL 0 
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
It should be clear that, even in this reduced economy, the introduction of each additional 
sector or flow significantly complicates the potential set of relationships. Since each flow 
has its opposite counterpart, every new element introduced has an exponential impact on 
the total potential complexity of the entire construction. This can make SFC models difficult 
to impossible to solve analytically, prompting the use of simulation methods to find 
solutions. This is the counterpart to Copeland’s (1948) “quadruple-entry system”: each 
change made in any cell in the system must, given the zero-sum requirement maintained 
throughout, also produce an impact in three other cells, so as to maintain the zero net 
balance on both the rows and the columns.  
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The structure, then, already contains some distinctive claims about the world, based on the 
argument presented in Godley and Lavoie and adhered to by subsequent researchers. At 
first, we have no capital accumulation of any sort: firms investment spending is purely on 
single-period commodities, perhaps to be thought of as raw materials. Note here that the 
investment funding is, in effect, retained within the firm sector – it is marked as a transfer 
from one firm to another, and therefore, in the aggregate, has no impact on other sectors. 
The remainder of firms’ spending is on wages for households, who are assumed to supply 
labour as demanded within the set up. To finance their expenditures, firms borrow an 
initial sum of money from the banks, who supply this in the form of a loan. This is a critical 
point, to which we will return in subsequent chapters. These loans are held as a stock, but a 
rate of interest is demanded of them, as indicated. Profits, finally, are sent back to 
households, on the assumption that all firms are owned only by all households in the 
aggregate. 
Those loan funds then end up in the hands of households. They are paid wages, but the 
monetary form of these wages is that of bank deposits, marked as a positive change in the 
matrix above. They spend on consumption goods, and this spending then makes its way 
back to firms. Banks, for their part, issue only loans to firms, and create deposits when 
doing so. They are owned by households. There is no equity in this simple version of an SFC 
economy, and no allowance as yet for capital gains. Nonetheless, we can see already that a 
series of key relationships amongst macroeconomic aggregates has been established. In 
particular, we can note that, from above 
                    
This is a standard national income identity, considered from either final consumption or 
final income viewpoints. Note, for now, that a stock (in this case of loans) is marked as 
existing at the beginning of a period with the -1 subscript. Flows are, in this matrix, marked 
solely with their letter; changes in stocks (which is to say, a flow over the period affecting a 
stock) are marked with the Greek symbol delta, equivalent to the end period level minus 
the beginning period level. The complications of periodisation will be considered more 
thoroughly in the next chapter. 
The system of equations, if taken as a whole, is overdetermined: any one equation is 
implied by the others. This gives rise to an important result, in which it is only necessary, 
for the n equations within the system, to determine (n-1). The final equation, the n-th, will 
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be completely determined by the others, given the twin requirements of accounting 
consistency and balanced budgets. Breaking either (or both) of these rules, of course, 
renders the system undetermined, with serious implications for the model as whole. Later 
chapters will look in more detail at this. 
 
From accounting identities to behavioural equations 
This system of linked balance sheets, however, is simply descriptive of the economy. It 
records the flows (and possible flows) between the different sectors and across different 
kinds of asset classes. What it does not do is show the relationships between those sectors: 
it does not contain any economics, as such, since there is little reason given for any part of 
the system to relate to any other. There are no causal inferences that can be drawn from 
the system at this level of generality. It is a constrained system, nonetheless, since we have 
demanded that every flow “comes from somewhere and goes to somewhere”, and that 
budget constraints are binding on whole sectors. But it contains no causal relations of any 
kind. To begin to infer causality, we need to introduce a further set of constraints, binding 
the system of separate sectors to each other and relating fund movements within each 
sector to others. 
One issue, which will appear later in the treatment of firms’expectations, is the asymmetry 
inside the quadruple accounting rule. The budget constraint has a real economic content: 
in a monetary economy, a unit’s budget is an absolute bind on its freedom of action, in the 
absence of theft, gifts, or bribery. But the double-entry rule is much weaker. We will show 
later how, if we expect firms (in particular) to behave as profit-maximising institutions, the 
double-entry rule may not be observed, in the sense that some flows will be unaccounted 
for.  
These accounting rules, then, should not be thought of as “behaviour” of individuals, or 
groups of individuals, in the manner of the representative agent models considered above. 
Rather, this is method to describe how parts of the whole system, the entire 
macroeconomy, can respond to each over time. Typically, at least until the 
microfoundations revolution of the late 1970s, these behavioural equations would be 
econometrically derived from historic data, the challenge in doing so being that of ensuring 
the time series econometrics avoided the classic problems of simultaneity, autocorrelation, 
model specification errors, and so on. The assault on these Keynesian econometric models 
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zoomed in exactly on what was held to be their naiveté in proposing that whole elements 
of the economy could behave in a way that was (potentially) inconsistent with the manner 
in which individual agents would behave; and that the parameterisation provided by such 
econometric exercises, along with the presumed behavioural elements of the derived 
equation, was strictly backward-looking: rational agents, it was argued, would in fact form 
forward-looking, rational expectations as to the future behaviour of economic variables of 
interest to them. 
As discussed, it was on this basis that increasingly technically sophisticated New Classical 
and DSGE models came to be developed and operated. We have addressed some of the 
concerns that these, in turn, have raised for researchers, particularly in their own weak 
specification of money, and in their failure to account for the totality of flows of funds 
within a macroeconomy, collapsing gross flows into only net. We will not, for the 
remainder of this paper, look in more detail at the appropriateness or otherwise of 
behavioural equations, and the best means to specify them; our focus and interest here is 
on examining the claims for coherency and consistency that the SFC matrices themselves 
present. There is a natural logic to this: the behavioural equations that the whole dynamic 
system must introduce are themselves secondary to the grand claims of consistency and 
completeness that the whole system should observe; the behavioural conditions, in other 
words, cannot themselves breach the binding constraints of matrix consistency. They are 
therefore strictly secondary to the rules of the matrix as a whole. 
In addition, however, the introduction of transactions matrices and the demands for 
consistency across them appear to be the more genuinely innovatory part of the SFC 
framework; what can be argued to be the reintroduction of Keynesianesque behavioural 
equations, of a pre-70s vintage, whether through adaptive expectations, or the derivation 
from time series data of modelling parameters (as opposed to argumentation from first, 
optimising, principles) can be thought of as a retrograde step, back into a pre-rational 
expectations world, or as the wholly necessary reclamation of an otherwise unfairly buried 
tradition within macroeconomics as such. The relative merits of apparently “naïve” 
Keynesian models versus the more sophisticated DSGE specifications, compared to 
empirical observation, are not compared in detail here: although we believe, in general, 
that the Keynesians have the edge. It is, however, a concern for another time. 
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Back to “Keynesianism” 
To some extent, at least, the rise to prominence of SFC represents a return to an earlier 
literature and set of modelling techniques, dominant before the turmoil of the 1970s – 
both economic, and theoretical – and the rise of models more inclined to embody the 
presumed neoclassical virtues. Its defenders would, of course, claim that this is reclamation 
of good practices that were lost: the reliance on empirical reasoning and numerical 
solutions ahead of technical or analytical sophistication; the reappearance of the social and 
the aggregate as meaningful categories apart from the individual and separate; and the use 
of econometric techniques geared to both (Kenway 1994). 
Godley and other SFC models, in common with earlier “Keynesian” literature, are clearly 
operating in defiance of the strictures of neoclassicism. The (assumed) behavioural 
relationships are those that can be derived from statistical methods, and strictly backward-
looking. They are not populated with rational agents, but instead rely on those derived 
“behavioural” equations to show how the complex mass of elements interact within the 
model. The consistency that in standard microfounded models is taken from the behaviour 
of the “representative agent” itself is here provided by the strict dependency on an 
accounting identity. 
The challenge here is in justifying the claims made about consistency and the budget 
constraint. With both of these two in place, the SFC presentation does indeed have the 
economic justification claimed of it: every entry within it is contained by the logic of the 
whole the system, which itself has an economic justification. We have noted that the 
budget constraint can be justified on economic grounds within a monetary economy 
enjoying strong property rights. It is less clear, however, that the accountancy rules consist 
in anything other than pure convention. They are therefore somewhat arbitrary. 
 
Regulating the circuits 
Regulation here, in practice, is left to the decidedly “sociological” attribute of “norms”, well 
expressed here by Godley and his collaborators: 
“As there is a limit to the extent to which stocks of debt can be allowed to rise 
relative to GDP, there is a corresponding limit to the extent to which the 
financial balances can (be allowed to) fluctuate, implying that the ratios of 
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stocks to GDP have norms that can sometimes be used to evaluate strategic 
options.” (Godley et al. 2007: 2. Emphasis in original) 
This, naturally enough, leaves open the question of how these norms are established. 
Godley and others have left this as a simply econometric question: the observed stability of 
the system over time in the past corresponds simply to how the system really is, in some 
sense. While this is intuitive, and as a first pass can operate well against the data, it does 
not answer some of the more obvious criticisms made by the neoclassical schools. 
The fatal flaw in both DSGE and SFC models is their naiveté of representation: either 
assuming that the underlying deep parameters of agents’ choices can be trivially reduced 
to an optimisation problem – perhaps with ad hoc adjustments – in the case of DSGE, 
which really does represent agents’ behaviour; or, for SFC, assuming that the presentation 
of economic aggregates contained within the national income accounts and flow-of-funds 
really does show the macroeconomic aggregates concerned. Both cases allow an 
approximation to the observed behaviour of the economy, and this may be more or less 
accurate; but the degree of “more-or-less” accuracy is both unknown beforehand and 
necessarily subject to the uncertainty that the problem of representation involves. 
 
Representation and microfoundations 
Certainly, influential post-Keynesians have made very strong claims for the primacy of the 
balance sheet representation: not just that it is a representation of a capitalist economy 
whose true processes remain unknown, but that in a certain sense it is the capitalist 
economy, being a direct presentation of the processes that drive economic outcomes. 
Hyman Minsky claimed that “an ultimate reality in a capitalist economy is the set of 
interrelated balance sheets among the various units, so that one way every economic unit 
can be characterized is by its portfolio: the set of tangible and financial assets it owns and 
the financial liabilities on which it owes.” (Minsky 1975: 118) 
 
This is an even stronger claim to reality than would be made by, for example, the old-
fashioned macroeconometric Keynesian models, which would (at their strongest) simply 
claim to be a statistical derivation of observed prior facts. The parameters they contain are 
contingent on the measurements previously made, and on the statistical and econometric 
techniques used to derive them. They contain no further content – and it is precisely that 
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absence of a necessary relationship to the “deep” (Lucas 1976) parameters of the economy 
that opened them up to the Lucas Critique in the first place. 
 
The claim that the balance-sheet presentation is a direct record of the underlying economic 
processes – of its deep macroeconomic structure, perhaps conditioned by the range of 
institutions and social norms – is, then, the direct equivalent to the DSGE models claim that 
the fundamental structures of agents’ preferences are the deep structure of the economy.  
Both depend on the very strong claim that what amounts to a theoretical imposition on the 
available data is, in fact, the true representation of an underlying data-generating process. 
 
The difference, of course, is that in the SFC world the representation is immediately 
observable – derived, with more or less facility, from the national income accounts. DSGE 
models make no such claim: at best, their strong assumptions about the behaviour of the 
“representative agent” are derived from the axioms of consumer behaviour, themselves 
derived from some combination of first principles of rationality, and revealed preference 
theory. The gap between the observed reality, and the strong claims made for the deep 
structure underlying this reality, is profound. But it is exactly the presence of this gap that 
allows a refutation of the Lucas Critique: it is because agents cannot respond to inherently 
unknown and unobservable variables – ultimately, to their own preferences – that the 
Critique fails. 
 
This cannot apply to SFC. There, the representation, to all intents and purposes, is the 
reality. The two are indistinguishable. The Lucas Critique fails here for a different reason: 
because, by definition, the SFC representation is a complete set of all possible stocks and 
flows within an economy, there is no possible means by which any agent could alter the 
structure of that economy – at least, to the extent that the representation of the economy 
can function. They are doubly bound by the structure, and the zero-sum rule. The 
presentation of the economy, is by definition, the actuality of the economy.  
 
 
Complexities 
 
What applies at the aggregate level applies, by the same logic, to the separate elements of 
the representation: to each sector, and to the relationships between the sectors. Because 
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the representation is by definition complete, there is no way for any “agent” (or sector) to 
break with the necessary bind of the quadruple entry rule. Every action taken automatically 
has a consequence elsewhere. It is therefore impossible for any “agent” or aggregation of 
agents to act in such a way that they can change this set of relationships. The parameters 
that describe the behavioural relationships between sectors, however derived (whether by 
simulation or econometric estimation) are incapable of being altered by the agents (or 
aggregation of agents) within the representation, precisely because of the bind of the 
quadruple-entry rule. If we imagine a sector to be a single actor, for it to change its own 
parameters necessarily implies that other parameters, outside of the sector, must change, 
because its own holdings of assets and liabilities are themselves the holdings of assets and 
liabilities of other sectors. The SFC matrix is the relationship between the sectors; the 
behavioural functions estimated underneath a subset of that relationship. 
 
This, however, creates two sets of (related) problems that parallel related issues in DSGE. In 
the first instance there are no clear rules on how the parameters within the model should 
be found. It is theoretically possible econometrically estimate the entire parameter set. But 
given that the statistically observed prior relationships between sectors are bound also by 
the definition of the accounting matrices for the whole economy, we cannot be certain that 
the estimates we generate are robust: the estimates are, in effect, overdetermined by the 
(assumed) presence of the SFC matrix. The presence of the SFC matrix is equivalent to a 
restriction placed on all elements of the covariance matrix to be estimated. 
 
Similarly, while it is possible to calibrate, through simulation, the behaviour of the models’ 
elements, there is no clear selection mechanism that would allow the reasonable targeting 
of the parameters involved: since every sector is related, via quadruple-entry, to others, 
the sequencing of parameter adjustment can be assumed to affect other parameters in 
unknown ways. In this instance, the attempt to isolate any particular sector for adjustment 
in its parameters is under-determined by the presence of the wider SFC representation. 
Like DSGE, the process of calibration of a complex model  
 
Both of these are additional to the severe complexity of SFC models, driven precisely by the 
quadruple-entry rule ensuring that each additional sector or sub-sector incorporated 
automatically generates a multiple number of additional relationships with other sectors, 
each to be specified and estimated. Even a minimally simple SFC model will suffer from the 
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parameterization problems highlighted above. In all instances, at best a process of trial and 
error can be used, although this will become rapidly more complex with the expansion of 
the transactions matrix.  
 
The solution generally proposed, by Lavoie, Dos Santos, and others, is to rely on simulation 
methods (Lavoie 2008). A Levy Institute discussion paper (Caverzasi and Godin 2013) 
identifies a further, possible, quasi-solution in the form of a discussion around the results of 
the model. Such narrativistic and descriptive arguments are not, in any formal sense, 
“solutions” to the model, but they can offer a way to structure an argument that the formal 
solutions may not, bringing mixed methods and insights from outside the model (indeed, 
outside of economics) to bear. Clearly, exercises of this kind have fallen out of favour in 
recent decades, as the formalisation of economics – particularly within the neoclassical 
school – has proceeded apace, but earlier practitioners viewed discussions of this sort of as 
a vital part of developing economic analysis. Deirdre McCloskey has elsewhere argued that 
a rhetoric of maths and scientificity prevails in economics (McCloskey 1983), and in favour 
of the use of “thick” descriptions and narrative (McCloskey 1988). Presentationally, if the 
intention is to convince an audience of non-specialists, clearly the narrative from has 
significant merits, and – even for a specialist audience – many of the concerns of political 
economy cannot be reduced easily to a formal modelling exercise. Nonetheless, we 
concentrate in this paper on the formal structures of SFC, recognising that it is these 
structures that act to determine even narrative exercises in analysis.  
 
 
 
III. MONEY AND BANKING 
The neoclassical view of the banking system 
Toporowski makes a useful distinction between “critical” theories of finance, which see 
finance as systematically disturbing the “functioning of the modern capitalist economy”, 
and “reflective” theories of finance, in which financial markets are determined by 
circumstances outside those markets, in the “real sector”. Neoclassical finance theory is 
pre-eminently a version of the latter, with financial markets passively reflecting “real” 
economic data, the “fundamentals” (Toporowski 2005). In its most highly-developed 
theoretical form, neoclassical economics argues that the presence of complete markets for 
67 
 
all goods and services, and rational agents, provides the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a completely efficient utilisation of society’s resources. General equilibrium emerges as 
the spontaneous outcome of decentralised decisions by rational agents seeking to 
maximise their own utility given resource and technological constraints. The actual 
economic institutions existing in such a world, like money, are something of a sideshow 
relative to the benign actions of an invisible hand. 
As discussed earlier, neoclassical economics, in positing the existence of a perfect market, 
removes any theoretical basis for the existence of financial intermediaries. If agents really 
are rational optimisers, and markets really are complete, the entire economy can efficiently 
function without the need for any form of financial intermediation. Agents would simply 
contract amongst themselves. 
The principle issue for the standard view then becomes the existence of intermediaries: if 
markets really were efficient, and if agents within those markets were, by definition, well-
informed and rational, the presence of major financial institutions becomes a little 
unfathomable. Well-informed, rational individuals could contract with each other without 
any need for an intermediary of any description imposing an additional cost. Analysis of 
banks and financial intermediary functions took a backseat during the postwar decades: 
the canonical neoclassical paper (Modigliani and Miller 1958) quite explicitly claimed that 
the value of a firm is dependent only on the present value of its assets. Its financial 
structure, and hence relationship to a wider financial system, is irrelevant, since any 
particular debt leverage selected by a firm can be offset in the portfolios of individuals to 
suit their own risk preferences. That, in turn, implied that investors would not concern 
themselves with formal risk-management, since their portfolios would already be optimally 
diversified, given their preferences (Doherty and Tinic 1982). Institutions simply do not 
matter in a perfect capital market. 
Mainstream policy debates over the period tended, whether posed by Keynesians or their 
monetarists, to focus on the stability of monetary demand and the desirability of 
controlling the money supply. The financial system was, throughout the Western 
economies, both subject to heavy regulation, itself the product of earlier banking crises in 
the 1930s, and generally pushed into a subordinate position relative to the state and 
corporations in investment decision-making. 
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It was the breakdown of the “Golden Age” (Hobsbawm 1994) that encouraged the 
expansion of banks and non-bank intermediaries – as measured by volume of funds under 
management, or range of operations performed – and, in parallel, efforts by the 
mainstream of economics to better model banking and financial institution behaviour. 
Neoclassical models tended to fix upon the appearance of banks as deviations from the 
perfect competition model, appearing in the system as market-led fixes for market 
imperfections elsewhere. Prior to the development of the economics of information in the 
1970s, a theory of banking that was wholly consistent with the neoclassical axioms of 
consumer behaviour, and Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium, could not plausibly exist. 
(Freixas and Rochet 2008: ch.1) 
The presence, then, of financial institutions in the actually existing capitalist economy 
requires some additional explanation. The dominant view is that formalised first by Leyland 
and Pyle (1977), with important subsequent contributions from Diamond (1984), Boyd and 
Prescott (1986), and codified in Freixas and Rochet (2008). This holds that financial 
intermediaries appear essentially as a result of information asymmetries: at its simplest, 
potential lenders hold loanable funds, but are not well informed about potential borrowers; 
and potential borrowers hold private information about their investment projects, but do 
not hold funds. The financial intermediary is the means by which this asymmetry of 
information is overcome – information is costly, but by centralising and processing 
information financial intermediaries can overcome this transactions cost barrier. It should 
be noted that by introducing financial intermediaries as the result of market imperfections, 
the core structure of the neoclassical theory is left unchallenged. Markets should function 
as the theory described and, if they do not, an essentially ad hoc theoretical innovation is 
used to explain why. 
 
Transactions costs and information asymmetries 
The introduction of transactions costs, in the style of Coase (1937), creates one set of 
justifications for the existence of banks. If we hold that financial intermediaries’ principle 
function is the transformation of assets between classes (Fama 1980), and then further 
assume that the transactions costs present in such transformations create substantial 
economies of scale or scope, then it becomes optimal for rational agents to seek 
intermediaries to perform such transformations. 
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Alongside this, portfolio theory suggests another line of attack. Variations in risk aversion 
amongst investors, and the desire to diversify assets with potentially correlated returns 
could both lead to the pooling of risks (Pyle 1971). Again, in the presence of transactions 
costs, economies of scale can be used to justify the existence of specialised pools of 
liquidity, rather than transactions enacted between individuals. 
Extensions of the underlying premise could encompass agents’ information about banks’ 
own liquidity, to model for the appearance of bank runs in a fractional reserve banking 
system (Diamond and Dybvig 1983); or to explain the existence of credit rationing (Stiglitz 
and Weiss 1981). Both cases create the possibility of rational bank failures, emerging 
directly as a result of the banks' functions. 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), like earlier economic history writing on crises (Kindleberger 
1978), present a “sunspot” model of bank failures, building on the influential work of 
Bryant (1980): with long-term investments costly to liquidate in an uncertain environment, 
if depositors believe other depositors will withdraw, it is rational for them to behave 
likewise. Banks therefore can fail solely because they become subject to self-fulfilling 
prophecies, unrelated to real phenomena. Two potential equilibria – panic, and stability - 
appear as the model's outcomes, but selection of the actual equilibrium point is arbitrary. 
Nonetheless, this relatively parsimonious model became a foundation for later work. 
Equilibrium selection has been modelled explicitly, in a game-theoretic setting, by Rochet 
and Vives (2004) where the game to be played is assumed to be drawn randomly from a 
broader set of “global games”. Players hold imperfect information about the game they 
face, and so an equilibrium appears as the risk-dominant equilibrium for the entire set of 
sub-games. 
An alternative approach was to model the banking system as imperfectly competitive 
markets, with banks earning economic rents from their monopolistic control over access to 
banking services. This accounted, it was suggested, for the presence of positive bank profits, 
and so the continuing existence of banks as an institution (Klein 1971). 
What both approaches had in common was, first, the implication that removing barriers to 
competition (whether informational, or through market power) would improve efficiency; 
and that, second, the behaviour of banks as institutions could be treated as distinct from 
the behaviour of financial markets. Where markets deviated from the general equilibrium 
ideal, banks and financial intermediaries would appear; but, having accounted for the 
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presence of those financial institutions, modelling of the financial system could proceed 
along neoclassical lines. The institutions were defined by the market, and its specific 
features. They could therefore be treated as an analytically distinct problem from other 
features within the market – most particularly, the way the markets handled risk.  
 
Endogenous money 
The distinctiveness of SFC in this regards, at least in its post-Keynesian variant, can be seen 
in its explicit representation of the process of credit creation, and the endogenisation of 
the money supply as (solely) credit money, created inside the banking system to meet 
demand. Unlike the conventional, neoclassical theory, banks and bank behaviour are not 
just modelled – they, and the creation of money, are central to the representation. The key 
insight is that money, like any other financial attribute of the economy, is both an asset and 
a liability. A representation of a money balance in one place must also include its 
representation as a liability in another. All money within the model is inside money, in 
sharp contrast to the outside money of the conventional model. 
This provides the basis for the representation of the money creation process as the unique 
property of the banking system, through its ability to generate credit money as both a 
deposit (a liability for the bank, an asset for the debtor) and a loan (a liability for the debtor, 
an asset for the bank). These deposits can be created essentially on would-be debtor 
demand, with the only restraint on banking behaviour being essentially their own 
willingness to expand their balance sheets and manage the risks involved – leading, in some 
cases, to credit rationing. 
 
Money, risk, and uncertainty 
Moreover, the institution of money in a world beset by uncertainty has (in the post-
Keynesian reading) distinct consequences. They relate directly to what has emerged as the 
distinctive treatment of uncertainty within the post-Keynesian tradition, broadly identified. 
This tradition, growing particularly from the work of the Hicks (1980), Kaldor (1977) and 
others in the later 1970s, has based itself on a re-interpretation of Keynes’ own writings. 
Against the neoclassical interpretation, as developed notably by the younger Hicks (1937), 
pre-war, and Samuelson (1948) after WW2, post-Keynesianism has stressed the continuity 
of Keynes’ concern with risk, uncertainty, and expectations throughout his life and work. 
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Conventional presentations of the “neoclassical synthesis” of Keynes’ work, typically 
through the use of the IS-LM standard macro model, develop a deterministic view of the 
macroeconomic world. The principal macroeconomic relationships can be described by a 
few linear (or linearisable) equations relating in consistent fashion the propensities to save, 
invest, consume and hold money. 
Instead, post-Keynesians have come to stress the inherently unknowable character of 
economic events in the future, following Keynes’ own writings on probability. This lack of 
knowingness moves uncertainty from being, as it is treated in the neoclassical world, a 
species of “risk”, taken as an epistemological problem, to something akin to an ontological 
problem for the whole economy (Davidson 1996). It is, in other words, not a problem of 
knowledge, or its lack – the future being unknown simply because we do not know it – but 
of a constitutive problem for the economy: the future is unknown because, outside of 
limited confines, it is unknowable.  
It is this feature of the economy that makes money, in turn, the most desirable instrument 
for the handling of uncertainty. It is because money itself is simultaneously liquid – it can 
be converted into any other commodity available to buy – and yet can be reliably stored – 
it is a continual store of value – that its holding can be presented as a “hedge” against an 
uncertain future. This is precisely the logic that Keynes presented in the General Theory, in 
explicating the three different demands for money: that the desire to hold positive money 
balances, given the opportunity cost of those holdings, was directly tied to the desire to (as 
far as possible) ward off uncertainty. We will return to those features of money and 
uncertainty in later chapters.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has briefly described a neoclassical macromodel, and outlined some of the 
critical problems with its functioning. Models built along these lines are empirically of 
limited use and, worse, not internally consistent: the use of net rather than gross balances, 
organised around a general equilibrium concept, excludes (or can exclude) activities of 
interest to the modeller by excluding economically relevant information. And the use of a 
weak specification of money, essentially operating as inside money, given limited 
conception of the banking system, implies a related incompatibility with the need for a 
general equilibrium model’s internal consistency. 
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We presented a very basic SFC model, based on Godley and Lavoie’s textbook, to 
demonstrate briefly how SFC can attempt to overcome some of these issues. We 
highlighted a few further concerns, many of which are returned to later in this thesis, 
before moving on to a consideration of the role of banks, money, and uncertainty in the 
neoclassical case and in the post-Keynesian viewpoint largely embodied in Godley-Lavoie 
SFC models. These issues are, again, only raised here as they form key parts of the 
argument of later chapters.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TIME AND THE PROBLEM OF INVENTORIES 
 
Introduction 
We closed the previous chapter with an examination of some of the weaknesses of the 
standard, neoclassical view of the macroeconomy, and an introduction to the stock-flow 
consistent (SFC) alternative. We suggested that its explication, simultaneously, of the 
credit-creation process and its representation of the state of both flows between units 
within an economy, and the gross balances held by those units, represented a distinct 
improvement over the neoclassical state of the art, and that it bore distinct resemblances 
to the “circuitist” school of economic thought. In addition, the nature of the SFC modelling 
procedure is such that it is not well-suited to the type of methodological individualist 
approaches taken within the neoclassical paradigm. 
Having introduced the core principles of SFC, by way of a critique of the more pressing 
problems within the neoclassical theory, this chapter attempts to provide the foundations 
of how to consider the macroeconomic representation provided by the SFC matrices as it 
relates to the real processes of production and distribution. Time is critical to this; whereas 
the neoclassical school in general treats time as a mere index of events, marching 
continuously and inexorably into the future (and with, if we assume perfect capital markets, 
its own effective “price”: the rate of interest), SFC and other heterodox schools begin to 
force a consideration of time as a property of the system itself: that time is not just the 
order that things happen in, it also describes the necessary ordering of things, and that this 
ordering is itself central to developing effective models of the macroeconomy. 
The first section, then, at a very high level of generality, considers the implications of 
modelling time as a discrete or continuous variable, briefly critiquing the work of a 
prominent defender of continuous time. It argues for discrete time modelling as the only 
effective way to model properly economic (rather than simply dynamic) processes.  
The second section, building on this, considers the definition of flows over time, examining 
different plausible conceptions of income, and relating these to decisionmaking. Turning to 
the canonical SFC model in Godley and Lavoie (2007), we find that although in general an 
economic valuation of matrix elements is provided, they inconsistently use a hybrid 
74 
 
valuation for inventories. This opens up the whole matrix to inconsistencies: either firm 
behaviour is inconsistent with profit maximisation, or the balance sheet no longer balances. 
In the case of the latter, it becomes clear that the whole matrix system no longer closes 
and that the potential for monetary imbalances opens up on the basis of financial 
imbalances. Uncertainty affects real production decisions, which in turn impact on 
financing; these then feed in to the monetary conditions prevailing. 
 
I. DESCRIBING TIME 
Time in equilibrium settings 
As described, SFC models rely on a distinctive, sequential approach to time, in which a 
discrete series of interconnected events. This necessitates, in turn, introducing a distinction 
between the start and the end points of each sequence – referred to here and throughout 
as the “time period” or the “modelling period”. General equilibrium models do not, in 
general, treat this as a meaningful distinction, as a result of their underlying assumptions. 
Foley (1975), touched on briefly in the previous chapter, rigorously demonstrates that with 
“prefect foresight” – equivalent to rational expectations – as the whole period shortens to 
some arbitrarily small length of time, the “beginning-of-period” (“stock”) equilibrium is 
internally consistent with the “end-of-period” (“flow”) equilibrium. However, this 
consistency collapses if expectations are imperfect. The strong implication here is that 
stock-flow consistency is as a necessary alternative to general equilibrium only when 
expectations are imperfect; as later chapters will explore, we treat this as a general 
condition of economic life, based on arguments provided by the post-Keynesian literature. 
It is the presence not just of uncertainty, but of a particular kind of uncertainty that cannot 
be reduced to risk (and that therefore cannot be entered into a rational expectations 
formulation) that opens up the requirement for a rigorous treatment of time as a sequence, 
rather than time as variation from equilibrium. 
 
Discrete vs. continuous time 
The central distinction, between SFC models and those in more conventional economics, is 
that of the explication of time not as an index of events (generally referenced by continual 
increments in a reference number, t), but as structuring principle. The economy, in this 
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view, is not what comes spontaneously into existence as the result of the actions of 
autonomous individuals under the influence of their own preferences, but is something 
structured separately from its inhabitants, having an existence before they did, and 
providing a specific, institutional means through which sequences of economically relevant 
actions can be performed. This is the nature of determining a deep distinction between 
stocks and flows: the movement of one from the other is the movement through a 
sequence of events in the economy that can be known and modelled for. The time period, 
in this view, is not just a single point during which decisions are simultaneously made and 
enacted. The time period itself is the plane in which the structure of events is described, 
and that it follows from this that the start of the period, and the end of the period are 
distinct moments in the progress of the economy through time. There is then a distinction, 
if this holds, to be drawn between the time that exists within the time period, where the 
sequencing of events is described, and the period that exists outside of or at the ends of the 
time period. 
For the canonical SFC model in Godley and Lavoie, this structure of events can be described 
mathematically as a relationship between those parts that are fixed with respect to time 
within the period, and those that change with respect to time inside the time period. The 
former are stocks, which change only at the ends of time periods; the latter are flows, 
which alter during time periods, but, logically, have no existence outside of the modelled 
period. The relationship between the two can, at the very highest level of generality, be 
described mathematically, with S as the stock at time period t, and F as the flow during the 
time period t. 
           
Any given stock at the end of a time period will be equal to the level of that stock at the 
start of the time period, plus the volume of flow during that time period (which can of 
course be negative). The strong implication of this is that, after t=0, all stocks are a record 
of historical flows; the amount of any stock existing, after the initial t=0 levels, must be 
equal to the volume of flows which have impacted on it. There are, in other words, no leaks 
from or additions to the system: its state at any given point in time is a complete record of 
both its pre-history (given in the initial level of stocks), and the flows that have taken place 
until time period t. This gives us: 
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It should be noted, for now, that this explicitly includes an initial period (the initial stock) 
that is distinct and separable from the subsequent flows. All this, in the Godley and Lavoie 
model, is modelling time as discrete periods: as self-contained periods, set against the 
general flow of time (indexed in t), during which economically meaningful activity takes 
place. This activity follows a particular structure; the art of economic modelling, in this case, 
lies in the correct description of the sequencing of activity, with the SFC system showing 
the complete functioning of the economy. 
Observed time, however, is continuous: one event occurs after another, always irreversibly, 
and sometimes with causal links. We do not observe discrete units of time, but rather we 
arbitrarily impose discrete units on a fundamentally continuous procession of events. 
Following this, Steve Keen has argued forcefully for the use of continuous, rather than 
discrete time in the modelling of the macroeconomy on “at least four grounds” (Keen 2009: 
163-4): 
1. That discrete economic events are dispersed through time, and therefore (as in the 
physical sciences like “radioactive decay in physics”) should be modelled 
continuously; 
2. Time dependencies in discrete-time models “often force unrealistic compromises 
on the modeller”; 
3. “..all entries in the equations are flows” in continuous time, with stocks “in a 
continuous time model are the value of the system states, which are given by the 
integral of the flows”; 
4. Time dependencies are “more easily handled in a continuous-time form” as 
different processes operate at different rates (“beat to a very different drum”) and 
the necessary time-lags differ in complex fashion. 
Point (1) is an argument by analogy. It is not, however, a priori true that what applies in 
one field of knowledge is applicable in any other; for this claim to operate, we would need 
also to have a convincing reason for thinking that rules applicable in one science are 
transferable into another.  As we shall shortly state, for social sciences – and in particular 
for economics – this is almost certainly not the case, but (even without that strong claim) it 
does not constitute an argument for the adoption of continuous time modelling in 
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economics. (2), somewhat similarly, is a weak statement: it may be the case that 
“unrealistic compromises” are “forced on the modeller”, but this is the case for any 
modelling procedure. The difficulty is between choosing different types of “unrealistic 
compromises”, not between compromises and no compromises. The argument does not 
hold. 
(3) and (4) are the strongest parts of Keen’s hypothesis. They constitute a claim about the 
ease with which real data can be fitted against a continuous time model, marking it out as a 
more efficient modelling procedure. However, in making this distinction, what we have 
argued as the core part of SFC’s appeal threatens to disappear. It is precisely because the 
matrices provide a sequencing of activity, for a given period, that they have the potential to 
represent (in abstract form) the logical sequencing of economic events occurring in real 
world and in continuous time. But it is a necessary abstraction from that real world to 
introduce the notion of a time period as a separate element within that continuous time, 
during which economically relevant events can occur. More formally, the set of all times T 
must contain a sequence of discrete and non-recurring periods: 
  [     |  ) 
The modelling procedure describes the common sequence of operations, but each period is 
itself distinct because each period operates on a given set of stocks arriving from either 
outside the model (t=0) or from previous sequences. The stocks are the relationship 
between periods; the flows are the relationships within. 
The within-period/without-period division is critical to the functioning of SFC models 
precisely because this is the window within which economically meaningful decisions can 
be made. Outside of this window, at the start and the end of the period being modelled, all 
stocks and all flows once again balance. Keen argues that continuous time can be imposed 
on the model, by reference to calculus. With S as the stock, and F as the flow over time, we 
have: 
  
  
 ∫      
An infinitesimally small discrete period approaches continuous time, as a definitional 
principle of the calculus. But to collapse discrete time periods in this manner, and the 
grounds that this allows an approximation towards the continuous, is to reduce the periods 
during which economic decisions that are fundamentally inconsistent with the balance-
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sheet principle can take place to a period length that is asymptotically approaching zero. 
The within-period is when decisions that affect final balances occur; at the end of the 
period, consistency (by definition) once again must hold. So in other words, a continuous 
time model, if it retains consistency, must also be a model in which equilibrium is the 
general condition of its existence, rather than the particular condition. There would, in this 
case, be little recommend in choosing an SFC representation of the world over a more 
conventional neoclassical model, which might in addition claim the advantages of 
microfoundations and greater internal consistency.5 
Further, the initial period, in this modelling, is not a separate element in the whole model. 
It is simply a flow that hasn’t moved yet. But this is to ignore precisely the presence of 
historical distributions of assets (real and financial) that give the economy we see today its 
character. In continuous time modelling, this necessary presence of history – or, if you like, 
a pre-history, existing prior to the modelled period – is occluded by the assumption of 
continuous time. The distribution of assets prior to modelling may well be arbitrary from 
the point of view of the model as such – they are simply a given arrival. But this is precisely 
why they need to be treated as distinct from the modelling period, and not bound by the 
laws of the model.  
Keen’s own modelling swerves around these two problems through the introduction of an 
accounting device that in turn allow his presentation of the transactions matrix to become 
imbalanced. He claims loans can be modelled as a “a record of account” (Keen 2006: 7), but 
this record of account, he stresses, is “not a bank account” (emphasis in original). Rather, it 
is a note of the obligations owing from the firm to the bank, and it is payments flowing 
from these obligations, rather than the obligation itself, that he treats as the point of 
economic interest. This is itself questionable: although Keen introduces, later, the 
possibility of repayment of the whole loan, its repayment is treated as a distinct operation. 
The loan and the money it arrives with is created “instantaneously”  (Keen 2006: 8), but the 
flows of repayments the loan engenders take place over time. In the absence of default, he 
models these as a smooth flow of repayments that, if taken as an integral over time, can be 
thought of as a stock.  
                                                          
5 A point similar to that Pontus Rendahl has made elsewhere in debating Keen, claiming “All GE models (including DSGE) are 
stock flow consistent.” Quoted in Lainton, Andrew (2012), “Some notes on Pontus Rendahl’s review of ‘Keensian Economics’, 
available at http://andrewlainton.wordpress.com/2012/12/06/some-notes-on-pontus-rendahls-review-of-keensian-
economics/ 
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This is, however, not wholly accurate: first, repayments need not arrive as a steady flow, as 
implied in treating the discrete repayments as if they could be modelled in continuous (and 
therefore differentiable) time. A single (non-defaulting) firm making repayments may well 
be able to be represented as a smooth, continuous flow of those payments; but firms in the 
aggregate may not, since the timing of initial loans may vary. Even if every repayment 
schedule follows the same path through time, it is not necessarily the case that aggregating 
these identical repayment schedules will result in a smooth repayment path. There is an 
obvious fallacy of composition that emerges if we attempt to simply summate all these 
repayment paths, if firms have taken out loans at different points in time. 
We can shows this fairly simply. Assume two loans of arbitrary amounts L1 and L2, taken out 
at times T1 and T2, with T1<T2 and  repayment periods of τ1 and τ2. We can set τ1=τ2 for ease 
of demonstration; it has no substantive bearing on the result. For simplicity, we set the 
interest rate to zero; again, this does not change the result. M1 is the repayment rate from 
the first loan, and M2 is the rate from the second. 
 
With time indexed by t, this creates a discontinuous repayment structure, Mtotal, as below: 
 
0<t<T1:    0 
T1<t<T2:    M1 
T1+T2<t<T1+τ1:   M1+M2 
T1+τ1<t<T1+τ2:   M2 
t>T1+τ2:    0 
 
The total repayment is given by∫          
 
 
. Both the amount repaid and the repayment 
rate have clear discontinuities at their start and end points, M1, M2, M1+τ1, M2+τ2. The total 
repayment can be calculated, despite these discontinuities, and at any point outside those 
transition points, the repayment rate may be smooth. But we cannot say that this applies 
to the whole curve. 
 
At any given point in time, the volume of repayment will in fact vary erratically: dependent 
on both the dating of the initial loans made and on the repayment schedule for each loan. 
The dating of the initial loan will, in reality, depend on decisions made by individual firms, 
and relate directly to their own financial position, expectations, and so on. These decisions 
cannot be easily aggregated precisely because, even in the simplest possible case (with all 
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repayment schedules following an identical functional form), these repayments vary over 
time. 
 
This problem is not solved if we allow that repayments over time follow a probability 
distribution, each repayment arriving at any point in time with a variable probability, on the 
basis that we do not know what the individual repayment schedules are. The aggregation 
of different and unknown probability distributions is possible, of course, and via the central 
limit theorem these can be assumed to approach the normal distribution as the number of 
distributions increases. But this problem of the unknown forms of the repayment schedule 
(which can therefore be approximated to normal given a sufficiently large number of firms) 
is not a problem in the probability of repayment at any given point in time: it is a problem 
of the flow of repayment at any given point in time, which itself depends on aggregation of 
(unknown) repayment schedules commencing at variable intervals into the past. It cannot 
be reduced to a probability distribution because the form of the distribution is itself 
dependent on the timing by which repayments are made: the probability of a repayment 
by any given firm at any one point in time is related to the time at which the repayment is 
due, since the repayment schedule commences at some variable point along the interval of 
total time. 
 
This problem can be resolved if we periodise our model with reference to the initial time 
period when a loan was contracted, and over which it will be repaid, and allow the 
repayment schedule to vary within the period. At this point, with the initial loan treated as 
a start-of-period stock, and the end result being a zero loan stock held by the firm, the 
problem of the fallacy of composition in aggregation of multiple loan periods is resolved. 
We have simply declared each period to be exactly the production period over which both 
financing is raised for that period, and during which time financing is spent. We have, in 
other words, moved straight back into the discrete time world Keen wished to avoid. 
 
This illustrates a more general problem. The discrete time periodisation matters because, in 
reality, the timing of investment decisions is not taken, conveniently, by some benevolent 
planner. Decisions to invest are taken by individual firms on the basis of their individual 
financial positions and expectations of future demand. These individual decisions are, of 
necessity in a monetary economy, decentralised: the existence of money itself, used as the 
means of payment for investment decisions, guarantees this much. If we wish to 
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convincingly model a monetary economy with decentralised investment and production, 
we cannot use continuous time to do so, since the implication is that investment decisions 
are taken by a single firm, with a single repayment schedule. 
 
This is not simply a matter of necessary degrees of abstraction. The presence of time is 
fundamental to the functioning of an economy. It is in better dealing with time that the SFC 
modelling procedure claims to hold its superiority over neoclassical modelling. The correct 
method of modelling that time, however, is not then to introduce it as a continuous 
variable. Mathematically, the only coherent way to do this is to treat that continuous 
variable as the integral of a series of infinitesimally time periods, over which variables alter. 
This is not appropriate, however, because the time that matters to the economic model is 
the timeframe over which economically relevant decisions are taken. For the individual 
agent, whether firm, household, or otherwise, this time period appears to be continuous, 
and is experienced essentially as a continuous flow. For the whole economy, however, we 
cannot simply aggregate these continuous experiences of time because a clear fallacy of 
composition emerges in the behaviour of the economy as a whole.  
 
For the aggregate, the correct periodisation is necessarily in discrete time, because the 
decisions taken by individual agents cannot be reduced to a continuous time period. In the 
current discussion, it is the decision to invest by individual and decentralised firms that 
provides the initial impetus for the investment over a period of time. This interval of time 
(against the continuous, real-world time) is best thought of as the period over which any 
repayments arising from the initial period of investment must be made. This period can be 
thought of as an arbitrary, discrete unit length against the continuous, real-world time, and 
that unit length can be thought of as standard across production units for the sake of 
simplicity. Nonetheless, it must exist as a discrete interval of a time period shorter than 
infinity, and longer than zero plus some arbitrary constant. It cannot exist as the interval of 
the asymptotic limit approaching zero against real world time.  
 
It is the presence of money, as the decentralised, privately-held unit of payment in which 
payments are made for autonomous investment decisions that forces this reliance on 
discrete rather than continuous time as a modelling requirement.  If decisions to invest in 
general are decentralised and made in money terms, the decision to actually motivate 
investment for any particular firm will be tied to the inherent uncertainty of such a world: 
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the uncertainty that necessarily exists in an economy of decentralised units and money 
payments. This uncertainty, although a social feature of the economy, appears to each 
individual unit within the economy as its own particular uncertainty. Expectations about 
the future, and plans for further investment, are developed on the basis of an 
understanding of that uncertainty, with payments made on the basis of plans formed using 
the money unit of payment. It is, therefore, the capacity of money to both start and 
complete cycles of investment, with (in the formal description of the circuit) money 
entering the start of the circuit and then exiting at the end, that allows real-world time to 
become partitioned into discrete units, dependent on the decisions made by the 
decentralised and fundamentally autonomous firms making the investments. It is necessary, 
then, in a money economy with decentralised investment to allow discrete time periods to 
be modelled, since in a fundamental sense the precise timing of the decisions to invest and 
the amount to invest are outside of any general social control and necessarily unknown to 
the outside observer. It is money that creates investment period, and a money economy – 
rather than one with real-goods payments, say, or wholly centralised investment – that 
demands discrete-time modelling.  
 
The consequence, then, of introducing continuous time is to abstract from the real 
conditions of the economy’s organisation and replace them with a mathematical 
convenience, in the form of integral calculus, that glosses over the real differentiation that 
necessarily exists amongst competing production units in a monetary economy. To remove 
the presence of stocks as a distinct element within the system – distinct, and separable 
from the flows – is to remove one of the fundamental and, it is argued here, necessary 
elements of stock-flow consistency, replacing instead with something closer to the “flow-
flow consistency” (Taylor 2008: 640) of Keynes’ or Kalecki’s original work on the 
macroeconomy. If we suppose that stocks and flows can be easily treated as equivalents, 
non-additively, we dissolve this distinction entirely. 
 
The elision is made from capital as a whole, in the aggregate, to capital in particular, 
existing as a single unit, under the guise of describing the whole system: a parallel 
procedure to that enacted in the standard DSGE model, through the “representative agent”, 
but here introduced without the presumed benefits of microfoundations and optimal 
behaviour. The conditions under which economic choices are made by separate actors, in 
fact, are also reduced to a minimum by collapsing the necessary period of their actions to a 
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minimum point so as to sustain a continuously differentiable representation of the 
economy as a whole. Money, as the bearer of economic autonomy for individual agents, 
and competitive conditions of production are abstracted away from, rather than being 
foundational for the understanding of the economy, with the differentiated parts of the 
whole being reduced to a smooth consistency. Economics is replaced by an engineering 
problem. 
 
 
Time in a monetary economy 
 
The accumulation of stocks, and in particular those stocks that generate income, introduces 
further complications. Capital is the name of the distinct part of the economy that is 
adapted to the wider flows, but itself is (quite fundamentally) not a flow, and cannot be 
reduced to one. It stands (in this sense) in opposition to time, as recorded in the set of 
flows within the SFC matrix. Nor is it, as we will consider in the next chapter, reducible (as 
in the Ricardian and neo-Ricardian settings) to the summation of historic elements. The 
difficulties that capital causes for essentially any version of economic theory – whether in 
its pricing, or in its earning a positive return – can be attributed further to the difficulties 
caused by the presence of time as such. The process of development is both sequential, in 
which flows emerging at one point are captured in another – just as SFC shows – but also 
subject to the presence of distinct elements that are accumulated, and fixed relative to the 
flow. 
 
It is the appearance of differentiation of elements of the economy with respect to time that 
argues, also, for the need to consider time not as the continuous movement along a curve, 
but as a series of discrete intervals. The introduction of discrete intervals also aids the focus 
on specific sequences of interaction within the economy. Causality matters, in the 
traditional, Humean sense; the weaker concept of Granger causality, popularised in the use 
of large VAR models, is appropriate for a conception of time as a smooth process, and 
therefore of equilibrium as the key to conceptualising the economy. But once time is 
considered, in practice, as discrete, we are pushed towards also considering the 
connections between those intervals of time – that is, between the necessary and logical 
ordering of processes within the abstract economy – and, further, towards an appreciation 
of time not as a single continuous mapping for all available objects, but as a whole that is 
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identified by its differentiated parts (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 99-101). Different 
temporalities operate within an economy; this is generally, if weakly, recognised by the 
common distinction drawn between the short-run (commonly, that point at which only one 
factor of production can be varied in a neoclassical model) and the long-run (that point at 
which all factors can be varied).  
 
Neoclassical growth models attempt to collapse the one into the other: the appearance of 
equilibrium over time, and therefore of all variations away from a stable “steady state” as 
deviations from the temporal equilibrium path, is a means by which the assumption of 
ergodicity within the model is sustained. It is a longstanding objection to the neoclassical 
system by post-Keynesians that the real economy is nonergodic (Davis 2010): that the 
correct differentiation to make, therefore, in considering its operations and modelling its 
behaviour over time is not to find a “steady state” path (effectively treating all deviations 
from this path as errors within the model) but to identify the real processes of economic 
dynamics. That, in turn, has helped define a particular concern with the sequencing of 
economic processes, and of the causality within the model that (although assumed away by 
equilibrium modelling) is critical to the behaviour of the economy over time. 
 
It is in the consideration of how economies change over time that a core issue within SFC 
modelling emerges – that of accounting for income. Godley and Lavoie, to maintain 
consistency in their approach, use a particular definition of income, derived from Haig 
(1928) and Simons (1938). They define it as consumption, plus the change in wealth, the 
reasoning being that consumption must have arisen somewhere as an income, and that 
changes in wealth capture important price and valuation effects (Godley and Lavoie: 140). 
 
 
 
II. INCOME CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Defining income 
 
At the heart of the treatment of income is the issue of its definition. If we move from the 
essentially static conception of the economy implied in the neoclassical, general 
equilibrium framework and towards something that exhibits genuine dynamics then, as we 
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have seen above, a number of new complications begin to emerge. It is not at all clear, in a 
dynamic setting, what we should mean by even as basic a concept as income. Clearly, units 
in the macroeconomy earn something: there are observed transfers of monetary and real 
resources, and these transfers form a complex whole. But within that complex whole, the 
question of definition asserts itself. As a later chapter suggests, profits – incomes generated 
for firm owners in excess of initial funding – become a distinct problem at the level of the 
macroeconomy. For individual entrepreneurs, it is no great issue: they have no need to fret 
about where the revenues they earn come from, and could quite happily make a profit 
while (in theory) every other unit was earning a loss. But, unless we declare (implausibly) 
that the whole sector should be bound by a zero profits condition, losses and profits across 
individual units balancing each other to leave net zero profits for the economy as a whole, 
the paradox of positive net profits must emerge in a monetary economy with decentralised 
production. Income flows that present no problem at the micro, in other words, can 
become a macroeconomic issue. 
 
Since, however, this is a monetary, rather than a real, economy, those incomes must be 
measured in monetary units. And if the flows are measured in monetary units, the issue of 
accounting for those flows emerges, in a way that they would not for a real-terms 
economy: there, flows of income represent a real transfer of resources, there being no 
need to maintain also a record of the monetary transaction that the income was related to, 
since the monetary side was (as in the classical dichotomy) either irrelevant or (as in the 
New Keynesian tweaks) a deviation from the real-terms general equilibrium. 
 
This means, then, that the problem of income in monetary terms presents itself in the first 
instance as an accounting issue: what is the correct means by which incomes for units 
should be recorded, given the presence of money and earnings in monetary form? The 
critical issue here, again, is that of periodisation: given that money flows across units, is 
income determined by the flows that appear within the time period under consideration, 
or by those that take place between time periods, as measured by changes in the value of 
stocks held? There is not much a priori reason to favour or disfavour one over the other; in 
practice, the decision has tended to be driven by the purposes of the analysis.  
 
Historically, accountancy has tended to favour within-period flows, as recorded by the 
income statement, and economics, the changes in the values of stocks held, as recorded by 
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balance sheets, reflecting the different purposes of the two disciplines. The accountancy 
definition is, by its nature, backward-looking: it examines the record of transactions that 
have occurred, and determines the flow of incomes on this basis, as the difference 
between revenues realised and costs consumed (Mitchell 1967: 762-3)  Economics has, by 
attempting to determine the net values of stocks, adopted a forward-looking definition of 
incomes, since the value of stocks will change depending on expected future incomes 
relating to those stocks. Income, in this case, can be defined (following (Hicks 1946: 172)  
“the maximum value which *the consumer+ can consume during a week and still expect to 
be as well off at the end of the week as he was at the beginning.” (emphasis added). This is 
close, but not identical to, to the Haig-Simons definition Godley and Lavoie use. 
 
The differences between initial definitions emerges in the two separate conceptions of net 
worth. In an accountancy definition, this is simply assets minus liabilities, with assets valued 
at historic costs. Under the economic definition of income, net worth is the current value of 
assets, plus the net present value of future receipts, minus liabilities. In a general 
equilibrium setting, this difference would in practice disappear: the historic cost of any 
asset acquired would be the same as its expected value, since with perfect capital markets 
all assets would be priced at their expected future income streams, as the efficient markets 
hypothesis predicts (Fama 1970). It is this thought that helped motivate the shift towards 
mark-to-market valuations for financial corporations over the last few decades, on the 
assumption that this would provide a more accurate basis for the valuation of large, 
complex financial entities like investment banks. As things turned out, it was the mark-to-
market procedure that helped both arguably overvalue clearly deficient companies like 
Bear Sterns or Lehman Bros prior to the debacle, and then (once the crisis had kicked off) 
helped accelerate their demise. Adrian Tobias and Hyung Sun Shin argue that mark-to-
market rules introduce a more general procyclicality to markets, exaggerating existing 
movements as asset repricings are factored into financial firms’ balance sheets (Tobias and 
Shin 2008). 
 
Actually existing markets, unfortunately, fail to abide by the rules of efficiency, and it is 
exactly in recognition of this fact that SFC and other alternative modelling procedures have 
been devised. This, however, removes the easy correspondence that would otherwise exist 
between the (backward-looking) accounting measure of income and the (forward-looking) 
economic measure. 
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The accounting version of income, however, effectively presupposes what amounts to a 
form of barter economy, akin to that presupposed by general equilibrium modelling. It is 
central to any definition of money that it not just acts as a means of conducting 
transactions; it is also a unit of account, and (if hoarded) a store of value. It is its role in 
facilitating not just temporal exchanges, but intertemporal exchanges that gives money this 
character. Its use as purchasing power can be “generalised in two different directions, 
across commodities and over time” (Bhaduri 1986: 89). The accountancy measure, though, 
closes this open-endedness of the monetary form by supposing that all flows that have 
occurred can be netted off from each other without reference, in addition, to the presence 
of variations in their monetary value with reference to existing stocks. That is to say, the 
variation in value of existing stocks of assets (and liabilities) does not enter the equation 
and, therefore, money’s character as a generalised means of exchange and valuation is 
curtailed, since if this was a generalised use, it would be necessary to also take account of 
the valuation of flows relative to the stocks of available financing. Money has a use, on this 
basis, in only a single “direction”: not as a unit capable of facilitating intertemporal 
exchanges, but as one only capable of temporal use, since its existence as a stock (that is, 
as something held over and against time) cannot be accounted for. The practical 
consequence of this is that the accounting measure of income takes no heed of the 
changes in the general level of prices, assuming the existence of a “stable monetary unit” 
over time (Mitchell 1967: 770). The relationship between stocks of assets (financial and 
real) and the flow of monetary value that otherwise exists has been lost. 
 
An income measure derived in this way, then, excludes the operation of money as a unit of 
account and store of value. It appears as a mere facilitator of temporal exchange, with the 
income measure derived being one that exists “as if” money was a pure token for 
exchange, rather than money as such. The generality of its existence is lost.  
 
In addition, the use of an accountancy definition of income abstracts from the presence of 
uncertainty. All previous flows are, by definition, known with certainty, since they have 
already occurred. Future values of assets, however, are subject to the uncertainty that 
prevails in any economic system. As we have indicated, it is fundamental to the post-
Keynesian account of a capitalist economy, with decentralised production decisions and 
where money exists, that uncertainty is of a definitional character to understanding the 
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economy: all decisions must take place against a generalised background of social 
uncertainty, rather than the merely additive “risk” that neoclassical economics supposes 
prevails. Deeper yet, it is generally held that money is the pre-eminent social institution by 
which this uncertainty can be dealt with, precisely through its use as a store of value.6  
 
This brings us close to some of the singular problems with reliance on balance sheets and 
accounting definitions in attempting to construct models of the macroeconomy. It is in the 
issue of uncertainty that the accounting definition, or anything approaching it, becomes 
most problematic. We are operating in SFC with an economic model that places huge store 
on the use of money – as credit-money, pre-eminently as inside money – as the means by 
which all economic transactions are performed, and, if not performed, the measure by 
which are all units are valued. Money, its creation, use, and disposal are central to the 
entirety of the operation of the mode in the way that it simply is not for more 
conventional, neoclassical modelling strategies. It is absolutely essential, then, that the 
consistency that is claimed for SFC representations applies not just across the balance 
sheet, or as an accounting feature: the operations of the model need also to be internally 
consistent with its own claims to be a model of a monetary economy. 
 
Money in the post-Keynesian view is the central social institution for dealing with 
uncertainty. Uncertainty is related to time, but not reducible to it: it is the combination of 
both time’s irreversibility and future events’ unknowability that introduce uncertainty. 
Were either to be removed as a feature of a sequence of events over time, uncertainty 
would also be removed: indeed, the standard neoclassical means for treating uncertainty 
as “risk” depend on something like this manoeuvre, converting uncertain possible future 
states to the status of contingent commodities, capable of being priced as if by comparison 
to each other. Time, to remove uncertainty, is crippled in one of its attributes to enable 
rational choices to be made. 
 
SFC models seek to break with that, locating themselves as part of a tradition within in 
economics that has looked to the sequencing and circularity of events as the best available 
means to begin to abstract from the complexities of real social relationships and the 
construction of viable models and analysis. Within the SFC procedure, the question of 
earnings and income becomes paramount, because these are exactly the flows that allow 
                                                          
6 The following chapter will cover this point in more detail. 
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the system of stocks to become connected and dynamic over time. Because SFC seeks to 
represent something of an advance over the earlier “flow-flow” models of Keynes and 
similar authors, the presence of stocks is central; because these stocks are not disembodied 
entities, or entities inspiring action at a distance – perhaps akin to revealed preference in 
neoclassical consumer theory – the relationships between stocks and flows requires explicit 
attention. Relationships between the two need to be made explicit for the model to 
operate; the balance sheet and transactions matrices, indeed, force this on the modeller. 
The fundamental conception of income, then, matters; as a definitional matter it must 
connect both stocks to flows and vice versa.  
 
Godley and Lavoie, therefore, understandably adopt an economic measure of income, 
recognisably derived via Hicks’ original formulation. This should, in theory, provide them 
with a sound basis on which to value the end-of-period stocks, given the system of prior 
flows as motivated by the behavioural equations. However, some confusions already start 
to creep in, in which the requirements of consistency that Godley and Lavoie choose to 
impose on the system force them away from a correct economic account of income, and 
into a (basically incorrect for these purposes) accounting definition. It is in the difficulties of 
dealing with the presence of uncertainty that the SFC system finds its weakest points.  
 
Solving the Godley-Lavoie model 
 
Stepping back slightly, the simplest version of their model can be solved analytically, 
making use of the quadruple-accounting rules. As noted above, the presence of both the 
budget constraint, and the double-entry accounting rule together ensure that the system is 
closed: that, in economic terms, “everything come from somewhere, and goes to 
somewhere”, or, in mathematical terms, that the system is determined. With no capital 
accumulation, the analytical solution (shown in the appendix, from Godley and Lavoie’s SIM 
model) reveals the unsurprising result that all income received by households is consumed 
entirely, and household net saving is zero, with no growth over time.  It is a comparatively 
simple matter to see, at this point, how the comparison with a standard Walrasian general 
equilibrium fits: the quadruple accounting rules are the direct equivalent of the 
equilibrating mechanism contained in Walras’ law and optimising behaviour. In the latter 
case, the “rules” needed to bring the model towards a steady state are behavioural. In the 
former, they depend on the structure of the balance sheets: we do not need an explicit 
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behavioural rule to generate stability, as the analytical solution shows. This is, however, a 
solution based on something a little like a sleight of hand: as Godley and Lavoie say, in 
extending the model beyond this simple point, that in this model “production is 
instantaneous: it did not require the passage of time” (Godley and Lavoie: 218). But as we 
have earlier suggested, it is precisely the process of accumulation (as a process operating 
through time) that makes time relevant: that stocks may vary from the start of the period 
to the end. The parallel here with static Walrasian general equilibrium analysis is of course 
exact: both models are, in the sense of being indifferent to time as a process, “static”. 
 
It is necessary to expand on this model, since it deliberately excludes the overwhelming 
fact of accumulation over time. First, the presence of the quadruple accounting rule means 
that only small additions to the baseline model can rapidly increase the complexity of the 
model beyond the point at which it can be plausibly solved analytically. A simulation 
method must instead be used.  
 
Second, this complexity makes the relationship (or parallel) with general equilibrium harder 
to discern. General equilibrium models with growth, like the baseline Solow growth model, 
rely on the introduction of further behavioural rules to bring stability and closure to the 
system. In the case of the Solow growth model, this was through endogenising the 
capital:income ratio via the neoclassical production function, which ensured that the 
economy, over time, would develop on a “balanced” growth path, in which the major ratios 
(capital:labour and output:labour) are stable over time, and can be treated as equivalent to 
a static equilibrium.  
 
For Godley and Lavoie, without the option of behavioural assumptions, building a stable 
model in a dynamic setting is far harder. Their path to a solution exploits the fact that the 
model is based on money, rather than real values. Since the system is fundamentally a 
monetary economy, the problem of accumulation must take a monetary form. By assuming 
that fixed capital, K, is owned by households, they can assume that household net wealth is 
the same as fixed capital, since both are valued in the same monetary unit. Credit money, 
supplied by private banks, can then be introduced as the means by which fixed K is 
accumulated, with the private sector now holding deficits (as a result of loans) upon which 
they are expected to pay interest. However, with fixed K in a purely monetary form, 
equivalent to net wealth, this is not a significant challenge: wealth (here, fixed K) can be 
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netted off against loans outstanding, since both are in monetary form. The double-entry 
rule requires that the appearance of fixed capital must be properly accounted for within 
the matrix, since it must represent both an asset and a liability, requiring the expansion of 
firms’ accounts into capital and current expenditure, with capital accumulation (in this 
simple form) represented as a transfer from the capital to current accounts each period.  
An analytical solution remains possible (Godley and Lavoie: ch.7), since the system is closed 
and will drive itself towards steady state, on the basis of the assumptions made, even 
where the model begins initially a significantly long way from the steady state (ibid: 233-
240). The parallel, again, with Walrasian general equilibrium should be obvious.  
 
It is only, as we see, in the rest of this chapter, once some differentiation in the forms of 
capital accumulation is introduced that both analytical solutions become increasingly hard 
to find; and, as suggested below, the assumed equivalence with general equilibrium breaks 
down. We demonstrate that is only with the introduction of behavioural assumptions 
exactly matching those of neoclassical economics (that is, based on a particular form of 
optimising behaviour) that a genuinely dynamic stock-flow model, with productive wealth 
differentiated from wealth in general, and accumulation appearing over time, based on the 
Godley-Lavoie system matches general equilibrium. 
 
 
 
III. INVENTORIES IN SFC 
 
The appearance of inventories 
 
The Godley-Lavoie model, and related SFC models, pose an innovation generally excluded 
from economic modelling: the explicit appearance of inventories, held by firms, as stocks 
that can alter over time and that are themselves subject to decision-making by agents 
within the economy. Inventories immediately create a distinction in the forms of wealth 
held within the economy: it is no longer possible to assume that capital is the same as 
wealth, since, whilst inventories held by firms are clearly part of their capital, “inventories” 
held by the household sector are assumed to be wholly consumed, and play no further part 
in the model as such. The same output changes its economic status depending on whose 
hands it remains in. Inventories provide, potentially, a means to model for the distinct 
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properties of capital without having to introduce a new class of assets, since the addition of 
simply an extra section on the balance sheet, inventories held by firms, immediately 
creates them. 
 
It is inventories that appear, in the first instance, as a within-model index of the presence 
of wider uncertainty, prevalent in conditions of decentralised production. Inventories 
emerge in the baseline SFC model as the result of production occurring prior to sales being 
concluded. Production, then, takes place in conditions of uncertainty: while firms are 
assumed to fix their level output given the expected state of demand, and price according 
to a mark-up rule, they do not know for certain, ex ante, whether all their output will be 
sold ex post.7 Inventories, then, function as an index of uncertainty: the presence of 
unknown ex post values induces firms to overproduce, relative to their expected sales.  
 
There is little doubt that inventories matter, from a macroeconomic point of view. 
Although inventory accumulation accounts for a very small part of declared investment by 
firms, as (Blinder 1990: 85) argues, “the overwhelming importance of inventory 
movements in business cycles is one of those basic facts that seems to be inadequately 
appreciated”. His estimates suggest that movements in inventory accumulation “typically 
account for 70 percent of peak to trough real GDP decline during recessions.” (Blinder 
1990: 1). Including them within an economic model should provide a credible means 
through which business cycle dynamics can occur. 
 
From the point of the view of the balance sheet, initial sales are a positive addition to firms’ 
current accounts – money arriving directly from consumers, and constitute a source of 
funds for consumers. Unsold goods, Godley and Lavoie argue, are an addition to current 
inventories, ΔIN. But the question then is how to treat this addition to the (real) stock of 
unsold goods on the (financial) balance sheet. With inventories held previously sold off 
before new production is added to the current stock, the important element is the net 
change in inventories. In the case of new unsold stock appearing in firms’ inventories, they 
suggest that, from the “standpoint of accountants”, these unsold goods can be treated as if 
they were sold by one department of the firm – the production department – to another – 
the capital department. This gives the signs needed to mark the changes on the balance 
sheet: on the production side, funds are (in effect) acquired, as inventories are transferred 
                                                          
7 We can ignore, for simplicity, the desire of firms to hold additional stocks to deal with wholly unexpected demands. 
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over to the capital department, and are therefore marked positively; for the capital 
department, these inventories are an acquisition and so constitute a use of funds. As ever, 
a use of funds is marked with a negative side. The whole operation, then, is balanced within 
the firm: for its current account, the addition to inventories appears as a positive, and for 
the capital account they appear as a negative (Godley and Lavoie 2007: 251). 
 
The logic here seems internally consistent with the balance sheet methodology Godley and 
Lavoie use. Assuming the firm has unsold stocks of goods after sales have taken place (and 
funds acquired from sales), these stocks become an item on its capital account, 
representing an acquisition of an asset rather than a use of funds, while for the production 
department, the opposite occurs. “From the standpoint of accountants” this all seems 
reasonable. 
 
However, from the point of view of the economy, this is not correct. Uncertainty can work 
in the other direction for the firm: inventories can be held over from previous periods, and 
used to cope with unexpectedly high demand. But note, critically, that this implies an 
asymmetry in their use: while production in excess of actual demand produces an increase 
in the stock of current inventories, production insufficient to meet actual demand produces 
a depletion in the stock of previous inventories. We will return to this point shortly. 
 
 
Inventories as a bridge between past and future 
 
Remembering our distinction between accountancy (backwards-looking) and economic 
(forwards-looking) definitions of income, it should be seen here that inventories, if treated 
in the manner Godley and Lavoie suggest, constitute an uneasy bridge between two 
different conceptions of a firms’ financial position and therefore its decision-making 
process. Firms produce on the basis of their expected sales, at the price they set. Output is 
whatever firms choose to produce, given their expectations. Additions to inventories, in 
this instance, constitute a failure of their existing forecasts: they emerge only as an error 
term, in effect. The ideal for a profit-maximising firm would be to run a long-run inventory 
position that was as low as possible given inherent uncertainties about fluctuating sales. In 
the short-term, inventories can vary over time and in response to changing market 
94 
 
conditions. The stock of existing inventories, as with other stocks, constitutes a record of 
prior forecast failures, plus whatever stock turned up at time t=0. 
 
Firms, acting as profit maximisers, therefore will take account of their existing stocks of 
inventories when setting their production targets. For their simplest functioning model, 
and in physical quantity terms, Godley and Lavoie (2007) describe this as (Equation 9.1): 
 
               
       
 
The firm establishes a target inventory to sales ratio on the basis of (by assumption) 
maintaining a fixed capital:output level (Godley and Lavoie 2007: 286). Knowing, however, 
that “their expectations may be mistaken”, firms only aim to produce a fraction of their 
inventory target, given the existence of current inventories: 
 
          (  
      ) 
 
We can leave aside, for now, the specification of expectations formation: it is not directly 
relevant for the rest. Note, however, that this is all specified in physical quantities. But this 
is, very overtly, a monetary economy. There are both obvious problems of aggregation in 
lumping together heterogeneous goods in physical terms, although thus far we could treat 
y as a vector of produced goods without doing serious damage to the analysis.  More 
importantly, since the firms are expected to repay its loan in money, it must produce profits 
in monetary form. They will produce physical outputs, but they anticipate receiving money. 
The value of the inventories in the money form therefore matters, aside from their physical 
levels. 
 
That, in turn, means that the profit function must be described in money terms if the circuit 
is to be completed and credit-money supplied returned to the banks. Godley and Lavoie 
specify the relevant profit function as  
 
                    
 
They label this “entrepreneurs’ profits”. Here, the capital letters represent the nominal 
values of the variables: F is the firms’ aggregate profits, composed of sales revenues (S) 
minus money wages paid (WB). These two elements can be easily valued in terms of 
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current prices and current expenditure. Current profits are earned at current prices, by 
definition; sales likewise; and the money wages paid are simply the money advanced by the 
firm to secure labour’s services. All of these elements are unproblematical, in their own 
terms, and given the balance sheet presentation. 
 
The last two, however, are more complex. The final element represents the interest paid 
on the loans advanced. Loans were advanced by banks initially to secure production; these 
money loans were paid to households to secure labour, necessary to meet the firms’ 
production targets. To the extent that households consumed that which firms were selling, 
firms’ loans were repaid. To the extent that households did not, loans were left 
outstanding. If this is the case, then, the value of outstanding loans must be equal to the 
value of the inventories held. It is therefore the case that the cost of holding inventories is 
the cost of making interest payments on current loans outstanding. The two are identical in 
this instance. 
 
The second-to-last term, ΔIN, is more complex. It represents the net change in inventories 
over the period, and appears as an addition to the entrepreneurs’ profits because of its 
status as an addition to the firms’ current account as an acquisition of funds, set against the 
firms’ capital account acquisition of the inventories, and therefore loss of funds. This item 
ensures that the balance sheet remains, as ever, balanced, with each flow registering its 
equal and opposite reaction. The economic logic for this addition to profits is that 
inventories represent an acquisition of funds for the firms’ current accounts, and therefore 
can be treated as a net inflow for the purposes of deciding their financial positions. The 
inventories themselves are an asset for the firms, held by their capital accounts. Godley 
and Lavoie imply that this definition of profits, in accounting for the changing asset position 
of firms is compatible with an economic definition of profits, recognisably derived from 
John Hicks (1946), in which “profit is the sum of money that can be periodically extracted 
from a set of business operations and distributed while leaving the balance sheet of the 
concern unchanged.” (Godley and Lavoie 2007: 255) By incorporating inventories as a net 
addition to profits, they are ensuring that this condition can seemingly be met. 
 
But these inventories, newly acquired, must be valued in money terms, since the firm itself 
owes money. Its position in pure physical quantity terms is of no relevance to a bank 
insisting on balances being paid in its own credit-money. The consideration that matters, 
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then, is the valuation of the inventories in terms of money. It is here that Godley and 
Lavoie’s treatment of inventories, we argue, begins to fail. 
 
 
The valuation of inventories 
 
Godley and Lavoie argue that inventories should, indeed, be valued in money terms. This 
implies that the physical vector of inventories must be weighted by a price vector, giving 
the money value of the inventories concerned. However, given that inventories were 
acquired either at the start of the current period, or at some point in the past, it is not 
immediately clear which vector of prices to use.  
 
Their argument proceeds as follows. On the assumption of a single common good 
produced, we can easily show that the change in physical inventories is 
 
                
 
With physical quantities marked again in lower case, this shows the change in the physical 
quantity of inventories is the same as the unconsumed output. “We now need,“ they go on 
to argue, “some relations to move smoothly from physical units to dollar values.” (Godley 
and Lavoie 2007: 257). This, they propose, can be found by taking a nominal value of 
inventories, IN, to be equal to the volume of physical units produced “valued at cost.” This, 
they claim, must be the case because “this is how much it actually cost to get and produce 
the inventories” (ibid 2007: 257). They give this as 
 
         
 
Where UC is the unit cost of production, defined as the wage cost per unit produced today. 
There is, immediately, a problem here. The value of producing the inventories was certainly 
the cost of producing them. This much is banal. But the value on the firms’ current balance 
sheet is surely not the cost of producing those inventories again. The cost “to get and 
produce the inventories” was not the cost today. It was the cost when they were produced. 
 
The value to the firm today, on the other hand is surely the value it can receive from 
disposing of the inventory through a sale. This, after all, was precisely the argument for 
97 
 
treating the inventories as a net gain for measured profits. The current cost of the 
inventory is an irrelevancy. If inventories were a cost, as valuation at current cost would 
imply, they would have to be counted as a cost against the flow of profits distributed by 
the firm. The current cost valuation of inventories is, then, incorrect for the purposes of 
valuing the inventories given the definition of profits as that sum which can be extracted 
from the firm’s operations leaving the balance sheet unchanged. Valuation at the cost of 
current production would not, in reality, leave the firms’ true balance sheet unchanged, at 
least in the sense of not altering its net worth given its asset and liability position.  
 
We can develop the issues here by opening up the inventory equation a little, following 
Godley and Lavoie’s own presentation (2007: 257):  
 
                                    
  
This apparently simple expansion of the previous equation, based on its total 
differentiation in discrete time, helps identify the real problems here. This equation claims 
that the changes in the value of the inventories is equal to the value of the change in the 
physical volume of inventories, multiplied by their current cost, plus the change in the 
current cost, multiplied by the physical volume of the old inventories. It bears a 
resemblance to the derivation Godley and Lavoie propose as the general rule “for asset 
stock, tangible or financial” that they use repeatedly (2007: 136). However, because the 
values used here are costs for the firms, rather than market values of the assets, the 
general rule cannot apply. The equation has very little economic content. 
 
Godley and Lavoie have claimed that their profit rule is one of economic profits: that, 
following Hicks, it is based on a forward-looking notion of the stability of balance sheets 
given the disbursement of funds from firms’ operations. But the decomposition of the 
inventory valuation formula makes clear that this is not, in fact, the case. The equation is 
partly forwards-looking, in the sense of using current values: the final term in the middle 
section shows current unit costs, UC, entering the calculation. Since inventories are 
produced at the start of the time period, at the end of the period this can be taken as the 
price of producing further inventories at the start of the next time period.  
 
It is also, however, backwards-looking, in the sense that past values enter in the form of an 
historic cost, as can be seen from the first term in the middle section. By the same logic as 
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followed in the last paragraph, the value given for the unit cost of the preceding period 
must be the same as the value of the unit cost at the start of the current period: the final 
cost of one becomes the commencement cost of another. The real historic cost of 
producing the inventories was the actual cost to the firm of producing the inventories held. 
However, the actual cost of producing any given unit in the inventory can vary over time. 
An inventory item produced, say, five periods ago may not cost the same as one produced 
at the start of the current period. This, however, is the assumption made here: the 
structure of historic costs is collapsed into a single cost item, that of costs at the start of the 
current period. Had a market valuation rule been used, consistent with the other values 
entered in the balance sheet, this would not be a problem: all inventories held by the firm 
would be for sale at today’s price, irrespective of their historic cost of production.  
 
This cost price, however, appears to have no economic meaning: it is neither the resale 
value of the inventory, nor is it (unless costs are assumed to be fixed) the actual 
replacement cost to the firm of producing another inventory. Yet this term enters as a 
determinant of the final value, to the firm as measured on its balance sheet, of its current 
stock of inventories. There may be some accounting relevance to this figure, since it 
measures the flow of an income (the change in inventory value) under an accounting rule 
for incomes. There is no convincing reason it should, however, enter consideration for the 
firm in terms of its balance sheet operations. 
 
We have, in effect, an uneasy amalgam of an accounting definition of income and the 
economic definition of income. The Godley-Lavoie claim to be sticking to the economic 
definition of income is trumped by their need to maintain consistency within the balance 
sheet presentation. This confusion has real effects. The firms’ real net worth would in 
general change if profits were distributed according to the rule Godley and Lavoie provide, 
since the value of the inventories (at their sale) would not in general coincide with the 
value of their production today. The value of their production today is given by UC=WB/y, 
where WB is the total nominal wage bill. This will only equal the value of sales in the 
exceptional case when all existing inventories are consumed in their entirety by household 
spending. This, in turn, will only happen when both the households’ marginal propensity to 
consume from income is unity (and so all income is consumed), and when the net addition 
to inventories is zero, a clearly exceptional condition only likely to prevail under perfect 
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foresight and zero growth. Under other conditions, a depletion of inventories would 
deplete a firms’ net worth.  
 
 
Inventories, the national accounts, and net worth 
 
This confusion produces real effects when we attempt to relate the construction here to 
actual national accounts. With investment taking place (in a world without fixed capital) 
only in inventories, we have  
 
             (   ) 
 
With p.s as the price multiplied by sales measured in physical volume terms. The final 
element on the right-hand side is the expenditure today of firms on new inventories: 
clearly, this is equal to the cost today, multiplied by the increase in the physical volume of 
inventories. Using S as the nominal value of sales, and recalling from earlier that 
 
                    
 
We can therefore rewrite the equation for national income as 
 
                     
 
Both S and ΔIN can be read straight from balance sheets as the volume of sales and the 
value of inventories. They directly correspond to the columns in the firms’ current account 
of the balance sheets as presented (Godley and Lavoie 2007: 262). The final element, 
however, is peculiar. It is the value of the current-period change in costs of producing 
inventories, multiplied by the old level of inventories. This, again, has no obvious economic 
meaning or relevance: there is no reason to suppose this peculiar calculation would ever 
enter any firms’ decisionmaking procedures. It is a residual element, the leftover product of 
the earlier confusion over historic and actual costs, and replacement versus resale 
valuation of inventories. 
 
Godley and Lavoie excuse this by reference to the authority of the national accounts 
themselves, where a similar adjustment is made under the guise of “inventory valuation 
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adjustment”. Balance sheets can be brought into alignment with the national accounts 
through the periodic use of this adjustment factor, applied ex post to accounts recorded. 
But this does not provide any theoretical basis for making the calculation. It remains a 
residual, theoretically unexplained, but necessary in practice because, as the US “Guide to 
the National Accounts” relates: 
 
“Inventory valuation adjustment (IVA) is the difference between the cost of 
inventory withdrawals valued at acquisition cost and the cost of inventory 
withdrawals valued at replacement cost. The IVA is needed because inventories 
as reported by business are often charged to cost of sales (that is, withdrawn) at 
their acquisition (historical) cost rather than at their replacement cost (the 
concept underlying the NIPAs). As prices change, businesses that value inventory 
withdrawals at acquisition cost may realize profits or losses. Inventory profits, a 
capital-gains-like element in business income (corporate profits and nonfarm 
proprietors’ income), result from an increase in inventory prices, and inventory 
losses, a capital loss-like element, result from a decrease in inventory prices” 
(Bureau of Economic Analysis:5, fn.18) 
 
This is reasonable, ex post, as a recording adjustment, bringing the elements businesses 
chose to record in their accounts into line with the presentation national accountants wish 
to make. That is the ex post case for the adjustment: a simple effort to capture unexpected 
gains and losses arising from the revaluation of inventories. However, SFC purports to be a 
modelling of the economy, and, in particular, one based on forwards-looking behaviour by 
firms and others as they adjust towards target incomes and profits. To operate, the model 
must operate in ex ante terms; whatever relationship is constructed between the flows of 
transactions and the stocks of variables is one that has a behavioural impact, describing the 
ex ante decisions of economic agents. Ex post adjustments can be justified in accounting 
terms, but not in economic. 
 
One underlying difficulty here is the asymmetry within the quadruple accounting rule. As 
we have earlier suggested, whilst the budget constraint can (in the absence of theft or 
bribery) be treated as binding, setting an absolute limit to actions over which agents cannot 
cross, the double accounting element is much more slippery. There can be, in practice, 
occasions when this can be ignored: as we have seen, because the balance sheet is not a 
complete representation of economic reality, agents will (in practice) end up breaching its 
rules. In the key instance shown above, this will occur once a firm attempts to apply 
forward-looking expectations.  
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So the value to the firms’ of inventories held today is not simply their value on sale today. 
Inventories, in this simple model, can be held over time with zero depreciation. They can 
therefore be disposed of at any point in time at the current price. Although firms are price-
makers in this world, establishing a mark-up price to meet profit targets, they respond to 
expected market conditions as they do so. They are therefore not sure of the price stream 
arising from any stock of inventories into the future; nor can they know, without perfect 
foresight, when or if those inventories can be disposed of for any given market price at any 
given point in time. The real value of the current inventories for the firm, then, is an 
expected value, looking forward, rather than a current cost. The change in the value of 
inventories, ideally, is not backward-looking, but forward-looking, based on expected 
returns from the stock of inventories that is held. 
 
In other words, the measure that is relevant is the expected value of inventories. But if the 
expected value of inventories matters to firms’ behaviour, Godley and Lavoie’s 
fundamental claim about the irrelevance of the measured net worth (2007: 30) cannot 
hold. Firm net worth matters to firm behaviour. Early on, they make the point that the 
liabilities to “‘second parties’, that is owners of equities of firms” (2007: 29) should be 
included in the balance sheet of firms as a liability against the firm, since otherwise the 
implication is that a claim held against the firm by other parties as an asset does not, in 
fact, hold its financial counterpart as a liability: the balance sheets, at a macroeconomic 
level, would not balance (2007:30). This carries the risk concomitant risk of introducing 
what they call a “counter-intuitive” result that a rise in the value of equities, reflecting an 
optimistic assessment of the firms’ worth by the financial markets, would lead to a fall in its 
net worth. They further note that this could be avoided if accounting at historical cost was 
introduced, but this would lead to a failure of the entire macroeconomic balance sheet to 
balance out. They therefore resolve the problem largely by excluding it: firms’ net worth is 
of “no practical significance”, since all economically relevant activity takes place entirely 
within the balance sheet. Capital gains, when introduced later on, are purely a concern for 
households’ (Godley and Lavoie 2007: ch. 11) portfolio decisions. Tobin’s Q, the ratio of net 
financial value to replacement value is “interesting” but not relevant to any agent; not only 
are there “no mechanisms to… make it converge towards unity”, as might be held in a 
general equilibrium setting, it has no impact on any decisionmaking (Godley and Lavoie 
2007: 392).  
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However, given the problems that the valuation of inventories introduces, with the strong 
implication that inventory valuation must be both forward-looking and enter into firms’ 
decisionmaking processes, if they are to behave consistently, this assertion by Godley and 
Lavoie cannot hold. The necessary grounds for it to stand are in contradiction with the 
need for the balance sheets themselves to balance: with historic cost accounting rejected 
by the authors as undermining balance sheet consistency, and with equity valuations ruled 
out on similar grounds, they are pushed into having to preserve an incoherent account of 
inventory valuation. This resorts, ultimately, to appeals to empirical evidence, and the 
authority of the national accounts, rather than to its internal, theoretical coherence; in 
effect, the SFC system here privileges the consistency of the system of macroeconomic 
matrices, against the internal coherence of the presumed behaviour of the individual units.  
 
The correct valuation of the immediate addition to (or depletion from) inventories, from 
the point of view of the firm’s current account, is their immediate resale value: firms’ 
current accounts captures the flows of financing within this period. On the other hand, the 
change in the value of the stock of inventories is the change to its expected valuation, given 
additions to or subtractions from the actual stock of inventories occurring over the period. 
The cost of producing those inventories remains as before, but this cost does not now 
appear directly on the balance sheet: only the loan needed, in this model, to acquire the 
funds necessary to meet the cost appears.  
 
 
IV. IMBALANCES AND UNCERTAINTY 
 
The effects on the balance sheets 
 
These changes, attempting to reconcile the inconsistencies in the current treatment of 
inventories, render the matrix unbalanced. Taking the firms’ transactions account column, 
and applying the revaluation for inventories, here marked simply with an expectations 
operator, we find (following Godley and Lavoie, Table 8.1) 
 
Table 4.1: Revised firm flows 
 Production firms  
 Current Capital 
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Sales +S  
Change in value inventories +ΔINe -ΔINe 
Wages -WB  
Interest on loan -rl-1.L-1  
Entrepreneurial profits -F  
Change in loans  +ΔL 
Total ΔINe-ΔIN ΔL-ΔINe 
 
The definition of entrepreneurial profits needs some attention. The value of inventories 
previously held as their replacement cost by both the firm and therefore (by assumption) 
the firms’ owners who would receive the profits. This ensured that the whole column met 
the zero-sum rule. However, we have argued to reject the replacement-cost valuation of 
inventories, in favour of their resale price. For profits distributed in this period, the relevant 
valuation of a change in inventories is therefore their current-period resale price: it is a 
current measure, not a capital measure. Otherwise, the definition needs no further 
correction, beyond noting that the correct valuation of interest on loans is now rl-1.L-1, 
rather than using the substitution of rl-1.IN-1. This gives the final row: 
 
    (               ) 
                        
      
 
The difference on the current account is between the expected value of the change in 
inventories, and their value at market prices; and difference on the capital account is 
between the addition to loans, and the expected value of the change in inventories.  
 
Firm net worth changes by 
 
                         
 
That is, the current resale value of inventories minus the change in the value of loans. 
Given that inventories are produced at their cost price, we have ΔL=UC.(Δin), as previously. 
Firms’ net worth will alter to the extent that the current valuation of inventories at market 
prices varies from their cost of production. This reflects the position of inventories as (in 
effect) the sole tangible asset that the firm posses. Increases in the expected value of the 
equity would form a capital gain, boosting the firms’ net worth. The treatment Godley and 
Lavoie propose for inventories, however, excludes the possibility of capital gain; there is no 
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compelling reason, in this new setting, why it could not be included as an adjustment factor 
to the balance sheet, as they propose for all other gains, and implying a Haig-Simon 
formulation of income for the gains-holders (2007: ch.5).  
 
For the economy as a whole, this gain in firm net worth represents a gain in economy-wide 
net worth. However, since these assets are owned by the firm as a distinct entity, it does 
not follow that the net worth of the whole economy can be presumed to equal the 
effective “capital” (that is, tangible asset) stock. Or, rather, there will be distinctions within 
the net worth dependent on claims of ownership. With undistributed capital gains accruing 
to the firm as an entity, the distribution of the firms’ ownership matters, since there are 
now capital gains arising that remain (in this setting) undistributed. Inventories are not any 
longer an adequate substitute for capital in general, since the presence of capital gains 
accruing to inventories ensures that it is now the ownership of capital that matters directly: 
households in general still own all of the firms, but it is not enough to describe the 
macroeconomic flow of profits to their recipients in the households since firms are 
acquiring capital gains, and these gains can only be held by specific owners, not by the 
generality of households.  
 
Notice, too, that it cannot any longer be the case that the firms’ balance sheet position has 
no impact on its behaviour: expected values of inventories matter, and the distribution of 
ownership (if equity is introduced in this manner) also impacts on the firm. A longstanding 
criticism of Cambridge Keynesian models, that they “trivialise” financial decisions (Blinder 
1978: 83), can be answered through such means. The firms’ complete production decision, 
ex ante, now looks like 
 
   (             
  ) 
  
   
   
  
   
   
  
     
   
 
The first distinction between this and the Godley-Lavoie function (Equations 9.1 et. seq.) is 
the use of the value of inventories as the decision variable, reflecting our claim that it is this 
value, not the cost, that is determinant. The second is the appearance of a distinction 
between the acquired stock of assets (the inventories, indicated in the third parameter) 
and the expected future value of the stock of assets (the last parameter). For now, note 
that this formula expresses a version of Tobin’s q-ratio, in with unit costs entering as the 
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denominator and the current spot-market value of inventories as the numerator, q=(IN-
1/UC). In both cases, the spot-price is the one to use, reflecting either the immediate 
disposal value of all inventories, or the immediate costs of further production. Following 
Tobin’s logic, we can argue that firms have an incentive to increase their asset holdings 
when q>1, and decrease it when q<1, depending on market valuations. There is, then, 
contrary to Godley and Lavoie’s insistence (2007: 392), a mechanism to force q to converge 
towards unity, once firms start to perceive the market valuation (rather than only the 
replacement costs) of their assets – which, in this case, are only their inventories. Others 
writing in the post-Keynesian tradition have highlighted the relevance of Tobin’s valuation 
ratio to firms’ decision-making, Rimmer (1993) amongst them, while an earlier SFC paper 
by Godley and Lavoie noted its importance (Lavoie and Godley 2001: 286). 
 
However, this is more complicated because additions to inventories exist not just as a flow 
(or potential flow) into existing inventories, subject to the firms’ control. We have claimed 
that the expected value of the existing stock will also enter the firms’ calculations, 
dependent on the market valuation of those inventories treated as a potential flow of 
income into the future. This is the final parameter in the expression. Its derivative is left 
undefined since this will depend critically on the firms’ own perceptions of uncertainty, 
which can be ambiguous, and on the type of uncertainty encountered: an anticipated 
increase in the expected future value of inventories need not need to an increase in current 
inventory accumulation if (for example) the expected increase is of a temporary duration, 
whereas a permanent increase could well produce that outcome. In both instances, it is not 
possible to say a priori how any given firm or firms will respond to this sort of uncertainty. 
 
Nor is it necessarily even possible in general. It is critical to note that for our purposes this 
is not uncertainty that can be reconciled through some market mechanism. Precisely 
because it impacts directly on the firms’ own production processes, influencing the flow 
variable under its direct control, it cannot be treated as a separable from of risk, subject to 
the usual rules of portfolio management. It is inherent uncertainty: the existence of an 
unknowable future impacting on decisions made today in an uncertain world. We will 
return to this point in a later chapter; for now, it is only necessary to note that (1) 
uncertainty has an impact on firm decisions over production; (2) uncertainty has an impact 
on firms’ financial positions; (3) uncertainty of this kind cannot be reduced to “risk” and 
subjected to a market process of portfolio allocation. 
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Underdetermination 
 
Inventories can only play this dual uncertainty management role imperfectly in the context 
of the SFC matrices. Our introduction of uncertainty has posed a potential wedge between 
the financial representation of firms’ activities, as recorded in the balance sheet, and the 
real process of production that underlies this. With cost-valuation of inventories, all 
uncertainty (perhaps over future cost movements) is fundamentally exogenous to the 
production process: it does not intrude on the firms’ decision-making procedures, which 
respond only to the changes in expected sales (an exogenous factor, determined by 
autonomous consumer preferences) and expected costs (again, exogenously determined 
by changes in technology or labour markets). It is once inventories are, we argue, correctly 
valued that uncertainty appears as a necessary and distinct consideration for the firms’ 
decision variable, output to be produced. This is distinct from the portfolio decision of 
households, where real wealth can be allocated between different monetary assets, and 
the sole supply decision is that of allocating labour. Here, firms directly control the 
production of the asset, and directly hold onto its acquired stocks. It is this that lends the 
decision its asymmetric character.  
 
But inventories only perform this task imperfectly because they are a real, not a financial, 
implement. They cannot simultaneously act as hedge against uncertainty, and arbiter of 
past uncertainty, without disrupting the balance sheet representation. The appearance of 
uncertainty in this form, entering as a consideration for firms’ production decisions, 
renders the balance sheet unbalanced, as we have seen. A distinction emerges between 
decisions of individual firms, dependent on considerations of prevailing uncertainty, and 
the wider macroeconomy, since we cannot simply aggregate firms’ capital gains to give a 
net worth for the economy as a whole: ownership, and therefore distribution of the 
product, matters. 
 
This is a deeper problem than that of merely lacking microfoundations, which, as discussed, 
we do not view as especially detrimental to the exercise. It relates directly to the 
conceptualisation of major economic variables, and associated concepts like income and 
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(especially) profit. It is because inventories are being asked to do too much by SFC that 
these problems arrive. It is unclear whether they should be deemed tangible assets, and 
therefore quietly pushed into the firms’ “net worth”, or if they should be financial assets, 
and therefore have an impact on the firms’ balance sheet position. This confusion arises 
because inventories form, in practice, something akin to capital: a form of accumulated 
asset that is produced in the past, holds a current value, and will affect production 
decisions into the future. Yet at the same time, they are the repository for the presence of 
uncertainty within the system: they are the point in the system in which uncertainty 
manifests itself, this uncertainty occurring in no other form throughout the SFC 
representation. They are required by firms both as a barrier against uncertainty, in that 
firms’ target inventories are assumed to be nonzero, but, at the same time, they are the 
manifestation of uncertainty as such. 
 
There are consequences, if we accept the critique offered here, for the coherency of the 
system. If we allow both that inventories should be valued on an expected value basis, and 
that firms will (therefore) take account of their own net worth when making production 
decisions, the matrix system is no longer determined. In their presentations of the system 
of the matrices, there are (n-1) equations determined for a set of n equations. With n 
equations in the system, because the system is (assumed) closed by the balance sheet 
requirements and the budget constraint, it must be the case that the with n-1 equations 
known, the n-th is also known. This follows directly from the requirement for “coherency”: 
since the zero-sum rule applies, the system must be closed, and therefore the final 
equation within the system need not (indeed cannot) be identified. This should seem 
familiar – it is, as Godley and Lavoie remark, the exact equivalent of the same rule in 
general equilibrium models, in which the system is determined at n-1 equations because it 
is assumed, for Walras’ Law to hold, that with all excess demands in the (n-1) demand 
equations at zero, the final demand equation must, by default, also be zero. Elsewhere, the 
two authors call this a “quasi-Walrasian” feature of their system (2007: 68, 404). It is, as 
Godley and Lavoie are keen to stress, not an equilibrium condition: it has no behavioural 
consequences itself, but the inevitable result of the accounting rules followed. It applies, 
critically, in the steady state of the model – the point of stability in which, akin to the 
balanced growth path in more conventional Solowian models, the major relationships of 
the economy (capital:output ratio, capital:labour ratio chief amongst them) stay stable. 
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This closure at (n-1) equations follows if, and only if, both the budget constraints and the 
double-entry rule hold. If we allow that this holds for all sectors in the economy, the system 
can be closed “without any equilibrium condition being imposed” (Godley and Lavoie 2007: 
227). If, however, one or other (or indeed both) of those conditions are disrupted, the 
matrix as a whole will be incoherent. The final element, in particular, will be no longer 
determined by the prior elements, since one (or more) equations within the matrix will not 
itself be completely determined. We would need, in other words, some further rule to 
close the whole system effectively. In the absence of that rule, the matrix is open: the 
presumption of determination for the n-th equation does not hold and no globally stable 
solution can be found.  
 
We have seen that if a forward-looking economic cost is applied to valuation of inventories 
(on the grounds that this removes an inconsistency with firms’ behaviour), the matrix is no 
longer balanced in the firm equation. This renders the “redundant equation” in the Godley-
Lavoie system no longer determined. The uncertainty now entering at firm level, at the 
level of production decisions, produces a distinctive macroeconomic effect in that the 
system is no longer closed. 
 
This absence of closure is important. The redundant equation takes a particular form, 
dependent on the construction of the preceding set of behavioural relationships. 
Increasingly complex specifications of variable systems within the SFC framework allow 
different forms of closure (Godley and Lavoie 2007: 460). However, they will all share a 
commonality. Because the construction of an SFC model presumes the existence of a 
monetary unit, it must be the case that all subsequent behavioural equations and 
relationships described within the complete model will be related in terms of that 
monetary unit. But because this monetary unit is produced within the model, there must at 
some point be an equation that equates the supply of the fundamental monetary unit to its 
demand. This follows logically from the presumption that the money produced, once 
entered into circulation, circulates through the economy and returns to its point of origin: it 
is endogenous, credit money and must therefore act in this fashion. It does not arrive as an 
exogenous stock, in which case (by construction) any level of demand would be met by the 
same supply. Here, supply is endogenously determined. But if money follows this circular 
path, there has to be some equation, written in monetary terms, that allows for the closure 
of the whole system. 
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If the zero-sum rules are adhered to, this is trivially the case. Closure occurs where demand 
for a monetary unit equals its supply once all other behavioural relationships are shown to 
be in balance – the (n-1) rule, again. If either or both of the zero-sum conditions are 
broken, however, this relationship does not hold. We can see this for the inventories-only 
model presented in chapter 9 of Monetary Economics. The redundant equation in this 
instance is Ms=Mh, where the supply of money (Ms) is equal to its demand (Md). Supply is 
determined by decisions of banks to grant loans to firms; demand for money is determined 
by the decisions of firms to create inventories and disburse profits. “There is neither need 
nor place for an equilibrium condition which makes the demand for money equal to supply” 
(Godley and Lavoie 2007: 292) in this framework. 
 
Permanent imbalances and the “monetary excess” 
 
However, this relationship no longer holds when the matrices become permanently 
unbalanced. We can see this by tracing some of the relationships between sectors in a 
simple SFC model with inventories, derived from Monetary Economics chapter 9.8 They 
assume that firms hold a line of credit at banks, similar to an overdraft facility, that “the 
stock of loans is automatically increased when inventories grow and automatically repaid 
when they fall.” (2007: 289) However, since we have defined the change in loans demanded 
by firms as now equal to the cost of production, and since (by assumption) firms supply all 
loans demanded, we instead have 
 
           
 
The expansion of the supply of money is equal to the cost of new production, which is (in 
the absence of productive capital) the wage bill. This is the initial injection of cash into the 
system. 
 
Household have at present only one asset they can hold – that of bank deposits. They can 
choose to either spend their income, or increase their bank deposits. Effectively, deposits 
are the money form of saving for households, out of which they can also fund current 
consumption. 
                                                          
8 We remove bank profits from the original for clarity; their inclusion makes no difference to the results. 
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When the balance sheet balanced, it could be easily shown that Ms=Mh, changes in the 
demand for money being matched by changes in its supply, since every other equation in 
the system was closed. That need no longer be the case. In particular, the need for the 
distribution of entrepreneurial profits amongst households, which Godley and Lavoie 
recognise creates the demand for credit money in the system, now imposes itself strongly.  
 
We can show this by looking at the demand for money. Aggregate household disposable 
income for the period is given by 
 
               
 
Where rm is the interest earned on deposit holdings and Mh is the household holding of 
money deposits, assumed to be held in the banking system. From the earlier definition of 
entrepreneurs’ profits, and with all firms owned by all households in the aggregate, we 
have 
 
    (               ) 
 
Where, as before, the change in the value of inventories is given at their current resale 
price. Substituting this equation for F into the households’ disposable income gives us 
 
                         
 
This shows that household disposable income is ultimately the same as the sales revenue,9 
plus interest accrued on money deposits, with a further term dependent on difference 
between the resale value of new inventories, and the loan interest firms have to pay.  
 
This last term is novel, reflecting the appearance of the valuation of inventories in the 
firms’ decisionmaking process. We can simplify it to remove the presence of inventories by 
                                                          
9 The wages paid cancel out: wages paid are spent on consumption goods, and therefore flow back to households through the 
profit function. 
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making use of the production relationships in the model. Unit costs are costs per unit 
produced, UC=WB/y, where y is the physical terms output y=N.μ. In the absence of capital, 
physical terms output is just the labour employed, N, multiplied by its physical productivity. 
Since the total wage bill is WB=wN, we have 
 
         
       
   
 
 
 
 
With the cost of additional inventories equal to in.UC, where in is the physical increment in 
the volume of inventories held, but the price of the inventories equal to p.in, the ratio of 
cost:price the two is therefore (w/μp). Since the cost of the increment in inventories is the 
expenditure needed to secure them, WB, it follows that the increment in inventories is the 
new production (in value terms), minus consumption, minus the old inventory stock: 
 
    
 
  
          
 
Since all inventories must be either sold or retained, in addition to the existing stock, we 
can substitute this into the expression for household disposable income to obtain: 
 
                     
 
  
      
 
With S=C, these elements drop out of the equation. From this new expression we can see 
that the total household disposable income will, for the end of the period, depend on net 
financial earnings. Wages earned enter the expression, but only as the product of a ratio of 
the balance between then wage rate offered, real productivity, and the sale price of goods. 
The final term is a hangover from the Haig-Simon definition of income Godley and Lavoie 
use, and that we retain: if income is consumption plus the change in wealth, last period’s 
stock of “wealth” (here, the inventories held previously) is, in effect, a drag on current 
income.  
This ratio is the critical part. If it is equal to unity, then there will be no problem closing the 
whole system. Alternatively, we can treat (WB/p) as the real wage rate, leaving w=μ as the 
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necessary condition to close the system. Of course, this is precisely the neoclassical case: 
with productivity equal to the wage rate, as is held to be the case in equilibrium the 
expression becomes simply that for real wages. In this instance, there is no problem in 
banks supplying (via firms) the requisite amount of funding needed to meet the amount 
demanded from households.  
But in the SFC setting, there is no plausible reason to suppose that this applies. In general, 
without some binding conditions, the wage rate will not equal marginal productivity. In this 
instance, and without the binding constraints of the SFC construction – which, as we have 
suggested, are not themselves consistent with behaviour by individual firms – the supply 
and demand for money will not, in general, equate. There will be either excess demand or 
excess supply of money, depending on the (w/μp) ratio. This is wholly in real terms; it 
cannot be settled by reference to the financial system alone. It emerges as a direct result of 
the presence of uncertainty impacting on production decisions taken by firms, which then, 
in turn, has a financial impact. These feed through into household incomes because we 
have assumed all firms are owned by all households. 
This excess demand or supply of money balances appears as an end-period problem, 
relative to the supply of funding made by banks at the start. Whereas in either the original 
Godley-Lavoie case, or in the neoclassical alternative suggested above, money demand and 
money supply would be in balance by the end of the period, as a result of consistency (or 
equilibrium) prevailing within the period, that condition need no longer hold. 
Money supplied will be equal to the WB. With all other demands for money balances met 
by bank credit at the start of the period, by construction, the remaining issue is to 
determine the relationship between WB and WB(w/μp). It can be seen that with (w/μp)>1, 
there will be excess demand from households remaining at the end of the period that is 
unmet by banks’ credit creation. With (w/μp)<1, there will be an excess supply of money. 
The balance here reflects the presence of wages in household’s hands over the period: 
where the nominal wage is greater than the nominal marginal productivity (μp) of the 
goods produced, the balance of funding within the circuit shifts in the direction of the 
households as providers of labour; if the opposite applies, the balance shifts in favour of 
households as owners of firms, but this is only a second-order effect and so reduces their 
total disposable income. 
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The balance of ratio will, productivity gains aside, be determined by the relative strengths 
of firms and households in their respective markets. There are few reasons, a priori, to 
expect it to take a particular value. Productivity improvements will reduce household 
disposable income, since they can be earned as additional increments in the value of 
inventories held by firms, rather than distributed to households. If we follow the preferred 
Kaleckian mark-up function for firms, it is implied that real wages earned will be 
consistently less than their effective productivity, resulting in a permanent excess supply of 
money to the extent that firms levy a positive mark-up over costs, which, outside of perfect 
competition, will generally be the case. 
 
Steady-states and dynamic solutions 
We return, at the close of this chapter, to a consideration of the dynamic properties of the 
model. We will use again the SIM model, as presented in Godley and Lavoie, for clarity, and 
because it admits of comparatively simple analytical solutions. As shown in the appendix, 
this model has a steady-state level of income determined by the ratio of government 
spending to taxes, following the presence of the multiplier effect. But, as distinct from 
conventional macroeconomic modelling, in which (as Godley and Lavoie note, 2007: 86), it 
is too often assumed, rather than demonstrated, that an economy moves back to 
equilibrium, the process of the movement being assumed less interesting than the eventual 
resting point, SFC models can explicitly show the dynamics of the model over time.  
For SIM, out-of-steady state national income can be found by substituting the consumption 
function back into the national income equation, which (through iteration) reveals the 
following dynamic equation (assuming perfect foresight): 
  
       
    (   )
 
With    as the marginal propensity to consume out of disposable income,    as the MPC 
out of household wealth (assumed here to take a purely monetary form), θ as the tax rate 
on income, and H as the stock of household wealth, subscripted here to the previous 
period. 
Household wealth itself follows the path:  
  (    )(   )  (    )    
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Because SFC has explicitly modelled for the stocks of wealth and assets over time, even a 
very simple model such as this one, with perfect foresight, will immediately yield a far 
richer (and, we would suggest, more empirically plausible) set of dynamics than the 
equivalent neoclassical model, whether derived through comparative statics as in IS-LM 
analysis, or with a more complete dynamic specification as in DSGE. 
Nonetheless, the exclusion of forecasting errors is here a problem: we have seen, in this 
chapter how the introduction of potential errors in forecasting leads to serious definitional 
problems for the standard SFC model – and that, in particular, even finding a steady-state 
solution to the model becomes problematic, unless further (neoclassical) behavioural 
constraints are introduced. Godley and Lavoie notes this difficulty themselves, in an 
appendix to their chapter 9, which first introduces inventories and expectations (amongst 
other things) to the basic SFC model (Godley and Lavoie 2007: 310-312). They also show 
that, with exogenous expectations, the model can produce a steady-state in which 
inventories remain permanently different from expectations. It would, of course, be 
possible to endogenise expectations, as we have shown above; but doing so creates more 
fundamental problems for their presentation of SFC than they give credit for in the text, 
problems that ultimately threaten to undermine its status as a coherent alternative to 
neoclassicism.  This is something of a critical point: whilst steady-state solutions to SFC 
models can reasonably be provided, they are of interest largely because they offer a means 
to model, explicitly, the dynamics of the economy outside of the steady state. But if 
introducing at least some minimally plausible elements (forecasting errors, accumulations 
of wealth in different forms) then undermines the capacity of the model to show 
economically meaningful dynamics, the claims for SFC as a general procedure for modelling 
dynamic economies looks less solid. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter started with an examination of the issues raised by time as an economic 
concept, and an argument for the use of discrete, rather than continuous time methods. 
Following on from this, the fundamental concept of income, as a flow over time relating to 
a stock, was introduced, and some ambiguities in its definition used to examine more 
closely some of the claims made for a standard SFC model. We found that the treatment of 
inventories, as the critical element within the model connecting the past, the present and 
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an uncertain future, was not robust. Correcting this, however, to be more consistent with 
firm behaviour led to inconsistencies in the stock-flow matrix presentation. We found that, 
in general, there would be an imbalance emerging in the would-be balance sheets, and that 
the question of ownership was therefore raised. 
This led to the argument that the financial imbalance, emerging as a result of real 
uncertainty, produced monetary effects. Outside of the unusual neoclassical case, we 
found that an excess demand for money would generally exist in the presence of 
uncertainty affecting firms’ decision-making. A final note on dynamics indicates that, whilst 
perfect foresight can provide 
The next chapter builds on some of the results here to explore the issue of capital, income 
by factors in production, and the problem of profits in a monetary production economy. 
 
 
  
116 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE PROBLEM OF CAPITAL 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter opened with a discussion of time in modelling, as an introduction into 
the importance of definition of flows within dynamic models. We indicated that the way in 
which a particular category of stock-flow relationship in the Godley-Lavoie model was 
handled was unsatisfactory, and demonstrated that their treatment of inventories was 
either (1) incompatible with firm behaviour, given profit-maximisation; or (2) incompatible 
with the accounting requirements of the balance sheets. On this basis we showed that a 
properly economic accounting of the value of stocks held by firms would lead, through the 
process of circulation of funds, to an imbalance in the demand for and supply of money. 
The impact of uncertainty on real conditions of production, via inventories, produced a 
financial effect that then fed into the money system. 
Given this problem of definition of flows, we now turn to the problem of stocks. If the last 
chapter considered mainly the form of flows within the system, and how they can relate (or 
fail to relate) to stocks, this chapter examines stocks, and how they can relate to flows. 
Capital, as defined below, we treat as the pre-eminent form of the stock under capitalism: 
its existence is presupposed by the financial representation of the macroeconomy built into 
the balance sheets, as we show below. But capital brings with it a parallel set of concerns 
to those we have seen for flows, precisely at the point where capital is expected to produce 
its own flows of income to capital-owners. We examine pricing and distribution rules for 
capital under neoclassical conditions, showing that these contradict themselves, and then 
develop this Cambridge-style critique into a more general problem for any representation 
of an economy that contains capital.  
It uses this argument to lay the foundation for a lengthier consideration of both the 
sequencing of events that SFC suggests, and the wider, related “circuitist” school, who have 
foregrounded considerations of logical sequencing within the economy. This section 
develops a particular anomaly within the circuitist school, that of the paradox of profits, as 
the central problem faced by the sequencing account of a monetary economy with 
decentralised production. The concluding section reintroduces SFC as a means to resolve 
this “paradox”, indicating that it is not wholly effective as the distinction between initial 
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and final financing is not brought out sharply enough. This provides the basis for the 
discussion of Keynes’ “financial motive” in the subsequent chapter. 
 
I. CAPITAL IN THEORY 
Capital as an economic problem 
We have opened the discussion of SFC modelling with a presentation of an abstract 
macroeconomy, closely following the standard model in Godley and Lavoie (2007), which 
attempted to collate and synthesise a growing body of work in textbook form. This 
presentation has been as kept as simple as possible to avoid the complications that can 
rapidly be introduced to SFC modelling, and develop (as a far as possible) a critique on the 
basis of first principles. The previous chapter closed with an extended discussion of their 
treatment of inventories - a durable stock of goods produced by firms that can be sold to 
consumers, but which have not yet been sold. We found that the treatment, in leaving 
undistributed capital gains, was unsatisfactory from the point of view of either consistent 
firm behaviour, or consistency with the SFC balance sheet approach.  
The presence of commodities that, while being produced within the system, are not wholly 
consumed in use but in fact contribute to further production is, of course, a standard 
feature of any modern economy; it would be difficult to imagine any plausible form of 
capitalism without capital of this sort, although of course for the purposes of exposition 
this can be modelled. Nonetheless, there are distinct categories of difficulties raised for 
economic theory by the presence of capital as such. These centre on, first, its non-
exhaustion over a time period, given usually as the period over which production of 
commodities occurs. At a further level of abstraction this can be thought of as approaching 
the problem of time as such: that the economy is a dynamic system in which processes 
happen at definite points in time and in a given order. Capital, as a produced element that 
is not (necessarily) wholly consumed over a given time period immediately presents itself 
as an element within the system with a distinctive relationship to time as such. Second, the 
presence of capital as a produced element within the economy that is required for further 
production – including its own production – immediately invites the problem of circularity: 
what exits the production process at the end of the production period under consideration 
re-enters the production process at some point. Of course, the whole economy is (as has 
long been understood, (Quesnay 1969)) a circular system: but whilst in general this is a 
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process of transformation between different periods, for capital the circularity is 
immediate, in the sense that it will immediately, and as a necessary condition of its 
existence as capital, re-enter the production process.  
Real wages, for instance, are earned by labour, and then spent; to the extent they are 
spent on necessities of life, future production is enabled, enabling the further payment of 
wages. But the relationship to circularity here is mediated by the transformation of the 
wages into commodities, and then, further, by what (for economic purposes) we can 
assume to be their complete exhaustion in use.10 Capital commodities, by contrast, are 
functioning properly only as capital if they immediately enter production. That is why they 
are purchased, and offered for purchase. The circularity here is, at the level of production, 
immediate. To the extent that they do not enter the process of production, they are failing 
in their intended use, a point to we have touched on in considering the presence of 
inventories of unsold goods. 
This combination of difficulties has acted to undermine and seriously complicate theories 
of capital. We will look at the outstanding example of this within neoclassical theory as a 
means to illustrate the parallel issues presenting themselves in SFC. We argue these issues 
repeat precisely because it inadvertently reproduces some of the more problematic aspects 
of the neoclassical theory. 
The essential element here is the presence, as hinted, of capital as a produced commodity. 
Were it to simply fall from the sky like the proverbial manna from heaven – or, somewhat 
less prosaically, as the inheritance of previous accumulation outside of capitalist conditions 
(Mandel 1975) – it would not be a produced commodity, and the conditions of its 
production would not matter: this “capital” would exist essentially as something of a one-
off “gift” to the system. And because it is necessarily a commodity, it exists – as must any 
commodity – as the combination of both a use-value and an exchange-value (Marx 1867: 
ch.1). Capital’s use-value is its facility in production; production is a system of production 
within which capital operates. It is redundant to consider its existence as capital separately 
from that, whatever the status of the actual commodity may be: a computer, if used (say) 
to control robots producing cars is indisputably capital; if used to play games, it is a 
consumer good. Its use-value as capital lies in its relationship to a system of production; its 
                                                          
10 There are, obviously, very many commodities purchased by workers that are not wholly consumed in immediate use, and 
that have a substantial useful life expectancy: cars, washing machines, books, and so on. These may also re-enter the market 
at some later date as second-hand goods. But from the point of view of the economy (rather than the individual purchasing 
the goods) they exit from economic use once they are purchased. Further re-appearances in the market are arbitrary from 
this point of view.   
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use-value as a consumer good lies with an (entirely separate) world of consumption. Its 
exchange-value, conversely, is determined quantitatively by a market process, like any 
other commodity. The direction of capital’s circulation within the economy is determined 
by the combination of these two facts: its relationship to the system of production of which 
it could or does form part, and its relationship to the quite distinct circulation of 
commodities within market processes. 
It is, then, generally incorrect to think of capital existing only as one or the other. It is 
precisely the inability to adequately account for both that determine the lacunae in the 
theories of capital we consider below, and that ultimately act to undermine the SFC claims 
about the presence of capital within the economy.  
 
Transitions and phases 
We should, in that case, think of capital not only as produced good, but as a relationship 
within the economy. If we conceive of a circuit of capital that integrates the separate 
processes of financing, production, and sale, and receipt of sales (with profits), a simple 
schematic presents itself, as first provided in Marx. The initial fund of capital as money, 
required to finance production, is M; this then becomes capital in its commodity form, 
which, in a modern, capitalist economy, implies the acquisition of separate commodities 
needed for the production of other commodities, plus labour power; these outputs are 
then sold, returning capital (through the process of sales) back to its original form as 
money-capital. This, however, will be in general an increment on the previous amount of 
capital offered. This increment was, in the first instance, the very reason for attempting the 
risky procedure of turning (safe) money into (risky) assets in the first place. With M as the 
initial amount and M’=M+m for the final amount, C can stand for the generic commodity 
production process. The whole circuit, then, runs to M-C-M’ 
The merit of the M-C-M’ representation of the circuit of capital is that it alerts to two, 
fundamental, features: first, that the circuit is one of the expansion of capital; second, that 
the circuit is not undifferentiated: it is punctuated by transitions between forms. The first 
feature can be easily accommodated within the post-Keynesian system, and therefore 
within the SFC representation: it is no challenge to either the Keynes of the General Theory, 
or to Godley-Lavoie SFC models, to allow that stocks of money capital expand as the 
economy grows. On this basis, it would make perfect sense to talk of a “monetary 
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production economy”, with money able to expand through time by encompassing 
production – leading production, even. In this respect, production can be presented simply 
as a subset of the overall expansion of the money-form over the circuit, M-M’. 
The second fundamental feature, however, is more of a problem. The transition out of the 
(general) money form and into a (specific) commodity – even without the introduction of 
an explicit phase of production, not shown here – presents an immediate and obvious 
barrier to the classical dichotomy: if, instead of an effective separation between the money 
economy (on one side) and the real economy (on the other), there is rather a continual 
flow of relations between them, the classical dichotomy cannot hold in any meaningful 
sense. The nominal and the real intertwine, and relate back to each other, far from the 
rigid separation of money-leading-money and real-leading-real of the strict neoclassical 
theory.  
That much can be dealt with within a post-Keynesian world. SFC emphatically does not 
observe the classical dichotomy, with money leading real production as a fundamental 
claim. However, the challenge here runs deeper. It is precisely at the second phase of the 
circuit, C-M’, that the post-Keynesian representation has deep problems. The implications 
of the claim that if the production of additional monetary value is to be consistently 
sustained, there must intrude a commodity phase in the circuit of capital (even without 
specifying a production phase) cannot be contained within the concept of a “monetary 
production economy”. It is the necessary opposition of the particular commodity form to 
the universal equivalent that enables the appearance of additional monetary value in the 
process of exchange. It is because the particular commodity opposes the universal 
equivalent that it is capable of being exchange for a different (greater) quantity of the 
universal equivalent. If the commodity was completely described by the money-form, it 
could not, logically, be exchanged in the exchange of equivalents for greater sums of 
money: at least, not beyond the haphazard occasional exchange, and it is precisely the 
systemic, continuous nature of the circuit that grants it is specific character as the form in 
which capital manifests itself.  
It is because the commodity, at this level of abstraction, is not merely identical to its 
monetary form – it is in fact the diametric opposite of the money form, being necessarily 
particular – that it can exchange as an equivalent between two different sums of money. Its 
ability to do this is the expression of its opposition, as a commodity, to the universal 
equivalent in the form of money. This is how the contradiction between the relative and 
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the equivalent forms of value is reconciled: precisely the possibility of commodity exchange 
existing in which commodities exchange for different sums of money. Of course, for this 
process to become truly systemic – for the fundamental operation of capital to become not 
just an adjunct to the economic process, to subsume the whole of the economic process – 
it must also contain a production stage, during which the commodities purchased can be 
themselves systematically transformed and then offered for sale. This, however, represents 
a movement from the abstract towards the concrete conditions under which production, 
exchange, and distribution of the product actually occur. 
In the most elementary and abstract representation of the whole process, M-M’, the 
commodity as such disappears. This is the circuit of capital as it appears, on first brush, 
within the financial system, and at least at this level of representation, those theories that 
concentrate on the exchange of money within the system – that place the exchange of 
money and forms of money at the centre of their understanding of the capitalist economy 
– that appear to possess the means to describe the totality of the relationships established 
under capitalism. SFC and monetary theories of production are of this character, SFC 
especially so: by remaining at the highest level of abstraction available under capitalism, 
that of the balance sheet representation of assets and liabilities, the appearance of a 
complete representation of the real circuits of capital and reproduction of capital can be 
represented. In practice, this representation is incomplete: a gap is always present, 
registered within the balance sheet representations as the “net worth”, or K – the capital 
seemingly accumulated as a mere residual within the process of the exchange of stocks and 
flows, rather than appearing as itself the driving element of the entire circuit, and thus of 
the entire balance of assets, liabilities, and flows between them. 
 
From physical outputs to market prices 
It is because capital must exist as both a use-value and an exchange-value that the 
conditions of its production matter. The relationship between the two, however, is not 
deterministic, in the sense that the use-value of capital – its use as a means to produce 
other commodities – provides the immediate guide to its value as an exchange-value. Since 
both capital itself, and its outputs, are traded in markets mediated by money, there is 
unlikely to be a direct relationship from the physical outputs of capital to either its price, or 
the price of those outputs. There is a necessary moment of transition between the two that 
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must be introduced. How this is introduced forms one of the core problems in any system 
of economics that attempts to model the totality of relationships within the economy. 
Following the Lavoie and Godley baseline, the problem of the transition between the 
physical output of production and the circulation of values has so far not featured. It was 
quietly assumed away in the preceding chapter, even as we highlighted the difficulties 
caused in attempting to provide rational, consistent valuations of assets. So far, it appears 
possible to move seamlessly from physical output to the circulation of money values – the 
word Godley and Lavoie use is “smoothly” (2007: 257). But this smooth transition takes 
place through a sleight of hand: precisely because the SFC focuses solely on the spheres of 
distribution and exchange – even if this is not acknowledged – it is possible to abstract from 
production.  
That does not, however, mean that the problems caused by the need to maintain a 
consistent asset value-price relationship as the transitions between the spheres of 
circulation have been resolved. Or, if they have, it is only on the same basis as Paul 
Samuelson’s “eraser solution” to the Marxian transformation problem:  
“Contemplate two alternative and discordant systems.  Write down one.  Now 
transform by taking an eraser and rubbing it out.  Then fill in the other one. Voila!” 
(Samuelson 1971: 400) 
The problem is “solved” by ignoring it, and doing something else. In the case of the basic 
SFC framework, treating inventories as the sole form of capital good, the effect is that a 
significant index number problem is glossed over. For a closed, single good world, in which 
(of necessity) there are no distinct capital goods and no relative prices, this is not a problem. 
Anything more complex than this, however, breaks down. 
In particular, the hinge of the Godley-Lavoie system is in the use of the unit labour costs 
(UC) of production as describing both the productivity of the production process, and 
establishing the distribution of its output. With WB as the wage paid, and y as the physical 
volume of output, it is defined as 
 
The numerator in price terms; the denominator is in volume terms; UC itself is assumed to 
be a price measure of costs although in a single-good world the distinction for costs is not 
important. It should be clear, however, that if we loosen the stringent assumptions applied 
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here, the measure collapses. If we assume more than one good output, for n goods indexed 
in the (price) output vector Y, (price) wage vector WB, and the new price vector p, all 
symmetrical: 
 
 
 
Assuming, as usual, that prices are formed competitively and that the wage paid allows the 
consumption of any combination of the output Y (up to the value of the wage), we find that 
the transition implied in the UC can no longer hold. This is because the physical quantity of 
output cannot be summated without first being transformed by reference to a common 
value since the vector consists of different objects that contain (as outputs) no common 
property. But if we attempt to apply this transformation to the vectors above, we find that 
even with a single price system, as implied by the assumption of competitive pricing, they 
cannot be rationally valued in the absence of some additional valuation procedure. 
We can present this, for the production side, in terms derived from Piero Sraffa (1960). 
With the notation as above, adding a profit rate r, and allowing the n commodities to be 
produced by a technology described in the (n x n) matrix A, where each aij element 
describes the amount of the commodity j needed to produce commodity i, we have for 
prices: 
   (   )(             )      
Sraffa argued that since there are n+2 prices (the set of commodities, plus the factor 
payments r and WB) but only n+1 equations, the competitive pricing system must be 
indeterminate. The neoclassical response to this was to indicate, correctly, that Sraffa had 
mistakenly collapsed input prices into output prices: the two would differ, in the presence 
of both a lag in production, input and output prices will (or at least could) differ over time 
and therefore cannot be solved simultaneously. General equilibrium would ensure that the 
excess demand equations were driven to zero, allowing the system to be closed through 
the presence of market-clearing and pre-given demand functions (Hahn 1982).  
General equilibrium, then, could supply the additional mechanism by which prices could be 
determined; the classical labour theory of value could supply another. Whatever the case, 
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the system could not be closed on the basis of commodity prices alone: some further factor 
would have to be brought to bear before input prices could function as output prices. SFC 
occludes this distinction by reference solely to the (largely) market-valued matrix of 
operations. The accounting procedures involved alone, however, cannot be enough to 
close the system: we need to introduce either behavioural rules, with agents acting to close 
the system themselves, or to bring in some external method of valuation. SFC does neither 
and it is therefore not, in general, possible to have a price system that both allows for 
increased productivity and describes the distribution of the income on the basis of prices 
alone. Unit costs, as described in Godley-Lavoie, cannot close the system if productivity is 
changing over time. 
This can be seen immediately in the unit labour cost equation above. In a one good world, 
we can retain some ambiguity about the valuation of UC: it is described as a cost per unit of 
output to produce y widgets “in the current period” (Lavoie and Godley 2007: 257), but 
with the numerator in money terms, and the denominator in physical output it is (in effect) 
a hybrid measure: cost-price per unit of output. This causes no difficulties where only one 
good can be purchased, but if additional goods are produced, there is no clear way to 
summate the qualitatively distinct units of output to allow a cost-price to be created.  
 
General issues in the distribution of the total product between “factors of production” 
The obvious mechanism for performing this transition is the appeal to the market itself. 
The formation of prices, in a money-form, provides an automatic standard of comparison 
for the entire range of commodities offered for sale. If we can provide some plausible link 
from real production into market prices we can rationalise the whole system of costs and 
deliver a common standard of measurement for value. This matters especially for capital, 
since the production costs of commodities in the past can vary from the costs today, 
making a valuation of the commodity difficult: it is not clear, a priori, whether valuation 
should be performed against historic prices, or current prices, and selection of one or the 
other may appear arbitrary. It was on this issue that the SFC treatment of inventories, as 
we have shown, fell into difficulties. Furthermore, as the case of inventory accumulation 
revealed, our valuations of these inventories have distributional impacts, outside of the 
case where all firms (accumulating inventories) are paying all factors marginal costs. 
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The claim of neoclassical theory is that it can provide an account of capital as a “factor of 
production” within a purely real-output “production function” which allows the question of 
production as such to be separated neatly from the issue of the distribution of that 
production. The production function describes only the set of possible outputs from the 
economy, from a given input set, with the distribution of finished output from that set of 
possibilities being then dependent on the choices of firms. If they are profit-maximising, 
they will select the optimum input set on the basis of marginal variations in the choice of 
input volumes, leading to a marginal productivity theory of distribution. Additional units of 
capital (or labour) will be employed by the firm until the point at which the cost of 
employing an additional unit exactly matches the addition to output it generates. Payments 
to factors of production are therefore, given optimising behaviour by firms, simply their 
marginal productivities. Under competitive conditions, with perfect capital markets, the 
cost of hiring additional units of capital is the rate of interest, and so the rate of interest 
will equate to the marginal productivity of capital, thus guaranteeing allocative efficiency. 
Under the usual set of assumptions – exogenous technological change, constant returns to 
scale, diminishing marginal productivity, and competitive market conditions – the 
aggregate production function given above demonstrates what Paul Samuelson, writing in 
its defence, called three “parables” (1962): the real return on capital (assumed the same as 
the rate of interest in the neoclassical world) is determined by technology, as described by 
the rate of decline of its marginal productivity; greater amounts of capital reduce its 
productivity, and therefore its return (the rate of interest), with the inverse also applying; 
and the distribution of income between capital and labour is dependent on their relative 
scarcities and marginal products. The neoclassical theory of prices depends on a principle 
of (gross) substitution amongst factors: given a production function, each factor at use 
within that function can be substituted for other factors to obtain a given level of output.   
 
In a one-good world, in which the output produced can function both as a consumed 
commodity (that is, it is destroyed in its final consumption) or as capital (that is, re-enters 
the production of future commodities), this is not a difficulty. In response to changes in the 
price of a factor, profit-maximising firms can shift away from that factor use and into others, 
thus minimising costs for the desired level of output. On this basis, downward-sloping 
demand curves for factors (including capital) can be easily derived, with the quantity 
demanded being inversely related to price. 
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These are, potentially, a powerful set of results, and are embodied in standard, Solowian, 
growth models. Downward-sloping demand curves ensure the stability and uniqueness of 
equilibrium (Garegnani 1990). But they depend, crucially, on a physical conception of 
capital: that inputs and returns can be measured in some “real”, physical quantity, rather 
than as money. This allows the elision between the rate of return and the rate of interest, 
but it also allows that inputs and outputs can be readily and simply compared for the 
purposes of determining productivity.  
All of these claims will be familiar. They depend on a number of assumptions to operate: 
competitive markets for factor inputs and production outputs, and gross substitution 
amongst factors being the most important. But even if we accept these assumptions, the 
standard story does not hold.  
In the general two-factor case, with labour (L) and capital (K) paid their respective factor 
payments of wages (w) and rent (r) respectively, it must be the case that the output (Y) of a 
homogenous consumption good is equal to the sums of the factor incomes. With all values 
measured in terms of the output good, this statement is definitional: 
Y=rK+wL 
To simplify the following, we can normalise at L=1 and rewrite in per-labour terms (Bhaduri 
1969: 535): 
y=rk+w 
Since this is a definitional claim, it must be compatible with any rule for the distribution of 
the product, including that of neoclassical theory in which factors are paid their marginal 
products. However, we can show that in general this will not be the case, and that 
therefore neoclassical distribution theory holds only under highly specific circumstances. 
For a single firm, the marginal product rule might hold, since changes in the input of any 
factor demanded can be safely assumed (in competitive conditions) not to impact on the 
price of that factor, and therefore will not impact on the demands for factor inputs. This 
cannot hold, however, for the whole economy, since changes in the aggregate output must 
(from the definitional rule above) result in changes in the distribution of all factors. 
Therefore, changing the input demanded of one factor has an impact across the other 
factors. 
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For the whole economy, changes in the total product must equal the sum of changes in the 
factor payments: 
dy=r.dk+dr.k+dw 
The marginal product of capital is therefore: 
  
  
    
  
  
 
  
  
 
Capital’s marginal product in general is equal to its factor payment, r, plus the impact on 
the wage rate of marginal changes in capital, plus the “income effect” of changes in the 
demand for capital on the price of capital multiplied by the whole capital stock. This is 
clearly substantially different to simply stating the marginal product of capital is equal to its 
factor payment; the neoclassical case will only occur when the other two terms are zero (as 
in the single-firm case) or when the two additional terms cancel each other out. As Bhaduri 
notes, this will in general occur when (following Samuelson 1962) the factor-price frontier 
is linear, equivalent to the same capital:labour ratio prevailing across all industries (Bhaduri 
1969: 536) – an assumption either implausible, or implying a single industry, but in either 
case not a general condition. 
In other words, what appears to be a generalisable theory about the economy decays 
rapidly into a very specific claim about certain sets of circumstances. If the economy exists 
as an aggregate – as a set of interrelated markets and processes - it will not, in general be 
possible to separate the distribution of the product from the conditions of its production. 
For the two-factor world above, even with other complications assumed away, the 
production relationship between capital and labour and the volume of capital employed 
both affect the actual distribution of the product.  
A change in the input of capital will affect the wage rate and the rate of return on capital. 
There is a circularity produced that can only be assumed away in the Samuelson linear 
factor-price case. Prices will, in general, be affected by the distribution of income and the 
specific welfare claims made for the neoclassical case will not hold. 
 
The Cambridge capital controversy and the problem of time 
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The general difficulties illustrated above stem from the treatment of capital as 
homogenous mass that can be easily reduced to a unit quantifiable by a single measure. 
The “Cambridge capital controversy” centred on the difficulties of providing a means to 
value heterogeneous capital goods, existing over time, against a common measure without 
running into insurmountable problems of circularity. Joan Robinson opened the post-war 
debate in 1953, with this classic statement of the problem:  
“The student of economic theory is taught to write O=f(L,C) where L is a quantity of 
labour, C a quantity of capital and O a rate of output of commodities. He is instructed 
to assume all workers alike, and to measure L in man-hours of labour; he is told 
something about the index-number problem involved in choosing a unit of output; 
and then he is hurried up to the next question, in the hope that he will forget to ask 
in what units C is measured…” (Robinson 1953-54: 81) 
 
However, if more than one commodity exists, this clear relationship cannot operate. Since 
the measurement of capital as an endowment must be independent of prices and the 
distribution of commodities, a contradiction can appear if this measurement of capital as 
an endowment is different from that measurement used when the production technique is 
describing how an increase in the factor inputs (in physical terms) leads to an increase in 
output. Heterogeneous goods cannot be simply added to each other, since they lack a 
common unit of measurement: this is, perhaps literally, comparing apples and oranges. In 
real terms, the unit of measurement, as Wicksell, pre-war suggested, could be either the 
cost of their own production, or the present value of the future output stream produced. 
Each variant, however, involves time: either the original time of production of the input 
good, or the time period over which the output stream is valued. That, in turn, implies the 
need for an intertemporal measure, which in a world of (presumed) competitive markets, 
particularly for capital, implies a rate of interest measured in money terms (Wicksell 1934: 
144). 
The rate of interest, though, is precisely that which the pricing of capital inputs is supposed 
to determine. This circularity introduces two potential sources of changes in the valuation 
of the capital stock arising from variations in interest rates, known as Wicksell effects: the 
real Wicksell effect occurs when the price-weighted sum of the physical quantities of 
capital alters; the price Wicksell effect occurs when price changes force a revaluation on 
the stock of capital goods. The combination of both implies huge difficulties in the 
valuation of capital in most reasonable scenarios – that is, ones in which more than one 
produced commodity exists. (Wicksell 1934) 
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It was in resolving, or failing to resolve, this circularity that what became known as the 
Cambridge capital controversy revolved around. The combination of Wicksell effects, in 
turn, could lead to two, related, violations of Samuelson’s neoclassical “parables”: first, 
that a technique could be preferred at two (or more) different interest rates, with 
intermediary techniques preferred inbetween those rates, a phenomenon known as 
reswitching; second, that a lower capital:labour ratio could be preferred at a lower (not 
higher) interest rate, implying that the demand curve for capital is not always downward-
sloping, a case known as capital reversing, or inverse capital deepening. In the case of 
reswitching, the claim that technical conditions would determine the real return on capital 
is violated, along with the claim that a greater quantity of capital leads to a lower rate of 
interest. Capital reversing also violates the latter claim, along with the claim that the 
distribution of income amongst factors of production is determined by their relative 
scarcities and marginal products. Both implied nonlinearities and, therefore, the possibility 
of multiple equilibria. 
The challenge, then, is that if reswtiching or capital reversing (or both) can be 
demonstrated, the majority of neoclassical capital theory would fail to hold. Early on, this 
much had been theoretically conceded by at least some of the neoclassicals, (Solow 1955-
56) immediately recognising that Wicksell effects mounted an insurmountable challenge to 
capital theory, but insisting on the empirical relevance of one good models. Assorted 
attempts were made at the level of theory to introduce different conceptions of capital and 
production functions, but to all intents and purposes these attempted to collapse analysis 
(via often questionable metaphors) back into a one-good world. Swan’s “putty capital” 
(Swan 1956) and Samuelson’s “surrogate production function” (Samuelson 1962) were 
both of this ilk.  
By the 1970s, it was widely accepted that the aggregate production function could not be 
reliably used for modelling purposes, due to the prevalence of reswitching and capital-
reversing (Samuelson 1966). Neoclassical theory moved, instead, into the adoption of 
Walrasian general equilibrium models, effectively sidestepping the core argument in capital 
theory. Rather than demonstrating a direct relationship between capital and prices 
relationship, as the earlier capital theorists had attempted to show, general equilibrium 
allowed comparative statics results to be demonstrated within an intertemporal system 
(Cohen and Harcourt 2003: 206-207). The Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium approach had 
the great merit of apparent generality. With few restrictions, and none of the 
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differentiability requirements that the earlier production function theory had relied on, it 
appeared to offer a solution to the price and distribution problems without the need for 
awkward underlying assumptions, and the serious inconsistencies of prior theory. Arrow 
and Debreu’s use of the theory of convex sets allowed a firm’s technology to be described 
as a feasible set out net outputs, with no further requirements necessary – or even the use 
of a production function (Arrow and Debreu 1954).  
The existence of general equilibrium – which was now neatly proven – is not the same as its 
determinacy, however. The Arrow-Debreu framework could be extended, following Hicks’ 
(1939) suggestion, by allowing the prices of commodities at different points in time to be 
treated as independent variables. This allowed a version of intertemporal trading to take 
place, transforming a static equilibrium model in to one that could incorporate dynamics. 
The extra degree of freedom introduced by intertemporal pricing, though, “opens the door 
to indeterminacy” of the equilibrium, since the prices of stocks produced in the past are no 
longer tied to the prices of factors currently under production (Mandler 1999: 41). Debreu 
(1970) had shown that for most economies, indeterminacy was unlikely, appearing only 
with some fairly implausible parametrisations of the model. Most plausible initial 
endowments of goods within the model would produce determinate outcomes. But if 
trading takes place over time, as Mandler (1999: 42-45) shows, indeterminacy reappears, 
since current endowments of capital goods will now depend on past decisions. The 
problem is that indeterminacy can be ruled out only by assuming that the initial 
endowment set is unbounded: once production actually occurs, and current endowments 
depend on both past endowments and past decision, that condition no longer applies – the 
feasible set of endowments is now constrained by the economy’s own past. Agents now 
have the possibility of treating factor prices as nonparametric, attempting to alter their 
factor supplies to market in an effort to shift the price, and therefore breaking the principal 
rule of competitive markets. Again, it is the presence of accumulated goods over time that 
forces the breakdown of the system. 
The problem can be resolved, in part, by assuming only a single, accumulable, capital good 
exists. But this sidestepped the fundamental problem raised by Robinson – that of 
heterogeneous capital goods. This was left unresolved, since capital goods were 
themselves now merely assumed to be one input into the set of production technologies. 
Garegnani had elsewhere shown that the Walrasian original concept of general equilibrium 
itself implied a “physicalist” conception of capital, with an exogenously determined 
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distribution of a pre-existing capital form ensuring the stability of equilibrium within the 
system. However, it was impossible on this basis to demonstrate a uniform rate of return 
for each capital good, and that therefore, in practice, most neoclassical theorists had 
earlier abandoned Walras’ concept of capital for one measured in value terms (Garegnani 
1990). By shifting back into a Walrasian world, the neoclassical school was dragging itself 
back into the difficulties of Walras’ concept of capital they had earlier attempted to avoid.  
The neoclassical response to this was, in the end, to point to the empirical applicability of 
the neoclassical models. Irrespective of the theoretical difficulties that the neoclassical 
theory may be glossing over, if the simplifications are made clear such models can provide 
empirical outcomes that are “tractable, fruitful, and policy-relevant” (Cohen and Harcourt 
2003: 209). That appeal to empiricism has dominated the neoclassical school until relatively 
recently, when, as we have seen, the formalism of real business cycle and DSGE models 
began to hold sway – despite the difficulties in getting such formal models to fit empirical 
observations, a recent comprehensive Federal Reserve Board assessment for example 
finding them to be “very poor in forecasting” (Edge and Gurkaynak 2011: 17). 
 
The Cambridge controversy is a generalised concern 
The underlying issue, however, has not been resolved. The Cambridge controversy focused 
on the problems that measurement held for neoclassical theory. However, the same 
problems arise for any theoretical system in which there are simultaneously capital goods, 
and a common valuation in the form of money. The heterogeneity of capital goods requires 
a common measurement to determine their value, but measurement in money terms 
introduces a circularity to the determination of values. Although the neoclassical school 
attached a singular importance to the valuation of capital, since it wished to derive a 
downward-sloping demand curve in line with marginal productivity theory and thus ensure 
the stability and uniqueness of equilibrium, even without the necessity of that theoretical 
hinge, the problem generalises.  
By definition, it must be the case that any commodities that are produced as an output, 
enter production as an input, and are not entirely used in production cannot be valued 
purely in terms of their output where there is more than one good, since the produced 
good (the capital good) forms also part of the input. This creates the necessity for an 
external valuation – a valuation that can be derived in terms of money. For the neoclassical 
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school, the need to enable production to be treated as a separate issue to distribution (and 
therefore holding that the return on capital is its marginal product, found by optimising 
behaviour), both reswitching and capital reversing emerge as immediate problems at this 
point.  
For a system that holds some barrier between the cost of capital and the rate of interest 
(that is to say, any system where the classical dichotomy does not hold, money balances 
having real economic effects), this contradiction is less stringent. It exists nonetheless, 
since the production, use, and reproduction of capital takes place over time. It is the 
presence of time that guarantees the heterogeneity of capital, and thus guarantees that 
measures of capital value that do not exist independently of the value of capital will always 
be subject to the contradiction highlighted above. The rate of interest is simply the money-
form of the valuation of time. In the conventional neoclassical capital pricing model 
considered above this is the form in which this contradiction emerges. 
Although a system in which the rate of interest is determined in a distinct market, or 
through a distinct process – for example, in the market for loanable funds, dependent on 
portfolio holdings – there is a degree of slack introduced, the underlying problem still holds 
since ultimately the production and use of capital takes place over time, and that capital 
(by definition, as capital) enters the production of goods in future production rounds. The 
existence of a capital good today is therefore necessarily different from that of a capital 
good existing at some point in the future - a point that is well-made by theorists in the 
Austrian school, Friedrich von Hayek most notably, in considering the “roundaboutedness” 
of production (Hayek, Robbins et al. 1932). However far the problem of circularity is 
occluded by holding a separate determination of the rate of interest – that is, by having a 
monetary rate of interest dependent on monetary conditions, rather than a “natural” rate 
of interest dependent on real production – the circularity of this valuation must reappear 
because it relates directly to the actual circularity of capital in use. 
It is therefore not the case that, in general, economic models incorporating capital will be 
easily able to avoid some manifestation of Wicksell’s two effects, arising from the 
circularity. Since production takes place over time, the valuation of capital goods varies, as 
Solow (1955-56) noted: “the real difficulty of *capital+ comes not from the physical diversity 
of capital goods. It comes from the intertwining of past, present, and future…” There is no a 
priori reason, in money terms at least, to select any given point in the lifetime of a capital 
good to perform this valuation, given that the money terms valuation is itself an 
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estrangement from the existence of capital as a use-value, that is as a commodity engaged 
in the production process. The appearance of a money relationship to any given unit of 
capital (of some indeterminate specific kind) is not the same as the relationship of that 
indeterminate form of that particular kind of capital to production, since it exists only as a 
result of the general system of exchange of commodities of which capital is only one 
particular kind. We cannot know in money terms, in advance and at the level of generality 
suitable for all particular forms of capital, whether a valuation of that capital should be 
performed at historic price, cost price, market price, future value or some other 
combination of specific price points selected from the capital commodity’s existence. We 
cannot know this precisely because of the element of circularity the appearance of price 
has introduced. 
In the case of SFC, this difficulty is somewhat obscured, on two grounds. The first is the 
appeal made to the accounting framework itself as the guarantor of a “sufficiently good” 
theory of value (Godley and Lavoie 2007: 250): not one that necessarily resolves all issues 
in valuation, but one that provides outcomes that are not going to be inconsistent with 
reality or with theory. The criterion of “sufficiently” good, however, is itself insufficient to 
provide a stable valuation for assets given the presence of exactly the circularity of 
definition for values in a monetary economy. The zero-sum constraints are not sufficient, 
by themselves, to rule out an indeterminacy of values within the framework. This circularity, 
highlighted for the neoclassical case, re-emerges in a very particular form within the SFC 
framework as a variant of the “paradox of profits” encountered in the literature concerning 
the circuitist school and the “monetary theory of production”.  
 
II. CAPITAL IN STOCK FLOW CONSISTENT MODELS 
Capital in SFC 
The second problem, however, emerges in the weak description of capital that SFC 
provides. By appealing to market prices alone as the criterion of value, SFC makes an 
“empiricist” claim to the reality of value within its system: value is simply that which we 
observe attaching itself to an asset in the market. But this is an even stronger commitment 
to empiricism than in other modelling procedures, since it is further reinforced by the 
appeal to accounting conventions (on one side) and what is more properly the economic 
convention of the budget constraint (on the other) to enable an economic meaning to be 
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derived from the system of matrices. The budget constraint has an undoubted economic 
content: in a monetary economy, with money forming the means of payment, and with a 
single sector operating a monopoly on their production, budget constraints must bind. If 
budget constraints bind, they establish the set of actions available to any actor. But it is not 
so clear that the accounting rule of double-entry bookkeeping can apply in the same way. It 
has a conventional character that does not lend itself to a directly economic interpretation: 
of course, the accounting position of the different units, and their net worth, matters to the 
decisions they make, but as long as the units remains solvent, no given accounting position 
at any point in time would have automatic consequences. The accounting rules only 
become truly binding where liquidity is constrained; they are not, themselves, a bind on 
actions. The accounts in SFC record, in effect, whatever the accountants have recorded – 
they depend directly on the effectiveness of the accounting procedures used in their 
construction. There is not an independent, prior and economic justification for their 
existence. 
This produces immediate effects. Capital is introduced, in the Godley-Lavoie textbook case, 
only after the previous services-only and consumption goods-only economic models were 
developed. As the previous chapter attempted to show, the shift to durable consumption 
goods, capable of forming a stock of inventories held over time, posed serious difficulties 
for the coherency of the whole SFC structure. Notably, the presence of inventories 
produced capital gains that were not accounted for properly, being left as an extra 
distributional element within the whole structure. Uncertainty, affecting production, 
produced financial and then monetary effects. An analogous set of problems emerges once 
the SFC framework moves into treating capital proper. 
The principal mechanism through which Godley and Lavoie do this is through the 
revaluation matrix, which seeks to capture capital gains made during the production period. 
An example is reproduced here, showing the changes in the valuation of stocks through 
capital gains as derived from the model in Godley and Lavoie (2007: 380). It is an expansion 
of their earlier presentations, which focused only on the capital gains or losses arising from 
bondholdings by households: 
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Table 5.1: Revaluation matrix 
 Households Firms Government Central bank Banks Total 
Bonds +Δpbl.BL-1  -Δpbl.BL-1   0 
Equities of 
firms 
+Δpe.e-1 -Δpe.e-1    0 
Bank equity +ΔOFb    -ΔOFb 0 
Fixed capital  +Δp.k-1    +Δp.k-1 
 
As usual, we will focus here on the production activities of firms. The behaviour of the 
purely financial elements in this matrix – the distribution of bonds and equities amongst 
households, banks, and government – is of less interest. An accounting system designed to 
capture the behaviour of financial assets and liabilities, unsurprisingly, does not face 
particular challenges from changes in the distributions of financial assets. 
The final line, however, should immediately stand out. The accumulation of capital by firms 
(here assumed to be paid for through the issue of new equity) results not in a balancing of 
the whole system to a zero net change to net worth. This, until now, has been the common 
occurrence within the SFC system. Instead, a residual element appears – a change in net 
worth that is unbalanced by any other element in the matrix, and instead appears as a pure 
accumulation. Net worth of the whole economy, in other words, increases with capital 
accumulation by firms. And the net worth of the whole economy is equivalent, in this 
model, to the value of the stock of capital goods. 
It is firms that make decisions over capital investment, based (in this version of the model) 
on some autonomous “animal spirits”, current capacity utilisation, and the real cost of 
borrowing. Godley and Lavoie assume that the bulk of investment is financed out of 
retained earnings, a stylised fact consistent with theoretical claims by Kaldor and Tobin, 
amongst others, and with current empirical evidence (Godley and Lavoie 2007: 390). Their 
pricing decision, therefore, is modified to the extent that their price must pay for the costs 
of production, the costs of distribution of the surplus to equity-holders and creditors and, 
now, the cost of continued investment. The “Kaleckian” implication of this is that rates of 
capacity utilisation are “not constrained to their normal or standard levels”, contrasting 
with standard Cambridge growth models, and with the classical view of investment (Lavoie 
and Godley 2001: 279). 
The direct form of the investment function they use is not of immediate interest to us: they 
follow Dos Santos and Zezza (2005) in making the rate of capacity utilisation the decisive 
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endogenous variable. Other, more complex investment functions could be provided, 
perhaps to try and capture increasing realism, as in Lavoie and Godley (2001). Our concern 
here, however, is the structure into which any investment function might operate, not the 
applicability (or otherwise) of the function itself. As ever, then, we will be looking at the 
relationships imposed on the economy by the matrix form being proposed here, and 
attempt to examine whether these foundational claims are consistent with economic logic. 
 
Firm financing of investment 
Godley and Lavoie, in common with other SFC modellers, propose a distinct sequence of 
events by which firms, at the start of each period, choose their level of output and (now) 
investment over time. They incorporate, still, the target level of inventories and insist (as 
we have argued, incorrectly) on the valuation of inventories at cost, although we will leave 
this issue for now. The valuation of capital, on the other hand, is implicitly given by its 
market value: that is, its resale value if the capital stock were offered for sale. This, 
however, is never explicitly defined within the model as a whole. The value of capital is, 
instead, the residual element within the whole economy, appearing as the element left 
over after all other balance sheets balance. This residual is, however, actually the product 
of specific decisions made by firms to add to their capital stock. 
The evolution of the capital stock over time is given by Godley and Lavoie as: 
      (     ) 
This is presented in physical goods terms: it represents the actual accumulation of capital 
goods over time. As we have already shown, this formulation introduces substantial 
problems in the case where there is more than one capital good produced. Nonetheless, 
for now we can assume that a single capital good is produced, and that this therefore 
resolves the index number problem of summating heterogeneous goods. Firms attempt to 
finance their gross investments out of retained earnings, as far as possible, with loans still 
being needed to provide initial financing for wages and therefore for inventory build-up. In 
the investment function presented here, desired investment is determined by “animal 
spirits” (some autonomous demand for investment), current capacity utilisation, and the 
real price of borrowing. There is a seniority of disbursements, with creditors being met 
ahead of retained earnings spent on investment, and the equity-holders receiving 
dividends. The proposed investment function, then, is backward-looking: it assess the need 
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for additional capacity given the level of capacity utilisation today, although it could easily 
incorporate forward-looking elements by modifying the argument we are presenting here.  
The first concern is the timing of the available funding. Loans are provided by banks to 
meet current costs in the form of wages. Firms then seek to provide for the desired capital 
investment out of retained earnings. They establish their desired level of investment on the 
basis of capacity utilisation in the last period (although, again, it would make little 
difference here if they relied on expected capacity). The financing of this is assumed to 
come from retained earnings, held in this period. Yet these earnings are not available until 
the period’s end, after production has been made and sales realised. Without the 
realisation of sales, there are no retained earnings available for investment. We have to 
suppose that investment, therefore, takes place at the end of the modelled period, since 
this is the only point at which retained earnings would be available. Dividends would then 
be distributed from the remainder. 
The demand for capital goods, however, exists over the whole period. At any given point in 
time, retained earnings held by firms will not be sufficient to meet this demand, by 
definition: until the earnings have been realised, the demand for capital cannot be met. At 
present, if the amount needed to meet the firms’ demand for capital goods was insufficient, 
the firm is assumed to turn to bank credit to make good the difference. However, this 
would constitute an additional demand for credit money. If spent by firms on capital goods, 
it would add directly to the stocks of money in circulation. But from the current balance 
sheet, it is unclear where this immediate demand for financing, if met by increased 
circulation of credit money, would end up. It would be obtained by firms, then spent on 
capital goods, and presumably then circulate back to the banks.  
The difficulty, however, is that there is no within-period guarantee that all monies released 
in this way would circulate smoothly back to the banks. If that can be guaranteed, the issue 
of additional funds for the purchase of capital is of no concern: the money is issued, 
circulated through the economy to purchase capital goods, and then circulated back to the 
bank before the period closes. As firms generate more retained earnings, the need for this 
additional financing gradually decays; its only legacy will be an increase in the firms’ 
outstanding loans over and above that needed to fund the capital purchase: essentially a 
kind of small additional cost that would decline the closer the purchase of any given fixed 
capital was to the end of the period. 
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Money, however, need not circulate in its entirety within one period. Indeed, it is central to 
its functioning so far – as a store of value – that it can exist in multiple periods. In the 
current model, workers paid in credit money can retain these payments (in whole or part) 
as deposits held within the banking system, earning them interest. There is no reason to 
suppose they could not do this with further monies circulated. As an aside, the flip-side of 
this, of course, is that firms themselves retain no cash balances: all earnings are always 
either spent on fixed capital, used to repay loans, or circulated as dividends. Yet empirical 
evidence, particularly after the crash of 2008, suggests non-financial firms have a huge 
propensity to retain money deposits, topping £300bn for the UK alone. 
Introducing a firms’ own account would imply that firms, too, made portfolio decisions, 
rather than pure investment decisions, akin to the suggestions made earlier about the 
correct modelling of inventories. That aside, the additional monies obtained by households 
are of more a concern: if these additional funds, issued in lieu of retained earnings being 
available, are repaid back to banks within the period (and therefore, in this model, entirely 
spent on consumption by households), the model closes without problems. As long as the 
marginal propensity to consume is unity for this additional credit finance – or, what 
amounts to the same thing, workers in the capital goods industry spend all their wages – no 
problems emerge. For any marginal propensity to consume lower than one, however, this 
additional source of funding presents a challenge for the current balance sheet 
representation: we have an issue of funds, within-period, that is falling into the hands’ of 
one sector – the households – without a clear liability relationship on the other side. 
The following chapter explores in greater detail some of the implications of what Keynes 
called the “financial demand” for money. The important point to note for now is that while 
SFC offers a system that, at the end of the circuit of credit-money, appears closed, it is 
more problematic when dealing with the state of financing at the start of any given period. 
Again, we find that the demands of production impose themselves first as a financing 
requirement, and that this turns into a potential imbalance in the monetary system: we 
would find, with demands for initial financing met by the banks, that a continual monetary 
overhang would come into existence, in excess of the actual requirements of investment, 
for any positive level of investment in any given period of time. 
“Overcapitalisation” has been introduced by (Toporowski 2008) as the “holding of financial 
liabilities in  excess of these needed to start production”. He argues that, under 
financialisation, the desire of non-financial firms to hold significant money balances has 
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grown, and that the demand for financing is not determined by prospective income 
streams as such (as in the conventional theory), but by opportunities to obtain finance and 
prospective capital gains. Michell and Toporowski (2012) have more recently introduced 
this concept into an SFC framework derived from Godley and Lavoie, with firms being now 
allowed to hold bank deposits as the simplest form of “overcapitalised” finance available to 
them. They show that consistency in the matrix can be maintained with this modification; 
we are sympathetic to this view, but will argue here rather that there are additional 
demands for financing that will act to disrupt financial and money markets.  
 
Capital cannot be reduced to inventories 
The initial Godley-Lavoie presentation, as developed in their Monetary Economics, 
develops a theory of capital investment in which investment by firms is initially adopted 
purely in the form of inventories (Godley and Lavoie 2007: ch.2). Later, as they extend the 
model, fixed (tangible) capital is introduced as a second item for firms to invest in, and 
assumed (for convenience) to be financed either through equity or retained earnings, 
leaving loans to finance pure inventory accumulation (Godley and Lavoie 2007: ch.11).  
Clearly inventories form part of the capital held by a firm. They can be considered part of 
the circulating capital of a firm: that section of its investment that is, in general, used up 
either within a single production period, or within a comparatively short space of time. 
What marks inventories out as unique relative to circulating capital of other forms – raw 
materials, intermediate goods, and so on – is that they are constitute both an investment in 
capital (of a particular kind) and have the capacity to be immediately available for resale, 
even if the resale price may be significantly devalued. Using the distinction made earlier, 
within the M-C-M’ circuit of capital, they are already – amongst the many forms that capital 
can take as a commodity – the closest, in practice, to the existence of capital as money. 
This, of course, makes them the ideal form for representation within an accounting matrix 
based precisely on flows of financing over periods of time.  
However, this proximity to the money-form – that is, the presumed liquidity of all 
inventories – is exactly what makes them inappropriate as a form by which to understand 
capital as a generality. In the first instance, the pricing of current inventories poses no 
particular problems: they can be simply priced at current market prices, which may imply a 
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loss or a gain for the firm holding them. There is an obvious relationship between the 
inventory, and net wealth at this point. 
For a one-good world, in which the same commodity (say corn) can be both consumed 
directly, or invested as capital, and in which all production lasts a single turnover period, 
this inventory-as-capital poses no especial difficulties. The difference between an inventory, 
and a capital investment, is merely that the inventory represents the good as unconsumed 
within the period, and the capital investment is directly invested at the start of the period, 
producing output at the end. In this instance, the good retains an immediate relationship to 
the money-form, since it is either consumed directly or at the end of the production period, 
and its costs can be compared across the period. 
If we assume multiple goods, and (in particular) the presence of capital goods, potentially 
of variable turnover times, this simple comparison cannot hold. As we have seen, the 
pricing of capital presents a unique set of problems: an ideal system would reconcile both 
the pricing of the output with its distribution across society. The neoclassical production 
function claimed to do this, but does not withstand the Cambridge critique; general 
equilibrium theory offered a more general solution, seemingly without the reliance on 
calculus and the concept of adjustments at the margin, but this cannot be treated as a 
theory of capital as such because of the recurrent problem of factor price indeterminacy. 
Although initially delivering a promising set of results, further research revealed that 
general equilibrium solutions could be neither unique, nor stable, under plausible initial 
conditions.  
SFC removes itself from these considerations through the construction of a series of 
matrices that are held to represent every stock and flow of economic relevance within the 
economy. If the combination of the budget constraints and the accounting identity hold, 
the system is closed and complete. If, however, there are “black holes” (in Godley and 
Lavoie’s phrase) at any point, the system will fail to close, and will be unstable. Inventories, 
if more correctly valued, constitute one such “black hole”; the funding of capital goods 
constitutes another.  
This is occluded in their presentation precisely because, in effect, capital is collapsed into 
inventories in making both constitute the “net worth” of the whole economy. But this itself 
contains a further problem: since capital is valued at current market price, in their 
theoretical system, and inventories apparently valued at cost of replacement, the two are 
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not easily comparable. They cannot simply be added together without first specifying how 
the replacement-cost valuation of inventories can be made to equate to the market-price 
valuation of capital. The SFC presentation, with its reliance on accounting, has here 
provided too easy a route out of a serious issue in the valuation of economic outputs. 
This affects the presentation of capital gains directly. At present, the revaluation matrix 
seeks to capture all capital gains made (or lost) during a period occurring as a result of 
pricing changes. For pure financial assets, this is not a problem, since each financial asset 
has a complementing liability that ensures the balances sheets still balance. For real assets 
– inventories and, now, capital stock – the situation is less clear: they at present cannot be 
priced commensurately to each other, and yet both end up as a residual in the net worth of 
the whole economy. Capital is in general valued at its market price, but inventories are 
valued at their replacement cost of production. These are two different things, and cannot 
be directly compared; we also know that, if these two goods are not the same, we cannot 
directly value them in money terms because of the circularity in pricing that is thereby 
introduced: this is the essence of the Cambridge critique. Capital gains (or capital losses) 
occurring for either inventories or capital cannot be compared: at any point in time, the 
revaluation matrix is potentially telling us very little about the state of the economy, given 
the possibility that the prices of both fixed capital and inventories – if they are not the 
same good – will diverge, and diverge in an a priori unknowable fashion dependent on real 
economic conditions.  
 
Capital as past accumulation of commodities 
What lies behind this occlusion is a specific theory of capital, derived (via David Ricardo) 
ultimately from Adam Smith. In this formulation, following a version of the labour theory of 
value, since all capital is the product of labour, any existing stock of capital can be 
considered simply the accumulation of prior flows of labour. Under these circumstances, 
the pricing of capital becomes a relatively simple condition: it is merely the summation of 
the prior labour exerted to create the capital, dating back to some distant point in the past. 
In Ricardo’s hands, this enabled him to dodge some doubts of Smith’s, and axiomatically 
assume that the labour theory of value still held: the accumulation of means of production 
translated, with no additional terms, into the accumulation of capital, and commodities 
could be very easily values in labour terms. Describing the production of stockings as the 
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accumulation of cotton, spinning labour, spinning machinery, and so on, Ricardo claims 
that “*t+he aggregate sum of these various kinds of labour determines the quantity of other 
things for which these stockings will exchange, while the same consideration of the various 
quantities of labour which have bestowed on those other things will equally govern the 
portion of them which will exchange for stockings.” (Ricardo 1821: 15) The value of capital, 
here, is the accumulated historic value of its components. In stock-flow terms, capital can 
be presented without seeming difficulty as the stock that emerges from the accumulation 
of historic flows, appropriately valued. It should be clear, already, that some serious 
difficulties in the pricing of historic elements are here being glossed over, and we will 
return to this point. 
This conception of capital as accumulation of historic production was resurrected by Piero 
Sraffa in his 1960 Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities, a work of huge 
subsequent influence on the development of non-neoclassical schools. Sraffa aimed to 
demonstrate (and to substantial extent did demonstrate) that the major claims of the 
neoclassical school regarding the separatedness of production from distribution, and the 
derivation of prices from demand and supply, was in fact largely incorrect, even in 
equilibrium. However, he further presented an argument for the presence of capital in 
which it could be reduced to the residual element in a series of commodities produced over 
time. 
For now, we can note that, under these conditions, there is no worthwhile distinction to be 
made between net wealth, and the value of the capital stock: with all value derived 
(ultimately) from labour, and with capital as only the stock of accumulated labour, it can be 
seen very simply that the net wealth of a society, and the stock of its accumulated labour, 
are one and the same thing. Under these circumstances, the SFC elision between net 
wealth and the stock of capital would function without difficulty. Additions to the stock of 
capital would be a simple residual – the addition to the stock of capital would be only that 
part of the total output left unconsumed, simply equating S=I, ex post.  
In fact, SFC represents (if anything) a retrogression from this point, since they do not 
incorporate either a labour theory of value (or some equivalent) that would allow net 
wealth and the stock of capital to equate easily. There is no external, non-monetary, 
referent for the value of past accumulations that would allow both net worth and net 
capital to become equivalent values, both under a common standard of comparison. The 
Godley-Lavoie presentation of the presence of assets accumulated under the firms’ direct 
143 
 
control is unusual: they present first the case for inventories, and then only later develop 
this into the capital. The result, in practice, is a confusion between capital, inventories, and 
net worth (the concept used to disguise both). Net worth, a residual element within the 
economy as a whole, is left undefined; it appears as a kind of repository for the presence of 
capital and inventories, appearing in real-life balance sheets but not, in this instance, 
pinned down to a definite theoretical existence. This becomes a problem, as we have 
suggested for a similar situation in the preceding chapter, because it hides a distributional 
issue within the economy: different firms (owned by different households) will in practice 
hold different amounts of inventories and capital; the amounts they hold, at any given 
point in time, will in turn affect their demands for financing, alter the net balance of 
financing, and therefore have a wider impact on the provision of credit money by the 
banking system.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter began with an analysis of the problems posed by capital for economic theory 
in general, before suggesting that the circulation of capital was the critical point to focus on. 
A number of specific problems were highlighted, relating to the problems of pricing 
heterogeneous capital forms, and it was proposed that both the neoclassical system and 
the SFC alternative both failed to adequately value capital. 
That, in turn, lead on to a consideration of the problems caused for the financing of capital 
as presented in the canonical Godley-Lavoie SFC model. We found that the financing 
procedure they proposed was not plausible, given the need to obtain initial financing for 
the fixed capital, prior to retained earnings being available; and that, while the use of 
retained earnings for finance simplified the problem of fixed capital investment 
substantially, it do so only at the price of disguising this wider issue. This brought us to the 
problem of pricing fixed capital and inventories, with inventory pricing already a deep 
problem for the system. The appearance of “net worth” and the use of net worth as 
residual “sink” for both these two elements was not, it was argued, an appropriate 
treatment given that we cannot directly compare the valuations of either. 
The following chapter develops the issue of initial financing further by looking closely at 
Keynes’ formulation of the problem and surrounding arguments, before using the 
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“circuitist” theory of production to provide a coherent basis for an alternative conception 
of finance.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTMENT, AND THE FUNCTIONS OF MONEY 
 
Introduction 
This chapter builds on the previous one to consider further some of the issues raised: the 
motivation for investment, the motivation to fail to invest – to create hordes – and the 
presence of money within a system of accumulation. It starts by examining the seemingly 
crucial role of the entrepreneur as the decisive element within a system based on Keynes, 
critiques this with reference to understandings of uncertainty, and then on the basis of this 
developed understanding of uncertainty. We move from this into a reconsideration of 
money as such, and attempt to show how the theorisation of money has consequences for 
the representation of flows of value.  
The final section concludes with the critical points for the wider discussion, in two parts: 
first, that an irreducible “leak” is created from the system of flows within the economy by 
the presence of both money and uncertainty. We suggest that the one – in contrast to 
much post-Keynesian writings on the subject – is neither reducible to the means to deal 
with another, but that nor is uncertainty separable from the circuit in any sense. Second, it 
is the presence of this irreducible leak from the system of flows that undermines the purely 
self-contained SFC universe. 
 
I. ENTREPRENEURS AND CAPITALISM 
Profit as the motivation for the circuit 
We have so far discussed the need to understand the sequencing of economic activities as 
forming a necessary, logical circuit of monetary and real flows over time. It is the presence 
of this circuit, and therefore the structure of the economy it presupposes, that must 
determine our understanding of how the macroeconomy operates; indeed, it is fair to say 
that the circuit is the macroeconomy: it is the conditions of existence needed for the 
maintenance of economic activity by large numbers of disparate individual units over a 
sustained period of time. 
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No circuit exists (or can exist) in general equilibrium, as we have discussed in an earlier 
chapter (Foley 1975). The question of expectations and therefore of motivation, in this 
sense, does not exist in the same way: entrepreneurship, considered as the activity of 
commencing cycles of production, does not exist, since factors exchange at marginal 
productivities, technical change is exogenous, and (in equilibrium) a zero-profit condition 
holds. All existing economic problems are already resolved in the condition of equilibrium, 
with the proper concern of macroeconomics simply being the conditions under which the 
equilibrium is restored as efficaciously as possible, given exogenous disturbances. 
SFC, very clearly, sits well outside this tradition. As we have seen, it presupposes a 
sequencing of economic activity, forming a logical process through time, with a definite 
beginning and a definite end. We have, so far, examined the conditions appearing at the 
end of that cycle: the conditions obtaining after production has occurred, flows of 
resources and money have occurred, and the balance of assets and liabilities across the 
economy is settled. This chapter turns to the condition of origins: how does the circuit 
begin? 
In making this turn, it is clear that profits as such have a critical position. The motivation for 
commencing the circuit of capital, and the flows that it engenders, is the expectation on the 
part of entrepreneurs (as business managers) that the return will be greater than the initial 
money offering. There is no motivation to the circuit beyond this point: the entirety of the 
motivation for investment, in the aggregate, is captured by the expression M>M’. 
Understanding the flow of money engendered by the decisions to invest, on the part of 
entrepreneurs – here defined as those in possession of the motivation to invest, but not 
(necessarily) the finance – means then attempting to understand, at the most abstract level, 
this movement from M to M’, and the conditions under which these can occur. 
If, however, we are talking about the forward-looking behaviour of units within the 
economy, we are of necessity moving into a world of uncertainty. We have already seen, in 
the preceding two chapters, how uncertainty over conditions obtaining after production 
has occurred can impact directly on the conditions of circulation of money and real 
commodities. The disruption imposed by the presence of uncertainty on production, as a 
real factor impinging on the production of commodities and their eventual sale, has 
consequences that stretch from the decision to produce (and the production that occurs), 
into the behaviour of financial assets and ultimately to the monetary system. 
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Mechanisms for dealing with uncertainty are therefore central to the economy. As 
discussed, we here will follow the post-Keynesian lead in considering money as the 
principal social mechanism through which uncertainty is managed. This, however, begs the 
question of who (or what) performs this management. We closed the previous chapter 
with an introduction to the problems created by the need to raise initial financing to 
commence fresh circuits of accumulation; this chapter unpacks this question. 
Entrepreneurship, considered as the means to commence fresh circuits of capital flows, 
hinges precisely on the question of uncertainty and its management, in a world in which 
both production (and realisation) takes time, and the future is unknowable. It deals closely 
with Keynes’ writings on the matter, for two reasons: first, the obvious and immense 
influence of Keynes on the development of macroeconomics in general, and SFC-type 
models in particular; second, where Keynes’ own arguments concerning uncertainty, 
finance, and the provision of initial financing stumbled, or where holes emerged in his line 
of thinking, they provide an invaluable reference point for the clarification of the issues. 
 
Entrepreneurs at the centre of Keynes’ system 
Keynes, at least post-Treatise on Money stressed this point. The hinge of Keynes’ General 
Theory system is the entrepreneur: the bearer of the “animal spirits” needed to drive the 
system onwards. This is the exogenous factor in an otherwise closed, circular system: that 
with investment, through the multiplier, acting to determine savings, and savings, through 
credit, feeding back into investment, the economy would otherwise form an entirely closed 
loop. It is “animal spirits”, irrational, psychological urges that compel entrepreneurs to act, 
that break the loop and introduce a necessary element of indeterminacy. 
It is, however, worthwhile unpacking Keynes’ concept. Keynes pictured the economy as 
fatally overwhelmed – however organised it may appear – by a fundamental, ontological 
uncertainty.  It was in response to such uncertainty that “animal spirits” were required, 
since it is only by acting somewhat irrationally, on the basis of faith, or hunches about the 
future, that entrepreneurs could choose to invest over the long term, given the presence of 
this uncertainty. Investment, in other words, is ultimately determined by a kind of 
irrationality: while, for the most part, it takes places within the system, it is always subject 
to a certain indeterminacy because it relies on the decisions of entrepreneurs.  
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De Brunhoff (1976) has criticised Keynes for introducing an “irreducible psychological 
mechanism” through this device. Indeed, it is at precisely the hinge of Keynes’ system – the 
determination of investment – that his system appears to be indeterminate. We have 
stepped outside the realm of economic analysis, and into the psychological: something that 
more recent work on behavioural economics, like Akerlof and Shiller (2009), has attempted 
to pursue, directly filling in the limited account of entrepreneurial agency in Keynes with 
insights drawn from psychological research and the emerging field of behavioural 
economics.  
We have, in chapter 3, discussed the limitations of this approach – essentially an extension 
of an earlier paradigm, that of providing “microfoundations” to the macroeconomy, and 
flawed because of it. There is, however, an important recognition by Keynes that the 
decision to invest cannot be represented solely as a mechanical procedure, akin to that 
proposed in a standard “hydraulic” IS-LM reading of Keynes’ system. Older Keynesian 
macromodels would represent the entire economy as a stable system of relationships 
between different variables of interest, in which indeterminacy (of any sort) was essentially 
banished.  Econometric estimations of the behavioural parameters could be taken, and 
these parameters assumed to be stable. It was precisely this set of assumptions, concerning 
both the estimation of parameters, and their use in forecasting, that led to sharp criticism 
from the early 1970s onwards (Lucas 1976). The microfoundations research programme 
was precisely intended to overcome these failings, populating macro models with rational 
agents and devising the routes by which the deviations of the macroeconomy from general 
equilibrium behaviour could be explained by asymmetries in information and other, similar, 
market imperfections. A formal indeterminacy was introduced through the use of 
stochastic errors in decision variables, although this had limited effective bearing on the 
functioning of the model. 
 
Probability in Keynes 
As those in the post-Keynesian tradition have noted, peculiarity of this representation of 
uncertainty – in which it is, fundamentally, an additive “error” imposed on an otherwise 
deterministic system – is that it is a substantial distance from Keynes’ own approach to 
uncertainty. Keynes offered a sharp distinction between risk, originally defined as a logical 
relationship between entities, and uncertainty, which emerges in his writing not only as the 
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product of our limited cognitive capacities, or restricted knowledge, but when the logical 
relation of probability does not exist, or cannot be expressed numerically. The first two are 
epistemological questions: a probability distribution could exist, somewhere, but we lack 
the processing power or the information to apprehend it fully. The latter is ontological: it is 
a feature of life itself that no consistent probability distribution can exist in some situations. 
Whether Keynes stuck to his earlier definition of probability in his later writings is 
somewhat moot. The risk-uncertainty distinction, however, was repeatedly stressed by him 
as of absolutely fundamental importance to economics. As Keynes himself put it, in 
summarising the General Theory: 
“The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of 
European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest 
twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of 
private wealth owners in the social system in 1970. About these matters there 
is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever.” 
(Keynes 1937) 
Moreover, the critical intellectual development from the Treatise to the General Theory is 
the movement from an asocial, logical view of probability and decision-making, to the 
treatment of decision-making under uncertainty as institutionally defined: the conditions 
under which decisions can be made in an uncertain world are, by the General Theory, 
bound by a series of social structures – in particular, that of money, his definition of which 
acted as the anchor for the whole system. Irreducible uncertainty exists and is only weakly 
captured by money’s separate functions. 
Keynes, in Davis’ interpretation, viewed uncertainty as both “epistemological and 
ontological” (Davis 2010: 37). The presence of ontological uncertainty produces a 
nonergodic economy – one that, as a first approximation, is not pulled back towards an 
equilibrium point, and whose observables will be nonstationary over a sufficiently long 
period of time. It is one that allows the space for the creation of radically new, unforeseen 
possibilities, in which “…the innovator creates new opportunities and new state of the 
world.” (Dequech 2003) Investment is a process that in conditions of indeterminacy. 
 
The “marginal efficiency of capital” 
Keynes’ own description of the critical determinant of investment, the “marginal efficiency 
of capital” (MEC) schedule, however, therefore contained a fundamental flaw. As against 
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what he took to  be the prevailing “classical” view of investment demand, which viewed the 
efficiency of capital as the single-period rate of return to an asset, Keynes wished to show 
that the MEC was defined as the expected return for a given asset, for all future time 
periods: it is “equal to that rate of discount which would make the present value of the 
series of annuities given by the returns expected from the capital-asset during its life just 
equal to the marginal supply price” (Keynes 1936: 135). MEC, in other words, like the rest 
of his system, depended on a particular view of future returns, formed by entrepreneurs’ 
expectations.  
However, if we allow, as Keynes insists upon, that expectations are about a necessarily 
uncertain future, and that there is no strictly rational basis to the formation of those 
expectations, then the distribution of expectations, for any given set of entrepreneurs will 
not be clear. Broadly similar information about the future will be interpreted in broadly 
similar ways, and the mean of these distributions will shift in a manner consistent with 
changes in public information. In the presence of private information and – decisively – no 
rational means to apprehend an unknowable future, the distribution around that mean is 
unknown. Factors outside of an economic analysis – whether institutional biases or 
entrepreneurs’ psychologies – will determine the location of any individual set of 
expectations within the whole distribution. 
But if the distribution is unknown, the mean cannot be taken as an indicator of the course 
of investment in the aggregate. An aggregate MEC schedule drawn on the basis of this 
mean could very well not reflect true conditions for investment – either as the objective 
circumstances facing entrepreneurs, or their subjective anticipations of the future. 
Individual MEC schedules could vary substantially. Keynes therefore proposes, instead, that 
the “greatest of these marginal efficiencies can then be regarded as the marginal efficiency 
of capital in general” (1936: 135-136).  
This removes the problem of the uncertain distribution of the MEC schedules for different 
assets by throwing out the distribution itself. On this basis, a single schedule can be 
presented for the economy as a whole. This is, however, unsatisfactory on two counts: first, 
the “greatest of these marginal efficiencies” could be a clear outlier relative to the rest, and 
determined by little more (in Keynes’ heavily psychologistic theory) than the whim of a 
single entrepreneur; second, more fundamentally, it is the distribution of the expected 
returns that matter if entrepreneurs can construct investment portfolios with more than 
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one asset, since it is the relative, not absolute, rates of return that matter in creating such 
portfolio (Markowitz 1952). Keynes’ attempted resolution is unsatisfactory. 
 
Keynes and psychologism 
Its failure stems from Keynes’ original error in attempting to find a psychological grounding 
for behaviour in conditions of uncertainty of a fundamental character. It is this that, later in 
the General Theory, leads him to focus on entrepreneurs’ “animal spirits”, on one side, and 
the three separate demands for money on the other. The macroeconomy resolves itself to 
a fine balance between the spiritedness and the cowardice of a few individuals; while 
arguably in keeping with Keynes’ wider views of society and morality (Skidelsky 1983), 
these divinations are, of best, of a necessarily speculative character. Revisions to Keynes 
original system pushed the centrality of uncertainty to one side, instead choosing to 
present the macroeconomy as a system of basically stable structural parameters (Hicks 
1937; Samuelson 1948) this, in turn, left the neoclassical synthesis models vulnerable to the 
criticisms of Lucas and others as their failings became apparent from the early 1970s 
onwards. 
There is, nonetheless, within Keynes’ system a critical insight into economics in the 
presence of uncertainty. Where he errs is in attempting to present uncertainty as 
something like an unfortunate individual affliction, rather than a social fact. Keynes simply 
takes the institutions of developed capitalism as read, and then assumes back from them 
that the processes through which uncertainty is dealt with are principally the result of 
individual behaviour. Like later neoclassical economists, or the earlier “classical” school 
that the General Theory was intended to overthrow, Keynes is blind to the existence of 
capitalism as a society with its own history – even if he provides a more sophisticated 
account of its operations, and is alert to its recurrent problems.  
His theoretical system depends on the management of behaviour by those deemed capable 
(if not willing) to make investments – the entrepreneurs. The problem of aggregate 
demand, although often (if erroneously) identified as Keynes’ critical new insight, is of a 
second order, given its dependence on prior investment. Changes in the MEC schedule 
determine the dynamic of the system as a whole. Those changes are driven by 
entrepreneurs’ expectations of returns, which in turn are mediated by the presence of 
money and finance, and depend on expectations of future demand. Government 
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intervention, then, is not simply about the management of that future demand, through 
taxation and spending decisions – important though this may be. It is, crucially, about the 
management of expectations, through its monetary and fiscal operations. 
But by attempting to describe the operations of a capitalist economy without also 
providing an account of its specific institutional features, Keynes’ analysis collapses too 
quickly into psychological explanations for its behaviour. Institutional blindness, and a 
deliberately ahistorical approach to the development of those institutions, leads to a 
psychologisation of economic issues. “Mass psychology”, whose presumed processes are 
referred to on occasion by Keynes, is not an effective substitute for economic analysis.  
This is De Brunhoff’s “irreducible psychological element” within Keynes’ General Theory 
reintroduced, similar to the problem of investment we discussed earlier. It casts a “shadow” 
(Brunhoff 1976: 41) over the whole, threatening the breakdown of the theoretical system – 
a point, at the heart of the structure, where economic analysis does not function. Marx, in 
this respect, is perhaps much stronger on the same question: although noting the possible 
psychological compulsions to hoard on the part of the hoarder – avarice or aesthetics – 
these motivations have “a single object and a single effect that completely exhaust them as 
psychological causes” (Brunhoff 1976: 41). The effective function of hoarding, in Marx, is to 
sustain the role of money as the universal equivalent. The effective function of liquidity 
preference in Keynes is to satisfy the urges of the hoarder. One is contained within the 
system under scrutiny. The other steps outside of analysis. 
The underlying problem is two-fold. Keynes has correctly identified the uncertainty-
hoarding relationship. But he has placed it outside of economic analysis: on one side, 
uncertainty is merely a natural feature of all societies, exhibiting no specific characteristics 
in any particular form of social organisation; on the other, responses to uncertainty depend, 
ultimately, on its psychological impacts. There is a hole in his theory where history and 
institutions should be, weakly substituted for in the form of entrepreneurs. Keynes, 
perhaps, identified some of the contradictions here, writing at the end of the General 
Theory of the need for a “socialisation of investment” as the means to ensure the 
autonomous supply of investment expenditure when “animal spirits” failed and the 
preference for liquidity overwhelmed all other considerations.  
 
Keynesian and Schumpeterian entrepreneurship 
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The type of uncertainty Keynes holds as fundamental to economic activity was, as we have 
just seen, of a different order to that of the standard neoclassical world. It cannot be fitted 
into the standard neoclassical representation of an economy as a deterministic system 
(with a trend) subject to stochastic shocks. Instead, the economy emerges as a social 
process, with Keynes’ description of entrepreneurs as effective mediators of this 
uncertainty, turning an unknowable future, by their decisions, into specific investments. 
This places him close to researchers in the Austrian tradition, most notably Joseph 
Schumpeter and Frank Knight. Schumpeter, akin to Keynes, posited the existence of a 
“circular flow” (Schumpeter and Opie 1934) that constituted the economy in its “pure” 
(essentially non-capitalist) form: the primary motivation of all activity is its ultimate 
consumption, and, with just two classes in society – workers and landlords – the whole 
economy is entirely stable, producing no surplus. What is consumed in one period flows (as 
money) into sustaining consumption in the next. This pre-capitalist conception of the 
economy allows Schumpeter to introduce the entrepreneur as the disruptive element 
within the otherwise stable flow, the entrepreneur functioning as the source of all 
dynamism and growth that marks capitalism out as a distinctive social system. Remove 
entrepreneurship - which was to be secured through a social, not economic, process - and 
capitalism decays back to a stable, even static, system (Schumpeter 1942). Schumpeter was 
more consistent in his treatment of entrepreneurship than Keynes; it was a social, 
ultimately non-economic process, and could not be so easily folded back into the economic 
analysis. 
The problem here, as Paul Sweezy indicates in a brief review (Sweezy 1943), is that the 
stable circular flow is highly sensitive to initial conditions (Sweezy 1943: 95). In particular, 
the assumption that no distinct group has access to capital ensures that no surplus is 
produced and no drive to accumulate exists. Once a distinct group has a privileged access 
to and ownership of capital, the drive to accumulate is rapidly set in train, reinforced by 
social institutions conferring prestige and power on this group. By effectively writing capital 
(and capitalists) out of his economy, Schumpeter can comparatively easily show that it is 
entrepreneurs, as a disruptive element, that drive innovation and therefore the 
accumulation of a surplus, rather than (as Sweezy contends) accumulation that creates the 
need for innovation: innovation helps secure the accumulated surplus; provides an 
advantage to the original innovator, in competitive conditions, in the form of an increased 
surplus; and the capitalist who does not innovate will, conversely, be driven out of business. 
(Sweezy 1943: 95-6) 
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A “circular flow” of some form, then, is unavoidable given a monetary economy, for the 
fundamental insight (often associated with Keynes) that every sale implies a purchase, ex 
post – if not ex ante, as Say’s Law asserted but never properly demonstrated (Marx 1973: 
201). Keynes added to this the identity, ex post, that sales must equate to investment. 
Where disagreements emerge is over how this circular flows moves from a stable, balanced 
economy to one (like the one we live in) that exhibits dynamism: the movement, in Marx’s 
useful designation, from simple reproduction to expanded reproduction. Marx certainly 
conceded that in pure consumption economy (with no accumulation), aggregate supply 
would equate aggregate demand: “Of the part of the revenue in one branch of production 
(which produces consumable commodities) which is consumed in the revenue of another 
branch of production, it can be said that the demand is equal to its own supply (in so far as 
production is kept in the right proportion). It is the same as if each branch itself consumed 
that part of its revenue.” (Marx 1969: 233) This is the equivalent to Schumpeter’s circular 
flow (Bellamy Foster 1983: 327). 
Disruptions occur once growth is introduced, and it is the conditions under which this 
process of growth and development of a capitalist economy can occur that bring us closer 
to a theoretical understanding of capitalism as a whole. Understanding the process by 
which accumulation occurs is therefore necessary to understanding the dynamic of 
capitalism as such. Schumpeter provides one answer: that growth, ultimately, is a process 
that occurs beyond the boundaries of the economy as such, with investment determined 
by the actions of entrepreneurs who, in a fundamental sense, are a class apart from – 
indeed, often a class in opposition to – the conventional operations of the economy. 
Sweezy, basing his argument on Marx, argues the opposite case: that accumulation is a 
social process that compels innovation, as a side-effect of accumulation, rather than its 
necessary condition. The pace of accumulation in general would set the pace of innovation 
in particular – not, as in Schumpeter, the other way round. Schumpeter treats, as defining 
feature of capitalism, the presence of “equal access to bank capital”; whereas it is a 
defining feature of Marx’s analysis that capitalism is most manifest in the structure of its 
unequal access to resources.  
This clear distinction, however, is never quite adduced by Keynes. His entrepreneurs matter 
to the system, providing the autonomous element of investment that is capable – given the 
possibility of permanent stagnation in a monetary economy – of restarting the process of 
accumulation and moving the economy back towards full employment. But this autonomy 
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is provided solely by their “animal spirits”. By holding that all uncertainty is of a general 
character, inherent in all human societies, Keynes never provides the link back to the 
specific, capitalist function of entrepreneurs.   
 
Knightian entrepreneurs 
A more precise consideration of the function of entrepreneurship takes us back to the 
Austrian School. Both Schumpeter and Keynes offered descriptions of entrepreneurs as 
something like guardians of economic dynamism: carving new paths for development in a 
world that otherwise crawls into the future, beset by ignorance. In Schumpeter’s telling, 
the activity of entrepreneurship, and the innovation undertaken by entrepreneurs, acquires 
a virtuous, even heroic quality; but it is Frank Knight’s more sober account that is of 
interest here. 
Knight (1921) proposed that the principle act of entrepreneurship was to act as the conduit 
by which an uncertain future acquired the rational characteristics of a risky future. The 
former is fundamentally unknowable, and beyond the immediate reach of rational forecast; 
the latter consists of future states of the world whose probabilities of occurring are, at least 
in principle, knowable and insurable. It is a movement from an outcome that cannot be 
priced, to one that merely is not and it is entrepreneurs who enable this operation to take 
place. They bear the initial burdens of uncertainty, taking on risks that cannot be rational 
hedged or insured against, and, by creating new markets, allow those risks to take on 
distinct, rational prices. 
Knight distinguishes between three different forms of decision-making under uncertainty: a 
priori probability, in which probabilities can be known with certainty beforehand, as in 
rolling a fair dice; statistical probability, in which probabilities can be reasonably inferred 
from prior observation; and “estimates” – the radical uncertainty of unique events (Knight 
1921: 224-5). The first two are quantifiable – one by definition, the other by inference. The 
third is beyond the reach of mathematics. Knight argues that if an individual cannot repeat 
an experiment indefinitely often, probabilities, defined as long-run frequency ratios, are 
essentially irrelevant to decision-making. There is no rational basis to assign probabilities to 
possible events. 
The existence of Knightian “uncertainty” depends on a feature of conventional statistical 
inference, rather than a more fundamental feature of reality itself. This opens the way to 
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link both risk and uncertainty through the market process. A central argument in Risk, 
Uncertainty and Profit is to justify the existence of profit by reference to the ability of 
agents to bear uncertainty: 
“It is this true uncertainty which… gives the characteristic form of 'enterprise' 
to economic organization as a whole and accounts for the peculiar income of 
the entrepreneur” (Knight 1921: 232) 
That is, risk can be found “objectively”, by reference to the tools needed to apprehend an 
external reality – whether induction or inference, but essentially as if a repeatable 
experiment was being performed. It is therefore insurable. Uncertainty emerges as that 
category of risk that cannot be insured, and so is borne by entrepreneurs (LeRoy and Singell 
1987). This implies a continuum from risk into uncertainty, mediated by the market: 
“Indeed, since, as we have noticed, entirely homogeneous classification of 
instances is practically never possible in dealing with statistical probability, it is 
clear that the divergence from it of this third type [estimates] where all 
classification is excluded is a matter of degree only. There are all gradations 
from a perfectly homogeneous group of life or fire hazards at one extreme to 
an absolutely unique exercise of judgment at the other…” (Knight 1921: 225-
226) 
Knight himself makes clear his essential indifference between whether a risk cannot be 
priced, or whether it merely is not (Foldes 1958: 250). Should the technical means become 
available to either improve our computational abilities, or to improve our knowledge of 
existing situations, then the distinction can be shaded away through the market process. 
The steady development of both the theoretical tools needed to price risks of various sorts, 
and the appearance of the computing power needed to do so on a very wide-scale, seemed 
to offer precisely the means to do this. Derivatives are held to break the (in practice weak) 
distinction between “risk” and “uncertainty”, rendering the previously intractable and 
unforeseen in clear shades of cost and volatility (Wigan 2009). 
But in Knight’s framing of the problem the risk-uncertainty distinction is then left 
theoretically “redundant” (Foldes 1958). A sufficiently advanced market system would 
remove in practice an unnecessary theoretical distinction; in the meantime, the actions of 
entrepreneurs will deal with uncertainty. Probability, as such, is subjective: or, at the very 
least, agents will behave as if it is, adopting subjective rankings of outcomes by intuited 
likelihood. 
It is in this sense that Mas-Colell et al., in a standard postgraduate textbook, claim the 
Knightian distinction between risk and uncertainty is “nullified” by subjective expected 
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utility theory (Mas-Colell, Whinston et al. 1995). The two approaches seem to end up in the 
same place. As Bewley suggests, “From the point of view of Bayesian theory, Knight’s 
decision theory has no interesting consequences. According to Bayeisan theory, decision-
makers act so as to maximise the expected value of their gain, irrespective of whether the 
fluctuations faced are risk or uncertain.” (Bewley 2003: 80) Moreover, the progressivist 
implications of Knight’s definition of uncertainty are strikingly similar to the assumption of 
the neoclassical school that refinement of their tools will lead to a greater ability to manage 
risks. It is no wonder that Knight’s risk-uncertainty distinction has become “deeply 
ingrained” (Runde 1998: 539) within conventional economics: it does not challenge the 
neoclassical account so much as extend its reach.   
Knight, unlike Keynes, does not attempt to analyse the motivations of the entrepreneurs. 
They merely have a function within the system; and, to the extent that this avoids the 
“psychological element” Keynes introduces, it is a stronger account. In particular, it draws 
attention to the existence not merely of a psychological motivation to challenge 
uncertainty, but to the existence of agents within the economy as conduits for the process 
by which uncertainty is tamed. 
This is critical. What sits, in Keynes’ account of entrepreneurship, as essentially a kind of 
psychological speculation becomes in Knight’s account a functional relationship between 
different elements of the economy. Entrepreneurs exist as agents that transform 
uncertainty into risk, through the creation of prices and thence markets. To put this process 
back into the terms of the General Theory, Knightian entrepreneurs solve the problem 
posed by Keynes’ marginal efficiency of capital curve, in that they take an uncertain future 
and by their own actions create a stable, known distribution of prices. 
 
Entrepreneurs versus the hoards 
It remains, however, in relation to a monetary economy, a flawed conception of the role of 
the entrepreneur. Within the flow of money through the economy, the crucial mediator for 
uncertainty is not the positive action of the entrepreneur in creating new paths of 
accumulation: rather, it is the negative presence of the monetary hoards. Uncertainty is 
inherent to a monetary economy based on competitive accumulation; the mechanism by 
which this uncertainty is dealt with is through the appearance of monetary hoards over 
time, held in multiple places and forms by a multiplicity of agents. There is no one 
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particular agency that exists with a unique ability to mediate and translate uncertainty into 
certain – to generate the investment decisions that turn an unknowable future into a 
known present – but rather any agent capable of acting with money inside a monetary 
economy must act against uncertainty.  
We have introduced elements of this negative specification before, in the discussion of 
Keynes’ “financial motive”. Each individual decision to invest, as Keynes conceded in 
debates subsequent to the publication of the General Theory, requires a prior mobilisation 
of monetary resources, since the funding for investment must logically be made available 
before the investment is paid for. In the neoclassical description of the macoroeconomy, 
this presents no great difficulty: the funding emerges simply from the presence of prior 
savings, allowing Say’s Law to once again hold and for S=I to appear ex ante. Keynes never 
conceded this much, sticking – correctly – to the ex post redefinition of the savings-
investment identity. But this leaves open the question of where these prior money holdings 
emerge from: how can would-be entrepreneurs mobilise the resources needed to invest, 
ahead of the additional savings derived from investment being made available?  
The answer lies precisely in the prior mobilisation of monetary, rather than real resources. 
The neoclassical paradigm misses this, or at least confuses a strictly monetary problem for 
a problem of real resources. But we can see here that money is principally mobilised in the 
form of its hoarding – that is to say, it is the demobilisation of money as a circulating 
element that then provides the basis for the mobilisation of real resources. The original 
form of the hoards, existing prior to the act of accumulation, provides the monetary 
resources for accumulation. But this is exactly to deprive the entrepreneur of their 
(Schumpeterian) agency: it is not the action of the heroic individual (or, perhaps, 
organisation, in his later formulations (Schumpeter 1942)), but the presence of the prior 
hoards that needs to be explained. Entrepreneurs are epiphenomenal: they are agents 
within a process, not causal factors of accumulation themselves.  
This is a vital point, since it indicates one of the points in which Keynes’ argument about 
money hoarding and its relationship to the fundamental savings-investment equation is at 
its shakiest. The problems he had in overcoming these weaknesses were brought in 
debates subsequent to the publication of the General Theory. They were not (as the next 
section seeks to show) adequately resolved by him at the time, and nor by those in writing 
in a post-Keynesian tradition afterwards. Resolving these conceptual problems requires us 
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to deepen our understanding of money itself, the circuits of monetary flows, and their 
relationship to uncertainty. 
 
II. THE FINANCIAL DEMAND FOR MONEY 
The stock of money and the financial motive 
Keynes’ attempts to resolve the contradictions noted above started by assuming in the 
General Theory that the stock of money is set exogenously, effectively under the control of 
the central bank. This removed from his model the need to describe the creation of money, 
and therefore also the need to provide a description of the formation of interest rates. 
Money simply existed, and the money interest rate fell “naturally” from this supply, in 
relation to the demand for liquidity given rates of return elsewhere. 
The weakness in the whole conception, however, was soon set upon by his critics shortly 
after publication. Ohlin and Robertson, writing in the Economics Journal, defended the 
then-prevailing, orthodox theory of interest as the reward for abstinence from present 
consumption – that is, as the result of savings behaviour only. Equilibrium interest rates 
would appear where this propensity to save was balanced by the productivity of capital 
needed to reward savings. Keynes, contrary to this, held that savings were created from 
investment, the two being identical ex post and with income and the multiplier effects 
supplying the necessary adjustment from one to other. Interest rates fell out of liquidity 
preference, not time preference, and liquidity preference, as above, had a particular 
structure. 
His more orthodox critics countered that, first, Keynes had overplayed the relationship 
between savings and investment, which existed merely as an accounting identity rather 
than a behavioural relationship, and, second, that he had unnecessarily confused matters 
by drawing a distinction between money holdings and savings where no such distinction 
could be shown to exit. (Ohlin 1937a: 435) proposed that a distinction could be drawn 
between net and gross credit supply and demand, with credit demand determined by the 
desire to invest and the supply of gross credit including claims other than money holdings 
alone. Both would have the same result: that savings and investment would be closely 
related to the demand for interest, and that “the rate of interest is simply the price of 
credit.” (Ohlin 1937a: 221) 
160 
 
But this was a flawed model. The stock of money was to be entered here, in the gross 
supply of credit, alongside the flow of demand and supply of new credit for investment. 
Keynes had opened the door to the Ohlin critique precisely because he had committed the 
same category error, introducing an exogenous stock of money into a system that rested 
on flows of credit demand and supply over time without specifying the mechanism by 
which one was transformed into the other.  The money stock was elided, through Ohlin, 
into an apparent flow of funds, when Kenyes had originally (and quite correctly) attempted 
to draw an analytical distinction between the two. In his 1937 reply to Ohlin and Robertson, 
he (partially) corrected himself. Accepting Ohlin’s point that planned investment could 
affect interest rates, he instead offered an alternative mechanism that made explicit the 
relationship between the stock and the flow. Keynes suggested that planned investment 
required the mobilisation of money to spend ahead of the investment being completed and 
producing a monetary return. This mobilisation of funding was withdrawn from the stock of 
money balances and then used for investment expenditure. A demand for investment 
could give rise to a demand for cash, and therefore to changes in the rate of interest via the 
financial system which mobilised the necessary funds.  
“Planned investment – ie investment ex ante - may have to secure its ‘financial 
provision’ before the investment takes place; that is to say, before the corresponding 
saving has taken place… There has, therefore, to be a technique to bridge this gap 
between the time when the decision to invest is taken and the time when the 
correlative investment and saving actually occurs.” (Keynes 1937a: 246) 
Money is required ex ante for planned investment, ahead of the actual mobilisation of 
funds for investment, and this requirement can exist without any necessary link back to 
savings. Note that this is a more complex point than it may first appear: given Keynes’ twin 
arguments, presented above, that interest rates determine the volume of investment in 
the future, and that interest rates are themselves determined by the volume of loanable 
funds available, a significant breach may have been opened here. If funds are mobilised 
prior to planned investment occurring, at what rate of interest should they be offered? 
Keynes introduced the “financial motive” as a challenge to the neoclassical theory of 
interest where the rate of interest is determined by “the  supply  of  new  credit  due to  ex-
ante  saving  and  the  demand  for  it  arising  out  of  ex-ante investment.” (Keynes 1937b: 
663, with emphasis added) The financial motive reverses this, positing an ex ante demand 
for funds for investment ahead of the ex post existence of savings needed to finance them. 
It is a demand for money that is quite distinct from savings as such. 
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Keynes introduced the financial motive as an answer to those of his critics who suggested 
that the distinction he wished to draw between loanable funds and liquidity preference 
essentially did not matter for the determination of interest rates, and that the demand and 
supply of credit alone would determine the interest rate. Markets would clear to balance 
savings and investment, ex ante, leaving money with no meaningful role in the 
determination of interest rates, which would instead be settled by the supply of credit and 
the demand for investment funding in the form of loanable funds. Keynes, as challenged by 
Ohlin (1937a) and Robertson (1937), was logically inconsistent in his original treatment of 
interest. Were the demand for investment to increase, Keynes suggests that it would affect 
the interest rate only ex post and only indirectly through a resulting increase in income, 
which would in turn lead to increased demand for money balances. The criticism of this 
position noted that, if true, this would leave ex ante desired investment and savings 
unequal, and therefore the rate of interest indeterminate. The neoclassical theory 
determines the system by allowing interest rates to move in response to increased demand 
for investment, ex ante, rather than income moving, ex post. 
Keynes’ rejoinder, an extension of his general critique of Say’s Law, introduces a distinction 
in the funding of investment between the ex ante demand for funds, taking place prior to 
its commencement, and the ex post arrival of those funds as savings that equate to 
investments once investment has taken place. By introducing this additional source of 
demand for money, the difficulty of interest rate indeterminacy is resolved – the financial 
motive uses up the slack in the system, as it were, sucking in otherwise idle funds and 
therefore leaving the interest rate unchanged. Shifts in the propensity to invest would still 
result, in the first instance, in ex post shifts in income, leaving ex ante rates unchanged. 
  
The financial motive challenged 
This financial motive was subsequently largely neglected by researchers. The IS-LM 
framework that became standard post-war had little need for it, translating Keynes’ work 
into a static environment and treating interest rates and income as determined 
simultaneously. One of the few economists to pick up on Keynes’ notes, (Davidson 1965), 
fits the financial motive into a standard IS-LM diagram of the macroeconomy, claiming that 
this comparative static approach allows the reconciliation of liquidity preference and 
loanable funds theories of the interest rate. The two, distinct, claims about the demand for 
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money (and hence the formation of the rate of interest) can be brought together by the 
financial motive since it implies that, if subject to an autonomous shock, both IS and LM 
curves will move together. An autonomous increase in planned investment expenditure, in 
the conventional IS-LM case, causes the IS curve to shift outwards. In Davidson’s 
interpretation of the financial motive, however, this autonomous shift in planned 
investment also induces an increase in the demand for money, since investing firms need 
cash advanced before they can invest. The resultant shift in the LM curve causes interest 
rates to fall back down again, with the entire effect dependent on the relative elasticities of 
the two curves. 
This interpretation has, however, been sharply criticised by Bibow (1995). Bibow argues, 
convincingly, that Davidson mistakes the disequilibrium concept of the financial motive for 
an equilibrium addition to the demand for money. Rather than creating a permanent 
additional demand for money at any given level of output, it is clear in Keynes’ description 
that the financial motive is only a temporary additional demand, present due to the 
temporary absence of immediately available cash for planned investment. In equilibrium, 
with planned investment equating to realised expenditure, as applies in the IS-LM system, 
this additional financing demand for money cannot exist. 
Bibow’s alternative is, however, not more convincing. He argues that the financial 
motivation should, at best, be considered merely a subset of the more familiar transactions 
demand for money. The transactions motive for holding money balances arises, in Keynes’ 
General Theory description, from the failure of synchronisation between receipts and 
expenditure. Money is needed to bridge the gap between the two across time, which is 
asserted to be brief in any case. In his earlier Treatise on Money, he had provided more 
detail, noting the presence of money held in different forms, holding different velocities, 
for different kinds of transactions. There is, on the Treatise basis, a distinction between the 
aggregate income-velocity of money, and the velocities of circulation for money in 
particular uses. Drawing on this distinction, Bibow argues that the financial demand for 
money, as presented by Keynes in his 1937 note, is merely an extension of the Treatise 
distinction between money demands in different transactions, rather than a distinctive 
element in his whole system. 
Asimakopolus (1983) claims further that Keynes’ description of the financial motive and the 
“revolving fund of finance” is in error, since it does not account for the multiplier effects of 
investment occurring over an extended time period the investment has been made. By 
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implicitly assuming (Asimakopolus claims) that multiplier effects are immediate, Keynes can 
maintain that savings and investments are ex ante independent of each other. Funds 
mobilised for investment are returned immediately in the form of returns from the 
investment, with the economy achieving an equilibrium position in the short-run at which 
planned investment and savings coincide ex post. The initial liquidity position is restored. 
However, if in reality these returns from investment are only realised over a longer time 
period, it should be clear that savings and investments can differ ex post, with 
Asimakopolus supplying a number of plausible examples (228); and that, moreover, the 
ability of firms to finance investment ex ante could be constrained by the availability of 
savings ex ante, since the funds may not then be available to make return the financing 
made available. In both cases, Keynes would be mistaken to both reject the identity of ex 
ante savings and investments, and to insist upon their ex post equality. 
Keynes’ error here was to assume that while investment is staggered over time, financial 
returns to investment arrive in very short order: at the end of a production period, in both 
cases. This leads to (as Asimakopolus suggests) a mistaken, if largely implicit, conclusion 
that the term structure of interest rates are unchanged by investment decisions 
(Asimakopolus 1983: 226). Keynes, clarifying his original 1937 article, holds that the rate of 
interest for ex ante investment is determined by the “current stock of money and the 
current state of liquidity preferences”, leaving long-term rates (also deemed relevant by 
Keynes to investment decisions) undetermined and implicitly unchanged by ex ante 
investment. (Keynes 1937c: 665) 
Asimakopolus (1991:110) further holds Keynes’ failure at this point in the argument to be 
another example of the wider confusion in the General Theory between an identity 
between savings and investment, and an equilibrium relationship between the two. Keynes 
wishes to show that savings and investment are identity only, with the balance between 
the two holding at any rate of interest, and therefore with interest rates determined only 
indirectly from the savings-investment relationship.  
 
Financial motive and uncertainty 
The apparent error can, however, be corrected if we make use of the earlier discussion 
concerning the role of uncertainty in Keynes’ General Theory system. Keynes clearly 
intended the financial motive to act as something akin to the transactions motive, since 
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both are necessary positive balances of money being held to meet payments due, as Bibow 
(1995) also suggests. But Bibow underplays the distinction between the two, which is 
pronounced once we allow for the presence of uncertain returns over time. The 
transactions motive is an equilibrium concept, and will be stable when the economy is in 
equilibrium. The financial motive, on the other hand, applies only to disequilibrium 
situations, away from a presumed stable point, and it appears only temporarily as the 
planned expenditure of firms and entrepreneurs on investment outstrips their immediately 
available cash balances. The financial motive can only appear immediately related to the 
transactions motive if we err, as Keynes did in his original presentation, in assuming that 
money returns from investment are available more or less immediately.  
If, more realistically, we allow these returns to appear only over time, the distinction 
between financial and transactions demands becomes sharper still; in addition, it becomes 
obvious that some relationship to the term structure of interest rates will appear. It is 
precisely because returns from past investment will arrive at different intervals, and with 
some uncertainty attached, that cash balances held at different points in time cannot be 
considered perfect substitutes for each other over time, quite apart from any time 
preferences the investor may hold. The presence of “lumpy” returns to investments, each 
having different prior requirements, places a premium on those returns arriving soon with 
high certainty relative to those arriving further away with greater uncertainty. That much is 
reflected, in the usual fashion, in their risk-weighted net present value of their future 
returns.  
But since each anticipated return requires a prior mobilisation of finance to meet payments, 
there is an implied relative price that exists for the cash demanded for each future return 
at each point in time previously. Cash held at any given point in time prior to the 
investment being made and producing a return cannot be perfectly substituted for cash 
held at any other point, even with unhindered access to a perfect credit market, since the 
returns the particular cash balance is needed for in the future are uncertain. Real cash 
balances must be held at any given point in time to cope with this, creating a demand for 
money of a type distinct from the others. 
The presence of uncertainty of returns therefore pushes the financial motive for holding 
money away from something akin to the transactions motive – in which money balances 
can be perfectly substituted for any particular transaction - to something far closer to the 
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speculative demand for money, in which the presence of future uncertainty has a direct 
impact on the need for balances held today. 
Alternatively, we can consider the case in which uncertainty over timings and returns does 
not exist, and all income streams from all investments are known with certainty into the 
future. In this case, there would be little need for investors to demand cash to meet 
immediate payments for investment: they could, for example, write their own promissory 
notes, which would (under certainty) be virtually as good as cash and offer the prospect of 
a rate of interest to soak up the limited remaining principal-agent risks, such as 
malfeasance by the investor. It is uncertainty that makes those selling products to the 
investor demand cash, rather than credit, and hence create the demand for money 
balances that Keynes introduced. 
The relevance of the financial demand for money, as developed by later researchers in the 
post-Keynesian tradition, is that it attempts to reconcile the presence of money as an 
autonomous feature of economic life – specifically, here, as something which can form 
hoards – and the savings-investment relationship. The decisive element is in the 
relationship, as Asimikopolus and others have suggested, between uncertainty, and time. 
The presence of time creates a properly dynamic economy, in which the sequencing of 
actions matters; the presence of uncertainty creates the distinction between real savings 
and monetary hoards. The financial motive is Keynes’ (only partially successful) attempt to 
coherently reconcile all three.  
 
Circuitists and the financial motive 
This alternative approach, introducing sequencing to the broadly post-Keynesian approach 
taken above, in which the financial motive, ultimately, can be thought of as a form of 
monetary demand brings us close to the circuitist school. Graziani (1998) and Rochon (1997) 
are amongst those arguing that the financial motive is fundamentally incompatible with 
Keynes’ liquidity preference theory (Tymoigne 2004: 1). Critically, once the sequencing of 
investment is properly introduced to the model, the standard post-Keynesian 
interpretation, in which the financial motive is a subset of the transactions motive that 
appears only when the economy is growing (Chick 1983: 199), is not correct: the financial 
motive appears under all conditions in which investments must be financed, even when the 
economy is, in the aggregate, not growing. Graziani and others argue that the advance of 
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funds is not automatic, and may be constrained by the financial system; the existence of 
Keynes’ “revolving fund of finance” is not sufficient to ensure that firms are independent of 
the financial system, since the credit received by investing firms from banks must be used 
to repay these initial loans. That means, then, that the revolving fund of finance laid aside 
to fund investment requires continual topping up from the credit system, irrespective of 
the rate of economic growth in the aggregate (Graziani 1985; Tymoigne 2004). Since 
income is generated by the spending of finance, including this initial injection of finance 
required to start the cycle of accumulation, it is finance that generates the income that 
sustains savings – and not the other way round. Investment is not constrained by savings, 
but may be constrained by access to finance, and the financial motive has very little to do 
with the transactions motive, since it features as an independent element within the 
system. The finance motive therefore does not only determine the rate of interest. It also 
acts to determine the distribution of income, since it relates directly to the provision of 
financing for sustained investment. A clear, conceptual distinction is introduced (where it is 
only, at most, implicit, in standard SFC models) between the market for money as the initial 
financing needed for investment, and the market for finance as the method to clear 
balances at the end of the period. 
It is on this basis that circuitists argue that the financial motive removes the basis for 
Keynes’ liquidity preference theory, implying a horizontal supply of money (Moore 1988) 
and that policy alone sets interest rates. Because the financial motive ensures that 
investment creates future savings, it cannot be the case (they argue) that the demand for 
money has an impact on the supply-price of loanable funds – the interest rate. Combined 
with Keynes’ post-General Theory statements on the role of overdrafts in meeting the 
demand for funds, an entirely endogenous money supply is posited (Wray 2006: 8). 
This, however, can only hold if the timing (rather than the sequencing) of the moments in 
the circuit are themselves fixed. As we have argued, the sequencing of the transitional 
points within the circuit is definitional: given the existence of ownership of assets, and the 
existence of money, it is necessarily the case that the process of production follows the 
sequencing indicated. But the precise intervals of these sequences are not fixed relative to 
wider time, and nor is the decision to initiate – or, crucially, fail to initiate – a sequence at 
any given point in time.  
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Circular flows and the paradox of profits 
Stock flow consistent modelling embodies this principle directly. In the textbook example, 
“It is a very important part of our story that firms initiate production, that the production 
process takes time, and therefore that firms need finance in advance of receiving anything 
from sales.” (Godley and Lavoie 2007: 251). This generates a “systemic need” (Godley 
2004b: 127) for finance, and it is finance that appears at the start of the circuit, initiating 
the sequence. Firms are then assumed to be price-makers, setting production levels in the 
expectation that with an appropriate price they will make some target profit level. Working 
backwards, this means that firms’ expectations of profits feed directly back into their 
demands for initial finance. It is banks that are assumed to supply that initial finance in its 
entirety, in the form of loans of credit money. 
Production is modelled as the production period during which loans are acquired by firms, 
production occurs, resulting in an increase in stocks held by firms, and then sales are made, 
resulting the reduction of stocks by firms. Inventories, stocks of unsold goods, will be held 
over time to the extent that forecasting errors are made by firms: of expectations of 
greater demand than, in fact, existed. The economy, instead of being an equilibrium 
mechanism in which time is a matter of indifference (or a mere source of stochastic, 
additive error against the underlying mechanisms), is being treated as regular, sequential 
process during which economic activity takes place, each part of that activity forming a 
necessary connection with the others. 
This conception of the economy as a circuit is not new, of course. François Quesnay was 
arguably the first researcher to adopt this approach in his Tableau Economique of 1758, but 
the classical school was in general well aware of the issues involved (Ricardo 1821; Marx 
and Engels 1967; Gnos 2006) It was with the “marginalist revolution” of the 1860s onwards 
that such concerns were buried behind the techniques of marginal analysis and equilibrium 
theorising upon comparative statics. 
Nonetheless, this subterranean tradition has been brought back to the surface in recent 
years. Deriving from the “underground” (Graziani (1982) quoted in Realfonzo (2006)) of 
scholars like Wicksell, Schumpeter and Keynes, the “circuitists” have attempted to lay bare 
the sequence by which an abstract, but recognisably capitalist, can produce and stably 
reproduce itself. Their starting point, like the three named, has been to identify the 
provision of financing to firms as the necessary catalyst for activity in a monetary economy 
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where production takes place over time and in competitive conditions, implying 
uncertainty of outcomes (Renaud 2000: 286-7). Once finance is provided, the key task of 
the theorist is to consistently trace its circulation through the economy, this circulation 
providing the basis of the analysis – in pronounced contrast to the equilibrium theorising of 
the neoclassicists.  
Graziani, a leading light in the Italian circuitist school, has perhaps best articulated the logic 
behind this choice of starting point. He argues, convincingly, that in an economy with pure 
credit money,  
“…any monetary payment must therefore be a triangular transaction, involving at 
least three agents, the payer, the payee, and the bank... Since in a monetary 
economy money payments go necessarily through a third agent, the third agent 
being one that specialises in the activity of producing means of payment (in modern 
times a bank), banks and firms must be considered as two distinct kinds of agents.” 
(Graziani 1995: 518–519)  
Of course, this would only apply in an economy with solely a credit form of money. It is the 
credit form of money, coming into existence inside the banking system with its loan mirror-
image, that ensures both its circular path through the economy, and the necessity of a 
“third agent” (usual a bank) that can settle payments for agents elsewhere. Money is 
wholly endogenous, in this, world: it cannot come into existence except through its 
creation in banks,11 and production is, in this sense, a process of debt creation (Seccarecia 
1988: 51), and money is credit-driven and demand-determined (Moore 1988). 
We will return to the applicability, or otherwise, of this particular conception of money. For 
now, we will simply note that if a credit theory of money is accepted, banks must exist and 
money must flow ultimately in a circular path: from its source, through the economy from 
account to account, and then back to its source in the banking system, clearing the loan 
that was created alongside it. The length of this circuit is indeterminate, given a planless, 
competitive economy; it must, nonetheless, exist if money takes this form – and, for the 
circuitists as for others in a broadly post-Keynesian analytical frame, it only ever takes this 
form in modern times. 
                                                          
11 This differentiates the circuitist treatment of endogenous money from the neo-chartalists, but for our immediate purposes 
the difference between an endogenous money created to fund investment, and an endogenous money created to fund taxes 
is immaterial. For more on comparisons between the two, see Lavoie, M. (2011). The monetary and fiscal nexus of neo-
chartalism: A friendly critical look. Ottawa, University of Ottawa. 
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Having the established the necessity of an intermediary agent (usually a bank), the general 
form of the circuitist model is to argue that firms approach the bank for a loan. Firms 
initially are assumed to have no monetary resources with which to make payments for 
employment, as a direct consequence of money existing as a property of the system of 
credit. They therefore have no choice but to turn to the bank (or banks) for a loan. This 
loan is invested, with payments made for the necessary means of production. Production 
commences, and the loan is repaid, with interest, to its originating bank, thus destroying 
both the loan and the money. The investment is made (in the simplest model) in labour, 
which receives payments in the form of wages. A sharp distinction is therefore made, 
drawn from Keynes, between initial financing of production (Keynes’ financial motive for 
holding money) and the final financing of output (Graziani 1987). The ability of the firms 
(having obtained the loan) to command the means of payment allows them to determine 
the scale of their operations, thus determining employment, on the basis of expected 
demand, and to determine their scope – whether investment flows to capital or 
consumption goods. Households then determine the volume of their saving, out of the 
income received, but, since the volume of goods available is determined by the decisions of 
the firm, this decision will affect purely the price of commodities (and therefore the real 
wage) only. Both consumption expenditure, and the decision to save through the purchase 
of securities entail the return of money back to firms, enabling them to repay their debts.  
This is where the initial versus final finance distinction matters: while initial finance is 
obtained with certainty by firms, who approach banks and receive credit money from them 
to fund their investments, final finance returns to firms dependent on decisions made by 
households, independently of the firms’ wishes. If households save in firm financing (bonds 
or equity), this money returns to the firms; if, however, they hold their savings as deposits, 
a gap will appear between initial and final financing, with this gap dependent on the 
households’ liquidity preference. There is thus a distinction to be drawn between the 
“money market”, supplying initial finance from banks to firms, and the “financial market”, 
supplying finance from households back to firms. 
The singular difficulty identified by many, however, is that it is unclear how, given this set 
up, it is possible for positive profits to be earned. All units in the economy earn only what 
was paid to them. Labour, receiving wages, can spend only what it has to hand. But since 
firms must repay the original loaned money with interest, it is not clear how they can earn 
positive profits in a credit money economy – or, as Rochon put it, using Marx’s terminology, 
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“How can M be transformed into M+?” (Rochon 2005: 125). Zazzaro framed this “paradox 
of profits” succinctly: 
“…if in an economic system (closed to external exchange) the only money existing is 
what the banks create in financing production, the amount of money that firms may 
hope to recover by selling their products is at the most equal to the amount by which 
they have been financed by banks. Therefore, once the principal has been repaid to 
banks, the possibility that firms as a whole can realise their profits in money terms or 
can pay interest owed to banks in money terms is ruled out” (Zazzaro 2003: 233) 
 
Even if households have no net savings, spending all their income on consumption goods, 
and thus ensuring initial finance and final finance equate, firms will still need to pay 
interest. The money advanced, however,  to cover production in a whole period is only 
sufficient to cover production in that period – temporary forms of credit, like trade credit, 
are advanced only within the period and are not relevant to the problem of where profits 
arise from (Nell 2002: 519). It is, as Schumpeter (1934: 189) noted, “impossible with a given 
sum of money to obtain a greater money sum”. 
 
Solutions to the paradox within the circuitist literature have been proposed at various 
points. But as (Nell 2002: 520) suggests too many of these rely on “outside assistance”: that 
is, rather than showing how a solution can be found within the circuit itself, at the highest 
level of abstraction, additional factors are brought in to play. Breaching the banks’ assumed 
monopoly on money creation, for instance, allows the circulation of fiat money, created 
directly by government (Renaud 2000: 291), but this imposes a dubious reliance of the 
systems’ liquidity on the benign, interventionist presence of government. Even if this were 
theoretically accepted, as is well-known from assorted monetarist experiments in the 
1980s, the actual capacity of government to intervene successfully in this way is limited in 
the extreme. Running a surplus on the current account, in an open economy model, would 
perform a similar trick; as long as some sector, other than that of the firms, runs a net 
financial deficit, the problem of profits can be solved. 
 
The “external funding” solution is an old one: Rosa Luxemburg’s classic Accumulation of 
Capital, and particularly her later Anti-Critique (Luxemburg, Tarbuck et al. 1973; Luxemburg 
2003), develops a theory of general capitalist decline based precisely on the need for 
external financing to ensure profits can be earned by those holding capital, which she 
identified with non-capitalist areas of accumulation. The problem, in all cases, is that the 
resolution to the issue of financing depends on external intervention, which, in 
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Luxemburg’s case, “proved” the eventual breakdown and descent of capitalism into crisis, 
as non-capitalist zones disappeared; leaving such speculation aside, the solution to the 
problem is unsatisfactory at the level of theory precisely because the supposed generality 
of the theory, in positing the circuit of capital as a general theory of capitalist accumulation, 
is destroyed.  
 
Alternatively, “overlapping” periods of production could exist. Messori and Zazzaro (2005) 
propose a model in which economic growth determines that some firms expire, failing to 
repay their debts on bankruptcy, while others, just starting, make no positive profits in 
their first years. This has the consequence of making the circuit solvable only through the 
creation of additional circuits: it cannot be sustained by itself. All of these proposed 
solutions, however, have the character of “resolving” the paradox caused by the monetary 
circuit only by introducing elements basically extraneous to that circuit. Like the 
neoclassical “solutions” to the Cambridge critique, they resolve the problem only by 
stepping away from it, introducing additional assumptions and breaching the presumed 
generality of the model.  
 
The “paradox of profits” is not resolved by the introduction of a capital goods sector alone, 
producing capital goods through some combination of labour and capital, with its outputs 
also used in the consumer sector. In this case, profits in the consumer goods sector do not 
present a problem, since this sector also receives the payments from workers in the capital 
goods sector. There is a direct flow from the capital goods sector back to the consumer 
goods sector which ensures the monetisation of profits made there. However, if profits 
made in the consumer goods sector are used to purchase capital goods, those in the capital 
goods sector can (at most) only recover their costs. The payments for capital goods from 
the consumer goods sector are not fully monetised by payments then made to workers in 
the capital goods sector, since the capital goods sector must also consume capital goods 
from the flows of payments it receives. Firms in the capital goods sector will make (at most) 
zero profits, an unsatisfactory conclusion.  
 
Allowing credit creation to completely fund capital goods expenditure (Rochon 2005) does 
not properly resolve the dilemma, since the extent of the credit financing implied is 
excessive. With the (credit) money supply as M, total wages as W and investment spending 
(entirely determined by firms) as I, we have: 
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This will hold without complications for as long as households either do not save, or save 
entirely through the purchase of firms’ securities (bonds and equities). Should households 
have any positive liquidity preference, however, they will hold some of their savings as 
deposits in the banking system, implying that, with consumption C less than the total 
amount received by households, W: 
 
           
 
In other words, the implication is that the creation of money is greater than nominal 
income. Once again we discover an “excess” of money creation, relative to demands for 
means of payment. 
 
Moreover, as Nell (2002: 526) indicates, there is an inconsistency implied in the logic. With 
loans received by all firms, and spent on either wages (to households) or capital goods (to 
the capital goods sector), at least some of the firms spending loans will be capital goods 
producers themselves, consuming the product of their own sector alongside spending 
money on wages, W. If that is the case, the realisation of some profits by the capital goods 
sector will depend on revenues received from within the capital goods sector – a circuit of 
realisation that is distinct from the rest of the model, when cross-sectoral earnings allow 
the realisation of profits. This implies, in turn, that as production commences and sales are 
made, firms in the consumer goods sector will have earnings on hand to purchase capital 
goods, whilst those in the capital goods sector will not need to borrow money to finance 
their own purchases: revenues, both from the consumer goods and from the capital goods 
sectors, will be arriving to enable finance. But then, as Nell asks, “Loans, however, are 
expensive and revenue is coming in anyway. Why borrow and pay interest on loans that are 
not needed?” (ibid.: 526) The paradox is seemingly resolved only at the expense of internal 
consistency and economic logic. 
 
 
The paradox in SFC and the issue of uncertainty 
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The decisive point throughout all this is the necessary presence of initial financing. By 
construction, this initial financing must be enough to finance the whole of the subsequent 
circuit. But it needs also to be sufficient as to provide for a level of profits capable of 
sustaining levels of interest and debt repayments, given the assumption of loan financing. 
The paradox, then, concerns the status of the circuit of production at the start of its period; 
SFC, as we have discussed, is concerned in particular with the status of the circuit at its end. 
The two approaches can be reconciled, as suggested by (Jespersen 2009). 
 
Zezza (2012) has proposed the use of an SFC-type framework to allow the resolution of the 
paradox through the explicit identification of interest payments and loan repayments as 
profits to the banking sector, which then spends these incomes received, enabling further 
realisation of profits elsewhere in the economy to take place. This appears to be a realistic 
solution to the problem, and one that does not depend on shifting the parameters of the 
problem too greatly. It is clearly inconsistent to treat interest payments, made in money, as 
being distinct from the generality of the circular flow of money; it is not the case that 
interest payments made to a banking sector by the non-financial sector simply disappear: 
in a market economy, with banks can be presumed to wish to maximise profits, interest 
payments received would constitute the immediate form of revenue; there would be little 
reason, otherwise, for banks to wish to offer loans, if not in anticipation of receiving the 
loan, plus interest, in return. Banks place a “bet”, through firms’ investments, on the levels 
of effective demand that will prevail at the end of the period, given events at the start. 
 
This is, however, precisely where the difficulty emerges: the bet placed by the banks at the 
start of the period, in expectation of the eventual return, is dependent on both the 
production of commodities (even if these take the form of services, rather than physical 
goods) and the realisation of their value in sale. These are distinct operations, against 
which the bank must adjudge both to come good. The entrepreneur seeking the 
investment must make a similar calculation; in both cases the presence of uncertainty 
mediates the decision. The investment, if made, presupposes a movement from an 
uncertain future, into a certain present, containing the products of the investment at the 
end of the period. There is, then, a relationship between the initial financing and the final 
financial status that is mediated by uncertainty: the link is exactly the movement from a 
certain stock of funding towards an uncertain return. It is the firm that, as an institution, 
mediates this uncertainty: the transition is only possible, in a production economy, because 
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the firm has committed some value of funding to the investment, producing commodities, 
and then offering them for sale. 
 
We have encountered this mediation before, in the form of the Godley-Lavoie treatment of 
inventories. But we noted that this was an unsuccessful attempt at mediation precisely 
because it abstracted from the full conditions of uncertainty that confront any 
entrepreneur, acting through a firm, ahead of any investment. This introduced an 
asymmetry in the treatment of inventories, since they appeared as a legacy of past failure, 
but were also held as the means of hedging against future uncertainty. They were, in other 
words, acting something like an inadequate substitute for holdings of money, with firms (in 
the Godley-Lavoie model) holding no positive money balances themselves: merely a stock 
of acquired loans and continual flows of financing. Clearly, inventories will be held by firms 
for precisely the reason Godley and Lavoie describe; but to correctly understand their role 
in decisionmaking by entrepreneurs, we must think about them in properly monetary (that 
is, current value) terms as one of several hedges against the future that a firm can maintain: 
the other being, of course, its own holdings of money. As we have shown in previous 
chapters, the desire of firms to maintain any hedge against the future in the form of 
inventories, or to maintain a positive level of capital investment implies the requirement 
for total financing ahead of the current demand for financing.  
 
This is, of course, exactly the “financial motive” that the circuitist school focus on, and that 
has been under discussion in this chapter. The point we wish to stress, however, is that the 
finance is not just that required for initial financing: any scale of operations beyond the 
pure employment of labour (with any positive level of inventories, or any amount of capital 
invested) will lead to a surplus requirement for monetary financing at the start of the 
circuit, as a direct result of uncertainty prevailing throughout the whole circuit and the 
firms’ rational response to it. Firms, in this sense, mediate the uncertainty of investment by 
also maintaining holdings of money. The propensity to hoard, and to withdraw money from 
the circulation through which otherwise flow, exists for firms.  
 
Banks, as providers of the initial credit, expect to receive a monetary return on the credit 
money offered, M’>M. But this return will be affected by the uncertainty that prevails: they 
may judge any given proposal for a loan more or less risky, and choose to make the loan on 
that basis by their own standards; but from the point of view of the circuit, given – if the 
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funding is provided – that a circuit must, as a consequence, come into existence, it is the 
firm that takes direct responsibility for the uncertainty that prevails within the circuit. 
There are two different categories of decision being made: one is to commence a circuit, 
and if banks provide initial finance this must reside with them; the other is to hedge against 
uncertainty once a circuit has begun by holding money back from circulation. Money is held 
back precisely because it is, as we have discussed, the ideal social form in which the 
uncertainty that prevails a competitive, unplanned economy can be dealt with. The 
provision of financing by banks, then, will in general exceed the returns that might be 
immediately anticipated by the banks, given the scale of realisation.  
 
The whole economy, in this sense, will need to be “over-monetised” by banks seeking to 
compensate, as the originators of the credit-money, for the desire of firms to withdraw 
money from circulation, as their own hedge against the future; and if money is withdrawn 
from circulation, it will not be realised in any sense. The bank will not earn a return on this 
portion of the money that is offered. It is in this sense that banks must have an incentive to 
attempt to over-fund firms, relative to an expected return; and, furthermore, to seek more 
efficient means by which they can earn any given level of return. This over-financing would, 
of course, ensure that the paradox of profits did not exist: if banks continually provide an 
excess of financing, relative to that which is required in actuality to realise sales and a 
monetary surplus, they will both account for this in making their initial loans; and, 
furthermore, can expect some positive return because the additional financing required 
has (subject to uncertainty and the successful completion of the circuit financed) already 
provided not just the finance needed to meet this, but a further element needed to meet 
the firms’ own desire to hedge and to hoard money during the circuit itself. The implication 
of over-financing, of course, is the expectation that at least some of the excess finance will 
not be returned, as investments fail, and therefore interest rates will be elevated in general; 
and it is here that banks have both an incentive to monitor and attempt to manage risks, 
and, at the same time, push those in the real economy towards an increasing 
financialisation of their activities, using the banking and finance sector in preference to real 
production. 
 
Failing overfunding, they can demand a non-monetary repayment of loans, through the 
acquisition of financial assets. This may, however, point to a further resolution to the 
apparent paradox, if we allow that indebted firms, receiving demands for repayment (with 
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interest) from the banks, can repay in real terms through the disposal of their financial 
assets. The implication, explored in (Bossone 2001), is that firms will be forced to meet 
interest payments not in money but in the disposal of financial assets. In the absence of 
firms’ asset growth, the net wealth of the whole economy will gradually shift towards the 
banks until all financial assets are owned by them, matching the growing preference of 
households to hold increasingly liquid assets. The path of the economy, over time, is 
determined by the balance between firm growth, bank lending, and household demand for 
money. Febrero (2008) has, by providing an explicit account of a four-sector production 
model (consumption goods, capital goods, and two circulating capital goods producers) 
along with the extension of funding into short- and long-term loans, offered a means to 
reconcile the presence positive monetary profits with the circuitist theory. The realisation 
of profits, however, appears to be a little sensitive to the precise linkages between the 
different elements of the circuit link and align themselves: it is not clear different 
configurations would produce the same neat results.  
 
This indicates, again, the issue of uncertainty as prevailing not just on the movements of 
financial assets but as the direct and necessary consequence of production occurring as a 
sequence of events over time. The crucial relationship here is between the role of money 
as both the initiator of the circuit and the means through which its separate elements are 
brought together, but also its presence as the ultimate means to hedge against the 
uncertainty that prevails at every stage within that circuit, including its completion in a sale 
and realisation of monetary profits. With banks providing funding there is, then, a direct 
relationship established between the credit system and the productive economy that 
hinges, in particular, on the existence of uncertainty. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter started with an examination of the role of uncertainty as it affected 
entrepreneurship, here defined as the capacity to initiate a circuit of capital, without 
necessarily holding the financial means to do so. This provided the basis for a discussion of 
the “financial motive” in Keynes, showing that Keynes’ (and others) were unable to 
satisfactorily include the financial motive for the provision of funding within an atemporal 
general equilibrium framework: the financial motive is certainly a demand for funding, but 
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it depends on the existence of uncertainty that necessarily prevails within a sequence of 
economic activities, from initial financing to the (hoped-for) receipt of monetary profits. 
This led to a discussion of the circuitist school, who have most closely focused on the role 
of initial (as against final) financing, and in describing precisely the sequence of events 
needed to enable production to occur. The problem was raised, however, of the raising of 
financing from bank credit implied that insufficient funds would be available to meet 
repayments with interest – the “paradox of profits”. We suggested a number of possible 
resolutions to this, eventually indicating that, in the presence of uncertainty, and with firms 
operating as the mediating element between a known present and an unknown future, 
there was a permanent incentive both for firms to hoard and for banks to oversupply initial 
credit. This would allow the paradox to be resolved.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND MONEY: HOARDS AND LEAKS FROM THE CIRCUIT 
 
Introduction 
The chapter is divided into three main parts. We open up a discussion of uncertainty, 
hoarding and money through an examination of the central writings of Keynes and the 
post-Keynesians. The second section examines Keynes’ theory of demand for money and 
liquidity preference in the light of his General Theory and subsequent debates. We note the 
centrality of uncertainty to Keynes’ and post-Keynesian thought, and indicate that is best 
understood as an issue in the social organisation of the economy, rather than as an 
abstraction from the economy, as in neoclassical systems. 
This consideration of the relationship between uncertainty and money leads us into 
developing an account of hoarding as a “leak” of money from the circuit, and as the 
presence of private, decentralised responses to a generalised condition of social 
uncertainty. Following Marx and subsequent researchers, we show that the circuit of 
capital implies a high degree of uncertainty and a desire (indeed a necessity) to hoard given 
the presence of that uncertainty. These private motivations to hoard assume a social 
character with the formation of the credit system, and with economic growth, this social 
uncertainty spreads across all of economic life. 
We discuss the implications of this theory of hoarding for our approaches to money, 
nothing in particular that the conventional quantity theory has significant difficulties in 
accounting for behaviour of this sort. That then leads us back to SFC, with the claim that 
the usual presentation of SFC cannot properly account for hoarding and “leaks” from the 
circuit. We note that a theory of credit-money alone, as SFC models rely upon, is not 
sufficient to account for the appearance of features such as world money, and that the 
circular path of credit-money cannot be assumed for all money forms in the presence of 
hoarding. The chapter concludes by introducing some of the issues to be considered in the 
final chapter, on the shadow banking system as a manifestation of the hoard.  
For clarity and consistency, uncertainty throughout refers to the real uncertainty, that is, 
the necessarily unknowable future as seen from the present. Occasionally “uncertainty” 
refers to the natural, ontological uncertainty that arises from the unidirectionality and 
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irreversibility of time, and when this is the case it will be made clear by reference to 
“fundamental uncertainty”. More usually it is used in reference to the specific form of 
uncertainty that arises in a capitalist monetary economy consisting of competing capitals. 
Sometimes this aspect will be stressed by reference to “capitalist uncertainty”. Risk, by way 
of contrast, refers only to understandings of uncertainty. It is epistemological, relating to 
how we might come to understand uncertainty. 
 
I. SOCIAL UNCERTAINTY, PRIVATE HOARDS 
Uncertainty and money in Keynes 
Probability and uncertainty were critical to the work of John Maynard Keynes throughout 
his life (Skidelsky 1983), but they have been peculiarly neglected in the standard 
treatments of his work – which, as Hyman Minsky put it, is like staging “Hamlet without a 
Prince” (Minsky 1975: 57). This chapter attempts to develop some of the insights from 
Keynes and the post-Keynesians concerning the role of uncertainty in economic life, 
developing a preliminary theory of the demand for money in a capitalist economy on the 
basis of it. This provides the basis for a subsequent discussion of money itself and the 
operations of the credit system. 
It is the centrality of uncertainty to Keynes’ own writings, at least in the post-Keynesian 
interpretation, that motivates the interest here. In contrast to the dominant tradition in 
macroeconomics, at least since the 1940s, Keynes treated uncertainty as a feature of 
macroeconomic life, not as problem for microeconomics to resolve. However, this may 
have been treated later in building essentially determinist “Keynesian” systems (and then, 
later, in stochastic models in which uncertainty was of an additive, error-term, character), 
the clear link Keynes wished to establish between the uncertainty that afflicts all economic 
activity and the development of money and credit systems. 
Keynes, famously, provided three different motivations for the holding of money balances, 
given the zero (or near-zero) interest rate it would pay. In the first instance, the 
transactions motive described the holdings needed to complete payments demanded. Next, 
a precautionary motive, “the desire for security as to the future cash equivalent of a certain 
proportion of total resources”. Finally, the speculative motive that could emerge when 
those holding money balances choose to speculate on future potential movements in 
interest rates (Keynes 1936: 170-174).  
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Some subsequent discussion has centred on the legitimacy, or otherwise, of these 
distinctions: Kahn (1954: 81) proposed that the divide between transactions and 
precautionary motivations had little relevance in practice, with both being simply the 
money balances needed at any point in time to meet demands for payment – the only 
difference being the length of time over which the payments might arrive. However, this 
misses Keynes’ critical reference point in uncertainty, which the distinction in timings 
between transactions and precautionary motives introduces: positive money balances are 
required at all because of the presence of uncertainty – either as a hedge against losses or 
unexpected payments in the precautionary motive, or as a bet on future interest rate 
movements in the speculative motive. Shackle (1967: 205) proposed that the precautionary 
motive ceased to exist when the transactions and speculative motives were “properly 
described”, on the basis of this hard distinction between a direct payments use for money, 
and its role in managing uncertainty.  
This does not seem quite accurate: while both precautionary and speculative motives 
concern the presence of uncertainty, the former can exist under any circumstances in 
which money payments might be needed in the future, but the latter can only appear in 
the presence of uncertain future interest rates. The key difference between the two is the 
complexity with which that uncertainty is handled. While the precautionary motive could 
plausibly exist in a world with zero interest rates – or, more precisely, completely fixed real 
rates into the future – the speculative motive only arises because of the institutions that 
are developed precisely to handle the presence of uncertainty – the financial system itself. 
It is, to that extent, reflexive: it deals with the uncertainty present in economic life at a 
higher level of abstraction from the precautionary motive. We will return to this distinction 
later. 
Keynes, then, presents hoarding not as simply the analogue of a decision to save – or, 
equivalently, a decision to forego consumption – but as something that, in a monetary 
economy, is necessarily distinctive: 
“The concept of Hoarding may be regarded as a first approximation to the concept of 
Liquidity-preference. Indeed if we were to substitute ‘propensity to hoard’ for 
‘hoarding’, it would come to substantially the same thing. But if we mean by 
‘hoarding’ an actual increase in cash-holding, it is an incomplete ideaand seriously 
misleading if it causes us to think of ‘hoarding’ and ‘not-hoarding’ as simple 
alternatives. For the decision to hoard is not taken absolutely or without regard to 
the advantages offered for parting with liquidity;it results from a balancing of 
advantages, and we have, therefore, to know what lies in the other scale. Moreover 
it is impossible for the actual amount of hoarding to change as a result of decisions 
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on the part of the public, so long as we mean by ‘hoarding’ the actual holding of cash. 
For the amount of hoarding must be equal to the quantity of money (oron some 
definitionsto the quantity of money minus what is required to satisfy the 
transactions-motive); and the quantity of money is not determined by the public. All 
that the propensity of the public towards hoarding can achieve is to determine the 
rate of interest at which the aggregate desire to hoard becomes equal to the 
available cash. The habit of overlooking the relation of the rate of interest to 
hoarding may be a part of the explanation why interest has been usually regarded as 
the reward of not-spending, whereas in fact it is the reward of not-hoarding.” 
(Keynes 1936: 174) 
It is precisely the fact that, in a monetary economy, the operations of saving, hoarding and 
investment are distinct that allows Keynes to claim that it is “essentially one in which 
changing views about the future [as they impact on changing propensities to save, hoard, 
and invest] are capable of altering the quantity of employment, and not merely its 
direction.” (Keynes 1936: vii) In Keynes’ system, money can act as a store of wealth over 
time (despite its generally zero, or near-zero, interest rate) because contracts are written in 
money terms, meaning that obligations to pay will be delivered and must be met through 
money. This creates an uncertainty about future liabilities, in which payments are 
demanded in money terms and for which other assets cannot easily substitute. There is 
therefore an incentive to hold positive amounts of money in the form of hoards, 
irrespective of their opportunity costs in interest foregone (Asimakopolus 1991: ch.5). 
Crudely, the decision to save is governed by time preference; liquidity preference by choice 
of assets. Unlike the “classical” (in Keynes’ terminology) system, the real and monetary side 
can be distinguished; and this distinction emerges, critically, in the creation of money 
hoards as distinct from real savings. 
Note, however, that in Keynes’ case the possibility of using money as a hoard depends not 
directly on its characteristics as money, but rather on the presence of both positive rates of 
return elsewhere, and the inability of other assets to act as ready substitutes for it. Money 
is here not directly a store of value, but even if it were only money of account it could still 
function as an effective hoard, given the presence of uncertainty about future rates of 
interest. If there was no positive rate of interest anywhere, there would be no incentive to 
differentiate between different forms of assets, and money hoards and savings would be 
equivalent. If other assets could be easily substituted for money, on the other hand, there 
would be little sense in holding stocks of money back from circulation, even where future 
payments were demanded directly in money form – other assets could be readily 
exchanged for money and payments met. 
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But there are two distinct problems with this view of hoarding behaviour. The first is its 
conventional character. Money itself, in this system, does not invite hoarding: it is only 
because of its characteristics in relation to other assets that it can function as such. The 
boundary, then, between money and other assets is weak: but if the boundary is weak, and 
potentially porous, there is good reason to think that a profit-motivated private sector will 
seek to undermine money’s unique status. If nothing else, arbitrage opportunities should 
exist. But this opens Keynes’ theory up to the challenge of Friedrich von Hayek’s own 
theorisation of the credit cycle, in which greater and greater quantities of money-like 
assets are produced in the course of a credit boom, approaching forms of private money, 
answering the demand of private capital for greater quantities of liquid assets. This then in 
turn leads to a dislocation of productive investment that only a thoroughgoing bust can 
reconfigure (Hayek 1931). If the private sector can create new forms of moneylike assets, 
with nothing other than pure convention to restrain it, there is no reason to identify – as 
Keynes does – the uniquely disruptive role of the money-rate of interest in “setting the 
pace” and therefore “hold*ing+ back investment” (Keynes 1936: 235) due to its uniquely 
desirable properties, since the money-rate of interest no longer need function as “the” rate 
of interest regulating the system as a whole. The private sector itself will happily create 
money-like substitutes that address the need for assets that have some of the desirable 
features of money – principally liquidity- while also maintaining their own rates of interest. 
Keynes’ system – and its policy conclusions, regarding the desirability of government 
intervention to drive down long-term rates of interest – lies potentially exposed. 
Second, and more fundamental, is that Keynes’ definition assumes that which it needs to 
demonstrate. Because money hoards exist by reference to other, interest-bearing assets, 
there must be a rate of interest which exists prior to the formation of these money hoards 
– or else there would be no need to establish such hoards, except perhaps on some 
personal whim. It is against movements in both the rates of return generally, and the 
money-rate of interest in particular, that Keynes believes hoards can become established, 
since – given the unpredictability of such movements over the long term, at least – there is 
a permanent need to hold at least some funds against (or in favour of) such movements. It 
is from the rate of interest that he reads backwards into the propensity to hoard. But if the 
propensity to hoard, by establishing the preference for liquidity, also helps establish the 
interest rate, it would appear we have run into a circular argument. 
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Uncertainty, and the desire for hoards 
As we suggested in the previous chapter, the Knightian description of entrepreneurs as the 
agents that translate uncertainty into certain outcomes is not quite accurate. It is the 
“entrepreneurs’” ability to systematically remove money from circulation, rather than 
introduce it into circulation, that is their distinctive ability. Keynes, in the post-Keynesian 
view, presented a view of the economy that was entirely at odds to what Keynes called the 
“classical” system, or what we would more usually identify as neoclassical. The key 
elements in the prevailing neoclassical view, following the marginalist revolution of the 
latter nineteenth century, were the existence of linked series of free markets that, left to 
their own devices, would clear effectively through time. Marshall, one of the great 
economic system-builders, described a world in which stability in asset markets was 
secured by the presence of long-term “fundamentals”. Speculation and short-run volatility 
had only transitory effects, with the economy, reverting to a settled equilibrium through 
time where agents’ beliefs would match economic reality. Keynes challenged this 
profoundly, presenting “an inversion of Marshall’s thinking”, in which long-term 
expectations are often “disappointed” and where the short-run is dominated by “animal 
spirits” (Davis 2010: 43). The economy, and long-run expectations, could only be stabilised 
by the use of government intervention: the replacement of public intervention for 
Marshall’s private virtues. 
He offered instead “a monetary economy guided by individuals’ expectations about the 
future. There is no permanent state of rest in a monetary world, and the equilibria that 
emerge are temporary and transient” (Davis 2010). Keynes further, in the General Theory, 
purported to show how decisions made through time in an uncertain world were formed 
through a series of social and institutional factors, the most important of which was money, 
acting as a medium of exchange, a store of value, and facilitator for speculation. This multi-
purpose money was both necessary for the continued existence of capitalism and 
economic growth, but the contradictions between its different roles could, in a system with 
decentralised investment decisions, lead to breakdown. 
This reclamation of Keynes’ probability theories, and the placing of uncertainty at the 
centre of his General Theory system prevents post-Keynesianism from relying on the 
(essentially unexplained) psychological and personal factors that drive liquidity preference 
in the conventional Keynesian system (Brunhoff 1976: 41). What it points to is the presence 
of hoarding as a necessary complement to money, in the presence of uncertainty. Money 
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cannot exist without the prospect of it existing as a hoard; even the most transitory 
moment where it is not in flow – that is, where it is not being used in exchange – can form 
a hoard of some sort. As part of its functioning, it can move directly from stock to flow and 
back again, determined entirely by the behaviour and actions of individuals, not subject to 
any wider control. This is precisely what makes money so conceptually difficult, particularly 
if the conceptual tools we are bringing to bear emphasise exactly the division between 
stocks and flows. But this presence of money as both a general medium of exchange, and, 
since it can act as a store of value, a barrier against the act of exchange – a barrier that can 
be erected by individuals given the presence of systemic uncertainty – is essential. 
 
Hoarding, and breaks in the flow 
This still does not, however, get us to a completely satisfactory theory of hoarding. It works 
as a description of its function within the whole capitalist system at the highest level of 
abstraction, that of capital in general. It is less satisfactory as a description at a lower of 
level of abstraction, that of particular capitals. Keynes’ “animal spirits”, as the motivating 
force for entrepreneurs facing uncertainty, by pushing the analytical frame down to the 
individual entrepreneur at least offers a means to understand why hoarding occurs – even 
if this is at the expense of economic analysis. What is required is a conceptual bridge from 
the generality of hoarding, to the particular behaviour of individual units of capital – 
preferably without falling into psychologism of a Keynesian or neoclassical variety. 
There are bridges offered in the development of a systemic conception of hoarding, as 
developed by economists writing in the tradition of Marxist political economy. Following 
Itoh and Lapavitsas (1999: ch.3), we claim hoarding develops from the necessarily temporal 
and unplanned nature of capitalism existing as particular capitals within the circuit of 
capital in general. That circuit, separated as it into competing capitals, is subject to 
breakdown. Suppliers go bankrupt. Markets collapse. Delays of every sort can emerge as 
capital flows through its circuit. Capitalists, in response to the necessary uncertainty 
surrounding accumulation in their own system, hoard funds. In doing so they are hedging 
against uncertainty.  
It is the contradiction between the finite available quantity of money, and its infinity of 
alternate uses that establishes the possibility of hoarding behaviour. Money has a 
permanent opportunity cost: its expenditure in one form always rules out its use in any 
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other, its value as a general commodity being exchanged for a value of a particular 
commodity. To use money in exchange is to destroy the generality of its value. This, then, 
can establish the need for a hoard, as a barrier against the destruction of its general value 
in particular commodity forms. The link between this general possibility, and the actual 
appearance of hoarding, is found in the particular experiences of social uncertainty under 
capitalism. 
Uncertainty, as in Keynes, is the vital element here. But the point to note is that this 
Keynesian uncertainty is uncertainty of a kind that necessarily prevails in any social system. 
Yet it has been used to justify the existence of particular behaviour in a given social system 
– that of a capitalist monetary economy. For general, social uncertainty of this kind to have 
particular effects – in this case, that of hoarding behaviour – it has to be mediated through 
particular institutions, and this is precisely the role of the credit system in Keynes. This 
takes us back, however, to assuming that which needs to be demonstrated. The credit 
system arrives logically prior, in this scheme, to the uncertainty that it is intended to deal 
with. But in Marx, unless we take his colourful, psychological descriptions of the “greed” for 
gold literally, no such economic rationale exists for the particular units of capital (Marx 
1867: ch.3).12 For the system, the purpose of hoarding is clearly described. For the 
individual unit of the system, the details still need filling in. 
The strength of the alternative offered by Itoh and Lapavitsas, building on Marx, is that it 
provides specificity to uncertainty. Uncertainty, of the kind that promotes the specific 
behaviour of hoarding under capitalism, emerges as a result of capitalist social relations. 
Although general uncertainty, of the kind that Keynes described affecting any society, 
clearly still exists, it is the definite relationships that develop between competing capitals 
that give uncertainty a particular expression under capitalism. That, in turn, creates the 
definite behaviour of hoarding. There is a clear, analytically defined link from the social 
relations being described, to the practice being analysed.  
 
Hoarding and the appearance of the credit system 
There are some difficulties, however, concerning the relationship of the phases of the 
circuit of capital to “leaks” of value in the form of money hoards. Following the 
                                                          
12 The analysis throughout volume 1 of Capital is conducted at the level of capital in general. It is only by the third volume that 
particular units of capital are introduced.  
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presentation used earlier, the whole circuit can be represented schematically, at the 
highest level of abstraction, as the combination of three processes: 
M-C…P…C’-M’ 
The first phase (M-C) describes the advance of money and the purchase of commodities. 
These commodities, including materials, means of production and (crucially) labour power, 
then enter the phase of production, …P…. In doing so, they are transformed by this process 
into further commodities, which then re-enter the market and are sold for an increased 
volume of money (C’-M’). Condensed, the entire circuit forms only M-M’, but Marx was at 
great pains to indicate the centrality of the productive process to the otherwise somewhat 
mysterious process by which money advanced now became a greater sum of money in the 
future. 
At the stage of commodity purchase (M-C) during the circulation phase, a hoard of money 
is held against unforeseen payments and price fluctuations (Marx 1976: 165). This is 
replicated in the uncertainty that is, again, present in the disposal of commodities (C’-M’), 
where uncertainties in sale and price fluctuations mirror those at commodity purchase 
stage. In both instances it is the logic of competition in the market, and the separation of 
buyer and seller in a monetised economy that produces the fundamental uncertainty. 
Hoards occur as a response to both. It is the transition between stages that creates the 
zone of uncertainty. 
However, Itoh and Lapavitsas (1999: 67) also detail two other instances of hoarding, where 
it can occur as a result of delays within stages, rather than uncertainties in the transition 
between stages. They note the possibility of delayed purchases and disposals, and – in 
particular – the need to maintain, and upgrade, stocks of fixed capital. Profits are 
accumulated and depreciation funds established to deal with both. The uncertainty here is 
not over the risk in failing to complete the transition across the phases of capital. It is over 
the presence of variable (and potentially unknown) time delays as capital moves within a 
single phase. 
There is, then, a distinction to be made between different compulsions to hoard. 
Uncertainty over the completion of the circuit emerges between the phases of the circuit. 
Time delays impact only within phases of the circuit, and could be themselves subject to 
volatility, but they do not threaten the breakdown of the whole circuit. Both, however, are 
brought together by the entire circuit, resulting in hoards “associated with the turnover of 
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capital as a whole” (Itoh and Lapavitsas 1999: 67). But for the circuit to proceed 
“uninterruptedly”, as it passes through alternating phases of production and circulation, it 
is necessary for only a part of the capital to actually be engaged in the process of 
production. “While one part is in the period of production, another must always be in the 
period of circulation. Or in other words, one part can perform the function of productive 
capital only on condition that another part is withdrawn from production proper in the 
form of commodity- or money-capital.” (Marx 1976: ch.15) 
Because the two stages are not necessarily of equal periods – indeed, as Marx notes, they 
will be so only as an “exception”, capital will be periodically “set free” from the process in 
the form of money hoards. For total social capital, the “release of capital must be the rule” 
and “*a+ very considerable portion of the social circulating capital, which is turned over 
several times a year, will therefore periodically exist in the form of released capital during 
the annual turnover cycle.”  (ibid.) Further, as the scale of production grows, so too must 
the scale of the released capital hoard, since the stages of the cycle become increasingly 
lengthened and unlikely to synchronise. The commencement of a new cycle by an investing 
capitalist will require an initial hoard greater than would be required in one production 
period, as we have suggested previously. 
It is, therefore, the case that as we move from simple to expanded reproduction the 
necessity to develop larger hoards appears, beyond the scale that a single capitalist can 
plausibly maintain. The creation of hoards, therefore, and in particular their expansion 
beyond the immediate requirements of production, is what creates the “social foundation 
for the credit system”. The credit system collects “’leaked’ value, transforms it into 
interest-bearing capital, and channels it back to real accumulation.” (Itoh and Lapavitsas 
1999: 69) Interest is, then, a share of the mass of profit – but the interest rate, importantly, 
has no necessary relationship to the rate of profit, being formed from hoarding within the 
turnover of capital. 
 
Uncertainty, not phase lengths, determines hoarding 
This initially might appear as a simple case of timing differences: the separate phases 
cannot be guaranteed to align sequentially, and so hoards become necessary, just as they 
do when dealing with delays appearing within the individual phases. This is, however, to 
miss a critical nuance. Marx’s own presentation of the turnover process, as Lapavitsas 
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elsewhere notes, is flawed (Lapavitsas 1997: 95). Marx assumed that although purchases 
occur at different times, the final output is sold “at one stroke” – an inherently implausible 
assumption, given the likelihood that final outputs are sold across different industries. 
However, on the basis of this assumption, Marx attempts to demonstrate that where 
disproportionalities occur between different phases of the circuit – as is very likely – money 
hoards will necessarily develop. His reasoning is that as sales revenue arrives in one pile, it 
necessarily appears after at least one production period has already lapsed, since prior 
production must have occurred for commodities to be sold.  
However, following Lapavitsas (1997), this is incorrect. The accruing money capital from 
sales revenue is fluid and it can be spread over the present and future production periods. 
The cash lump sums from sales revenues, unevenly distributed over time, are necessary to 
maintain continuous production, even if (as Marx holds by construction in his presentation 
of simple reproduction) the value of final output in each period is equal to the value of 
capital necessary to run one production period, with no growth occurring. Sales revenue 
arrives, and is immediately needed to cover production costs for the future period. That is 
to say, a hoard is needed to maintain production into the future, rather than – as in Marx’s 
presentation – to cover for costs already accrued. 
Even under the restrictive assumptions Marx uses, the sequencing of the separate 
production and circulation phases therefore matters less than uncertainty over their future 
behaviour. The phasing that Marx highlights, therefore, as driving the appearance of hoards 
over the turnover of capital as a whole is in fact mediated by uncertainty. It is not phasing 
alone that creates hoards, as in his original presentation, but the uncertainty of future 
phasing that creates them. 
 
Expanded reproduction generalises uncertainty 
This uncertainty that is present in the transitions between phases in the cycle is here both 
partly subsumed under the wider turnover of capital, as the possibility of hoarding 
throughout the entire turnover cycle can act to mitigate those transition uncertainties. A 
hoard that can be set up on a permanent, or at least multi-cycle basis, offers the possibility 
that uncertainties within a complete circuit of capital can be continuously hedged against. 
Simultaneously, however, the creation of these more permanent hoards generalises the 
uncertainty. The actions of particular capitals against uncertainty at the phases of the cycle 
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transmutes into an uncertainty prevalent across the whole cycle, confronting capital-in-
general. In particular, the appearance of expanded reproduction creates a generalised 
uncertainty, as it is unknown for capital-in-general if the newly-expanded volume of capital 
can, on completion of one circuit of capital, be successfully thrown back into and pulled 
through successive rounds of the circuit. 
In other words, what could appear to be simply an uncertainty against the vagaries of the 
market at any given point in time – the unexpected collapse of an output price; the 
unanticipated shortage of an input – takes on a more fundamental character as we move 
into expanded reproduction. Mitigating the uncertainty present in the transition between 
phases in the cycle of capital through the creation of hoards by individual capitals leads to 
the reproduction of uncertainty in a more general form as capital expands. Moving from 
capital-in-general under simple reproduction to particular capitals under expanded 
reproduction deepens the uncertainties that are particular to capitalism. The hoards 
themselves, now erected on a permanent basis against particular capitals’ uncertainties in 
phase transitions, become a source of permanent uncertainty for capital-in-general. 
As capitalism develops, with increasing turnover times and greater concentrations of fixed 
capital, the uncertainties attached to the circuit necessarily also increase. The deepening of 
capital implies the lengthening of the phases, increasing the costs of mismatch and 
uncertainty. Extended cycles of reproduction mean extended periods in which capital is 
fixed in place, illiquid relative to the demand for its liquidation and realization in the money 
form. The credit system is the institution that emerges to manage hoards created from 
uncertainty under expanded reproduction. 
It should be, further to this, apparent that the possibility of hoarding is one of the reasons 
that Marx himself, and later authors, were correct to draw a distinction between money as 
such, and money-capital. Money can, by its nature, be used for any number of different 
purposes: its status as the generalised equivalent guarantees this flexibility, and of course 
this liquidity of use is precisely what helps guarantee its status as money. But if introduced 
to the circuit of capital, it becomes quite a different creature. If money is hoarded, it is not 
necessarily functioning as money capital, since it is (virtually by definition) being held 
purely as the money form. To become money-capital, it must begin to circulate as part of 
the circuit of capital, and to this extent it must depend on the social institutions of credit 
that enable this to occur. As Marx put it: 
190 
 
The numerous points at which money is withdrawn from circulation and 
accumulates in numerous individual hoards or potential money-capitals 
appear as so many obstacles to circulation, because they immobilise money 
and deprive it of its capacity to circulate for a given period of time. (Marx 1894: 
493) 
That implies, too, the expansion of the credit system as a means to manage the process, 
and provide an expanded repository for the hoards that emerge.13 It is the necessary 
uncertainty of a capitalist economy functioning as many competing capitals that creates 
the necessity to hoard. If that particular uncertainty did not exist, capital would not be 
competing as many different capitals. And as the concentration and complexity of capital 
increases, the size of the credit system increases in parallel. It is formed from the process of 
accumulation, but is partly autonomous from it, exercising a dynamic that is constrained 
but directed by real accumulation. This is the dynamic by which the credit system creates 
loanable money capital: of the ability to offer, for wider circulation, money not just as 
money but as a distinct moment in the whole cycle of accumulation. 
 
II. UNCERTAINTY AND MONEY 
Uncertainty  and the velocity of circulation 
In the table below, we have shown each of the four motivations for holding money, their 
relationship to uncertainty, and whether a developed credit system is needed a priori to 
support them. “Intrinsic” uncertainty refers to the uncertainty that prevails over any 
expected sequence of future events in an unplanned, competitive economy. “Extrinsic” 
here refers to the uncertainty that can prevail in the structures intended, initially to help 
deal with that intrinsic uncertainty – the credit system itself. One is built into a capitalist 
economy, and is inescapable within that economy; the other emerges only as that 
economy develops and deepens its operations. Alongside the familiar three of standard 
macroeconomic theory (deriving more-or-less directly from Keynes) -–the transactions, 
precautionary, and speculative demands for money holdings – we have included the 
financial motivation for holding money, as analysed in the previous chapter. What our 
discussion above should indicate, however, is that these distinctions exist for the 
circulation of money in general, but do not hold for money in operation as particular forms 
                                                          
13 Hayek makes a similar point in his Prices and Production, although he reverses the sequence on the basis of his individualist 
approach: greater piles of credit call into play greater concentrations of capital as a result of its lengthening turnover time. 
Hayek, F. A. (1931). Prices and Production. London, George Routledge and Sons. 
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of money. Notably, there is the distinction to be made between money-in-general, which 
may be hoarded, and then money-capital, brought to the circuit of capital, and then (finally) 
the presence of loanable money capital as the distinctive form of money provided by the 
credit system.  
 
Table 7.1: Structure of demand for money and its relationship to uncertainty 
Type of demand Uncertainty Credit system needed? 
Transactions None No 
Precautionary Intrinsic Desirable 
Speculative Extrinsic, dependent on 
credit system 
Necessary 
Financial  Intrinsic No 
 
These distinctions matter inasmuch as the transitions and phases within the circuit of 
capital matter. The closer we approach the circuit of capital, with – notably – its 
differentiation of phases along the lines indicated, the further we get from being able to 
treat money as an undifferentiated mass. Each specific motivation for holding money 
balances implies, in turn, a distinctive relationship to the supply of money – that is, a 
distinctive velocity of circulation applies to each one. While Keynes indicated this point in 
his Treatise on Money, by the time of the General Theory it had been somewhat lost in the 
shift back towards a simple quantity theory – that is, back towards money conceived only 
as an undifferentiated “stock” of generic buying power. SFC models suffer from a similar 
defect: there exists, within the matrix representation of the economy, only one form of 
money in existence (that of credit-money), precisely because the representation claims to 
be complete (and therefore cannot countenance hoards and leaks existing separately from 
credit-money hoards). Its credit theory of money presents money as an undifferentiated 
mass of generic purchasing power; it is, to this extent, necessary to counterpose a money 
theory of credit, to a credit theory of money if we are to avoid falling into a (Friedmanite: 
see Friedman 1956) variant of the quantity theory. 
 
The quantity theory 
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Strictly, the quantity theory holds that the velocity of circulation is, in equilibrium (which is 
to say at full employment), fixed at a given rate. Prices, in contrast, are flexible and so 
therefore changes in the supply of money impact on the aggregate price level, the identity 
being maintained through a simple market logic: a greater supply of money, circulating at 
the same velocity, will cause prices to be bid up through market competition; the reverse 
applies if the quantity should be reduced. This system describes a relationship between 
velocity and money supply, and prices and real output in the equation of exchange: 
MV=PY 
This, under the assumptions of the quantity theory, shifts from being a statement of 
identity to a behavioural equation. There is a direct, proportionate relationship from 
money on the price level. Velocity itself is a function only of the level of income, which can 
under normal conditions be treated as a constant. Some variations can be made to this 
basic framework; a “Keynesian” twist would be to incorporate changes in the expected real 
interest into the velocity function, alongside income, corresponding to the precautionary 
and speculative demands for money holdings alongside the transactions demand, which 
varies in simple fashion with the level of aggregate income. 
This implies, on the basis of the equation of exchange, that monetary policy can have some 
degree of impact on the level of output. This constituted the basis for the standard 
Keynesian critique of the quantity theory, as it became codified post-WW2. It is an 
interpretation that can follow from Keynes’ presentation in the General Theory, largely 
because he himself accepted a version of the quantity theory in the book. But it misses out 
some important features of the macroeconomy. 
These fall in two parts. First, it misinterprets the separate demands for money as we have 
detailed above. It is not the case that these demands for money can be treated either as 
derivatives from a transactions demand, or that they will have a relationship of simple 
causality from the interest rate. Instead, as presented above, each element forms out of a 
given relationship to uncertainty, with the exception of the transactions demand which has 
a direct relationship to income and can be treated as the most basic form of the demand 
for money. It is this relationship to structural uncertainty under capitalism, not its mediated 
appearance in the credit system, that gives the different character to each of the different 
forms of demand. 
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That being the case, each separate demand for money has only an indirect relationship, at 
best, to the rate of interest, with the speculative demand forming the most immediate links 
to the rate of interest and the credit system, and transactions demand the most distant. 
But in no case will the relationship be simple, because the real driver for the demand is the 
underlying capitalist uncertainty, not the subsequent mediations of that uncertainty 
through the credit system and term structures of different assets, important though these 
are. We would expect the real demand for money, on this basis, to be comparatively 
interest inelastic, as indeed it has been – and is increasingly so. 
That is to say, the appearance of uncertainty within the system cannot simply be dealt with 
by monetary elements of the system. Interest rates as such will only partially account for 
the presence of uncertainty prevailing within the system as a whole. And because the 
system is properly dynamic, in the sense that the timing of events matters, uncertainty is 
irreducible.  
Second, the standard Keynesian model misinterprets the velocity of circulation itself. There 
is no, single, velocity of circulation – something Keynes had stressed in the Treatise on 
Money. Instead, different demands for money impose different requirements on the role of 
money and create out of this the different speeds at which money will move. An “average” 
velocity circulation can be constructed, but is of limited analytical relevance: at any given 
point in time, depending on how demand for money itself shifts, the “average” velocity of 
circulation can (and will) vary significantly around any assumed average over time. These 
shifts in the observed, “average” velocity of circulation will, under most circumstances, be 
dominated by shifts in the structure of demand for money rather than, as the standard 
Keynesian system might suggest, changes in variables seemingly affecting the velocity of 
circulation. As above, the interest rate will have only a weak impact on the observed 
velocity because it is only, at best, a mediated version of the underlying uncertainty of a 
capitalist economy. After allowing for the transactions demand for money, directly linked 
to incomes, it is the form of the demand, and the hierarchy of the different demands for 
money, that come to dominate the observed velocity. 
As we have indicated, the structure of that demand is fundamentally shaped by the 
uncertainty all agents in a competitive capitalist economy must face. But as noted earlier, 
that uncertainty is not directly observed or countable: a point detailed by Keynes himself, 
and placed centre-stage by the post-Keynesians. We cannot register uncertainty as simply 
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the variation of prices over time; rather, we see its effects by proxy in the shifts in the 
structure of demand for money over time.  
This is central to one claim presented for the chapter: the observed velocity of circulation 
can be best understood not as a function of observed variables, such as income and rates 
of interest, but of unobserved, structural uncertainty. Keynes’ attempts to describe the 
appearance of a “financial motive” in the demand for money has already opened up the 
possibility of a relationship between the monetary side (in hoarding) and the real side (in 
savings-investment) not wholly dependent on the behaviour of agents, but falling, instead, 
from the fundamental structure of a dynamic economy under uncertainty. But if the 
observed velocity of circulation is itself dependent on unobserved variables – rather than 
functioning, as in the standard quantity theory, as a directly behavioural relationship – we 
must ask what it is that determines these unobservables.  
 
Quantity theory and anti-quantity theory 
Attempting to answer that question takes us back to the equation of exchange, which 
shows (in the most fundamental form) the relationship between real and monetary sides of 
the economy. As an identity, it is necessarily true; but as a behavioural equation it is open 
to different interpretations. Taking income as read for now, we have attempted to show 
that in principle the velocity of circulation depends only as a second-order function on 
observed variables. We have left, however, both prices and the money supply itself 
undetermined. 
In the strict quantity theory, prices are determined by the money supply, rising and falling 
with the available stock of money. Control of the money supply therefore allows control of 
prices – an insight developed by Milton Friedman and the monetarists in their 1960s 
restatement of the quantity theory. Monetarism as such is now discredited, both 
intellectually and, following unsuccessful attempts to manage the money supply in the 
early 1980s, as a practical policy suggestion. Its determination of the supply of money, as a 
crudely exogenous factor in the equation, has a venerable history, however, stretching 
through the Treasury View of the 1930s, through to Ricardo and the bullionist controversy 
of the 1840s, all the way back to David Hume’s initial statement of the quantity theory in 
1761. 
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It has always been challenged. The applicability of the quantity theory depended, critically, 
on the stability of the velocity of circulation. If it could be shown that this was unstable in 
some sense, at least over the short-term, the quantity theory would break down and the 
money supply could no longer straightforwardly determine prices. As we have attempted 
to show above, under conditions of uncertainty in a monetary economy, we would expect 
this breakdown to be the case, a priori. 
In opposition to the quantity theory, a school of anti-quantity theorists has always stressed 
the instability of the velocity of circulation, depending on the nature of the demand for 
money at any given point in time. This, in turn, implied that the stock of money was not 
fixed exogenously to the system, but could fluctuate with the “ebbs and flows” of demand 
for money (Marx 1867: 134). This implied an effective differentiation in the forms of money, 
as opposed to the all-encompassing category of the quantity theorists, with different types 
of money circulating at different rates, in and out of the hoarded (non-circulating) cash, in 
response to changing demands. 
 
Marx and the Banking and Currency Schools 
The relationship between the credit system and the productive economy have, naturally, 
occupied a central position in economics since its foundation as a distinct discipline. But 
given both the nature of the development of economic thought since then (Rubin and 
Filtzer 1979), and given the deep complexity of the subject, it is useful to strip out a century 
or more of seeming development of this thought, and return to original variants. There is a 
clarity to the debates around the Bank Charter Act of 1844 that can be lacking in 
subsequent arguments. The Bank Charter Act enshrined, in law, the principle that all 
banknote issue by the Bank of England should be immediately backed by gold, issuing notes 
“pari passu” with changes in gold inflows and outflows: that is to say, while times of gold 
inflow the notes in circulation would expand, during outflow the Bank would be required to 
restrict the issuance and circulation of notes. The “currency principle”, to which the Act’s 
protagonists in the Currency School deferred, was intended to stem the flow of gold from a 
national economy, within an international commodity money system centred on gold. The 
Currency School argued that this clearly deflationary policy of the currency principle – 
restricting the issuance of means of payment exactly as the supply of alternate means of 
payment was also being restricted – was justified on the grounds that the interest rate 
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must be allowed to rise, reflecting the real scarcity of capital of which the drain on gold was 
merely a symptom. As rates rose, and prices fell, the price of domestic capital 
internationally would be bid upwards and gold would reverse its outflow. Monetary policy, 
then, was solely intended to passively regulate the movements of real flows of capital. 
In contrast, the Banking School argued that the expansion of banknotes in times of gold 
drain would be sufficient to contain the rise in the rate of interest, since the drain in gold 
reflected a drain in means of payment and that, therefore, the monetary authorities had a 
duty to intervene to maintain stable credit conditions. With means of payment becoming 
scarce as a result of the gold drain, the real risk was deflation; further restrictions in note 
issue would reinforce that drain in means of payment, reinforcing the drive to deflation 
rather than (as the Currency School held) accelerating the resolution of the real factors 
driving the loss of gold. In microcosm, both sides of the dispute contain the elements of all 
future arguments over monetary policy: whether movements in nominal values reflect real 
movements; whether monetary policy can effect long-term changes in real values.  The 
Currency side held to a strictly Quantity Theory of money; the Banking side was 
pronouncedly anti-Quantity Theory.  
Marx, in opposing the Quantity Theory, sided with the Banking School, favouring the 
expansion of currency in the presence of a drain on means of payment. However, he 
criticised both schools as holding to a fundamentally mercantilist view of the economy, in 
which drains on gold (and therefore of changes in money balances) represented a real 
drain on the national wealth, with the aim of policy being (ultimately) to stanch the exit of 
gold from the economy. For Marx, “the forced transformation of the value of commodities 
into money”, as occurred through the attempts to stem the gold drain by restricting (in 
effect) real economic activity, “represented a recession of commodity capital” (Ormazabal 
2009: 5). This “transformation” represented the primacy of monetary values, within 
capitalism, over commodities, and the production of commodities. The contrary process – 
of the forcible conversion of money into commodities – on the other hand was never 
observed. This asymmetry meant that, in practice, the expansion of commodity production 
(and therefore ultimately of capitalism itself) experienced real barriers in the form of the 
monetary limits against which it would compress itself.  
This is the key to understanding Marx’s opposition to the Quantity Theory, and his 
development of the labour theory of value. It is, further, the indicator as to why the SFC 
representation is, ultimately, incomplete, since it presents not the expansion of commodity 
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production as limited by its monetary shadow, but the monetary shadow as limited by the 
production of mere commodities. The representation in the social accounting matrix, in this 
sense, although it purports to be complete, is in fact always suffering from a species of 
monetary excess, in which the potential expansion of the monetary values permanently 
exceeds the representation of stocks and flows of values – and their presence as assets and 
liabilities – within the matrix itself. The form this takes, for society as a whole, is the 
creation of individual hoards that ultimately render themselves as social hoards in the form 
of the credit system. To see this, we will need to look further at the concept of money, as it 
appears in the Quantity Theory and its inversion in the anti-Quantity Theory.  
 
Different forms of money 
The derivation of the different forms of money corresponds, in our view, more closely to 
the appearance of money in history. Rather than, as argued in Graeber (2011), an 
opposition between commodity and credit forms of money, the two (in Graeber’s account) 
alternating through time, it suggests a unity of the different forms money has historically 
taken, and continues to exist as today. The quantity theory implies that, however different 
agents may behave over time, there emerges (through the presence of money itself) a 
homogeneity of the money form in its flows, which can be treated easily as a single flow 
allowing for a single, unitary, “average” velocity of its circulation. In the stronger form, such 
as early monetarism, this literally implied a single, stable velocity of circulation. In its 
weaker form, as in the “Keynesian” version of the quantity theory, it implied the formation 
of what was (in effect) a single velocity that, if not stable at any given point in time, at least 
held a stability of variance over time. It is the behaviour of agents that determines the 
direction of the system, with money driving prices, rather than the direction of the system 
that determines the behaviour of agents. 
Instead, what we have suggested from the above is something closer to the presence of a 
heterogeneity of flows of money, and therefore of money as (in effect) different forms, 
that cannot be easily reduced to a single form of monetary flow throughout the whole 
circuit. Those flows are, because money is heterogeneous in this sense, not complete, 
closed circuits: they are necessarily subject to leaks as money alters its effective form 
throughout the complete flow. The quantity theory cannot allow for that, since if leaks 
from the circuit of money occur, the relationship it describes breaks down: it is not 
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necessarily the case that money (over whatever period of time) always determines prices, 
even if this determination – given, say, a low velocity of circulation – is slow. If an effective 
leak can occur – with some volume of money indefinitely suspended from the wider circuit 
- money cannot completely determine prices. 
Leaks from the monetary system can occur. As we have suggested above, it is precisely the 
presence of irreducible uncertainty within a dynamic economy that creates the possibility 
of hoarding: of systematic, but variable, leaks from the system of flows. Those leaks are 
themselves directly related to the functioning of the system itself, and not reducible to a 
question of preferences or behaviour of agents within the system. The appearance of 
hoards is, critically, not derived directly from agents’ preferences.  
 
Hoarding and the “law of reflux” 
The hoard itself represents a concentration of claims on the capacity of society to produce 
values. It has a necessarily social character: it cannot function except in relation to the 
value produced by society, since it is held as a barrier against the uncertainties and 
planlessness of social production conducted by private agents. A fully private hoard could 
not exist, just as a particular money, valuable only for one individual, cannot exist. The one 
is built out of the other. Both are held as a relation between agents in the economy, but 
both stand opposed to the rest of the economy. 
It is the latter contradiction that, for the hoard, gives it a problematic character for the 
capitalist economy in general. Because it represents a continually abstracted stock of 
potential claims against value produced, it is always a threat to the production of those 
values. The presence of monetary hoards permanently threatens the circulation of value in 
general, since it can appear at any moment and blow apart that circulation by exercising its 
character as a store of claims against value. This alerts us to the more fundamental 
contradiction, which is that the strictly social character of the hoard must be expressed, in 
general, through the private actions of agents. 
Likitkijsomboon (2005: 161) has raised this contradiction. If the hoarding mechanism is 
necessary to stabilise the monetary system, “what is the intermediate link from the state of 
monetary disequilibrium to individuals’ hoarding decisions?” For quantity theorists, this is 
not a problem: the stock of money is strictly exogenous, and therefore prices formed in the 
market through private actions adjust to it. But for anti-quantity theorists, holding the 
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determination of money stocks to be driven by the price system, it is a serious problem. 
There is no clear mechanism by which those private agents seeking to hoard or dis-hoard 
money will operate in such a way that the money hoarded (or dis-hoarded) will clear the 
whole system. Marx, as Likitkijsomboon says, did not explain the mechanism (2005: 161). 
He cannot use the interest rate as the mechanism because it has not been introduced at 
this level of analysis. 
There is, however, a route towards a solution. It lies in two parts. First is through the 
recognition that at least part of the money created for the hoard –in developed capitalism, 
the very major part – will be credit money, issued by the credit system, rather than money 
of any other type. This has a very particular role within capitalism, being issued by banks on 
the basis of demands for cash, and being held against deposits left with banks as liabilities. 
Although in principle this money need not enter circulation, in practice it is precisely 
because it is created in the process of credit creation that its owner will not, except in rare 
cases, seek to hold onto it; rather, it will flood into the rest of the system and make its way 
round back to the banks in due course, as means of payment. On returning to the banks it 
annuls its prior existence as liability for its holder, and balances with the deposit liabilities 
of the banks that offered it. It is of course possible for banks to offer an excess (or, less 
likely, an insufficiency) of credit money relative to that which can be readily absorbed by 
the demand for payments in the rest of the economy. As long as, however, the banking 
system itself is sufficiently liquid, with banks able to call on balances amongst themselves 
as needed to balance the flow of demands for credit money elsewhere, the system as a 
whole is not threatened with breakdown. The “law of reflux” for credit money operates as 
part of the very functioning of credit money. It is distinct, in this case, from the meandering 
course that other forms of money could take, with no necessary route back to their source. 
Commodity money, or money functioning as a commodity money, has this form: it is issued, 
from whatever source, but need not follow a route back to that source at any point. 
This is why the financial demand for money is of critical importance. It is, as discussed, not 
simply a transactions demand for money, but one that is based on a particular relationship 
with uncertainty. It forms its distinct character precisely because it is, in some sense, 
forward-looking and therefore dependent on outcomes in the future that are necessarily 
not known with certainty at the time the demand is made. It also, however, is the direct 
means (as we have seen) by which Keynes hypothesised that the identity between savings 
and investment he asserted held ex post could come to realise itself ex ante. Or, to put it 
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another way, the financial demand for money could exist because returns from the 
investment it was mobilised for would start to flow, increasing incomes, and the increased 
income arising as a result of the multiplier effect could be used to cancel out the additional 
demands for payment the mobilisation of the cash would create. It is a version of the law of 
reflux, creeping into the General Theory system, which otherwise has no need of it. 
But it is a law of reflux subject to the uncertainty of the rest of the system. This gives it a 
distinct character. Because the course of money’s return cannot be guaranteed, if 
circulated as a result of the financial demand, it presents a source of instability for the 
system. The weaker the source of the returns needed to generate the money’s circulatory 
reflux, ensuring the system balances, the more unstable the whole system becomes. Or 
rather, to be precise: the more uncertain the future returns appear to be, the more the 
stock of money needed today appears to present a challenge to the system as a whole. It 
will not necessarily regulate itself because this stock of funding, if mobilised, threatens to 
destabilise the rest of the system. 
This is an important conclusion. It provides a means by which uncertainty over the course 
of future returns begins to affect the operations of the monetary system today, at a 
fundamental level. It implies that changes in the uncertainty prevailing within the system 
will start to impact as more or less smooth operations of the law of reflux and hence the 
balance of the entire monetary system. This is a manifestation of the fundamental 
contradiction between uncertainty, which exists as a result of social relations, at the level 
of society, and the private character of hoarding that takes place to deal with uncertainty. 
It is the private character of the hoard, together with the socially uncertain nature of the 
returns, that produces the instability across the whole system. 
That uncertainty does not exist as a representation of reality: it is a fundamental 
constituent of the reality of a capitalist economy. It cannot be, in other words, reduced (as 
in the Arrow-Debreu system) to “contingent commodities”, essentially equivalent to 
commodities existing without uncertainty. It forms the basis on which all economic activity 
must take place in a world of commodity production, generalised exchange, and 
autonomous production. Conversely, it also implies that the mechanisms by which this 
uncertainty is dealt with – identified here as hoarding in particular – cannot function as 
purely symbolic. They must, in a very direct sense, also be a real mechanism, or else the 
necessary symmetry between a real uncertainty and its real barrier would not hold. Hoards 
cannot be simply symbolic, or consist of an accumulation of symbols; they must act as a 
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real store of value. This has direct implications for the theory of money. Money must itself 
be able to function as a real store of value independent of its particular representation. 
 
Symbolic money and the Quantity Theory 
We must identify, against credit theorists, the presence of money not as a symbol of some 
other thing – some form of primordial debt (Théret 1999), say, or a representation of state 
power (Ingham 1999; Wray 2000) – but as the real form of social value in a decentralised, 
market economy in which commodity production has become generalised. The presence of 
money is unavoidable in the functioning of such a system: since equivalences exchange in 
trade (trade being a point of equivalence between different commodities) but since there 
exists a “third term” in monetary exchanges, this being the form of money, money must 
itself be a form of value (Lapavitsas 2003: ch.4).  
The weakness in the versions of money theory that hold money to be a form of credit 
(rather than credit being a form of money, as we are claiming) is precisely that they cannot 
uniquely determine this relationship: if money is merely a symbol of value existing 
elsewhere, that money form can be replaced by any other symbol at any point. The 
analogue of this argument, within conventional, neoclassical economics, are variants on 
Cagan’s model (Cagan 1956), with rational expectations, that point to the (near-)costless 
consequences of a quick and “credible” disinflation (Sargent 1982). If money is purely and 
simply a symbol, then removing one symbolic representation and replacing it with another 
is, naturally, of a very low cost. If, in reality, the costs of the operation turn out to be rather 
high (Romer and Romer 1989), so much the worse for reality. For the credit-money 
theorists, who avoid the more obvious weaknesses of the neoclassical case, a similar 
argument revolves around the possibility of printing money to create an expansion, or that 
(following a particular interpretation of the national income identity) it is necessary for a 
government deficit to exist, in a fiat-money system, for accumulation and therefore growth 
to continue. In both the neoclassical and the more heterodox case, the presumption of 
money as something closer to a pure symbol than itself being a valued commodity (of an 
admittedly unusual type) leads both into the error that only monetary operations are 
needed to correct manifestations of real economic failure. 
The theoretical result of this, in the case of the post-Keynesian SFC representation, is a 
misreading of the direction of travel of the circuit of money. A “monetary theory of 
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production” locates the spur for accumulation as the acquisition of credit liabilities on the 
part of the accumulating agent (whether this, in practice, begins directly with firms, or 
indirectly with households, is irrelevant here), the need for repayment of which then 
motivates the drive to expand the circuit of money flows. In terms of the SFC 
representation, this requires that credit money is created within the banking system and 
flows to other units within the economy only as a representation of (presumed) underlying 
movements of value. The representation of the movement then forces the real movement 
into play, and on this basis the separate movements of the flows across the balance sheet 
result in a stable set of stocks, ex post, at the end of the modelled time period. 
The movement of the (presumed) purely symbolic, in other words, heralds the movement 
of the real capital that, in turn, allows the symbolic representation to align with the real. 
There is a parallel here with the pure Quantity Theory case, in which, on the basis of the 
equation of exchange, a fixed velocity of circulation ensures that the movement of the 
monetary stock translates directly into a movement of prices, for a given output. For SFC 
and credit-money theorists, the relationship appears completely reversed: the movement 
of the money stock calls the real movement of output, underlying the representation, 
directly into existence. Yet for the system to be stable, ex post, given the real movement 
that underlies the purely symbolic representation at the level of the social accounting 
matrix. The circuit of the symbolic form of money – the credit-money here represented 
across the matrix – is always complete, by assumption: this is what the principle of double-
entry accounting of stocks and flows means. But since this representation is, in reality, 
dependent on the real movement, the presumption has to be that the movement of the 
underlying real is entirely distinct from the movement of the symbolic. This is because, to 
close the system at the level of its symbolic representation - with all stocks completely 
representing the past history of all flows – the symbolic representation must itself be 
complete. If the real movements that the symbolic representation claims to represent 
intrude in this circuit, they have the potential (at least) to force serious disjunctures 
between the symbolic and the real. 
In practice, SFC representations concede this point by holding that the ultimate movement 
of capital as such is determined outside the system represented by the social accounting 
matrix. The movement of capital appears as a residual element – as the “net worth” of the 
economy, a claim that is itself (as we have seen) slightly dubious – rather than the motive 
force of the movement of the system as a whole. And the expansion of that stock of capital, 
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like the neoclassical growth systems that SFC claims to be an alternative to, depends 
ultimately on the exogenous movements of the productivity of capital – something beyond 
the reach of the modelled system. 
The SFC representation is more complete than the neoclassical alternatives. It allows a 
fuller description of the movements of value across the economy, since value and flows of 
value are treated as gross, rather than net. But the insistence on closure at the end of the 
modelled period forces it back into something akin to a Quantity Theory: real movements 
affect only real movements; nominal movements, in the end, affect only nominal 
movements, since the real they purport to represent is ultimately unaffected by their 
purely notional movements. 
 
Quantity Theory, anti-Quantity Theory, and monetary crises 
This reappearance of an ex post Quantity Theory is a weakness within the SFC 
representation, and one that flows directly from first, the presence of money as symbol 
within the system; second, the insistence that the accounts are complete, and balance; and 
third, following in the trail of these two, the actual disjuncture that emerges between the 
movement of value in the accounting matrix, and the real movement of value in the 
economy. To close the gap between the real movement and its nominal representation 
requires us to rethink the presence of money within the system; in particular, we need to 
return to the (necessary, but hidden in SFC) role of money as the presence of value within a 
system of exchange, rather than a mere representation of that value. In practice, this 
means a reconsideration of the shape that money describes in its flow, and our 
understanding of the causal relationship that therefore develops between this description 
of the monetary flow and the wider economy. 
We can trace this path directly. “Marx holds that the value of money in capitalism is the 
interest rate, not its purchasing power. Money is not a sign of value.” (Ormazabal 2009: 9) 
This follows from his holding that what was known at the time as the Law of Reflux was in 
operation: that is, notes issued by the Bank of England (in the case of a gold drain) would 
not be inflationary because they do not represent an increase in the demand for 
commodities; rather, they represent an increase in the demand for means of payment, 
given its restriction otherwise. Excess issues would therefore return to the issuer, rather 
than remaining in circulation to bid up the prices of commodities. This latter point was the 
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Law of Reflux in operation; it implies both a capacity for hoarding that is independent of 
the real side of the economy, determined principally by monetary factors, and it implies 
that the measured velocity of circulation is variable, and highly sensitive to variations in 
monetary conditions. 
We have encountered something very similar to the Law of Reflux already, in describing the 
circular route that credit money takes, on its issuance, through the banking system. 
Because it is issued alongside a loan, credit money automatically has a “shadow” within the 
financial system that drags it back towards its issuer: the money circulates across the real 
economy, driving real activity – or at least potentially driving activity separate from the 
sphere of monetary circulation – but as it circulates from holder to holder, it must, in effect, 
return to its issuer as a payment for the loan advanced. Credit money, in this instance, 
follows a circular path, in contradistinction to commodity money which can follow an 
undetermined path through the economy: it has no “law of reflux”, and can remain either 
in circulation or in a hoard essentially indefinitely. It can even exit the sphere of the 
currency’s usual circulation, and be used as a store of value elsewhere in the world.  
SFC representations, at least of the post-Keynesian type we are considering, contain only a 
credit version of money. They have no space for a commodity version of money; money 
always follows a circular path, remaining, as inside money, inside the system as 
represented in the social accounting matrix. Commodity money as such is an archaic form 
of money; we will, however, shortly suggest that the development of credit money 
institutions has given rise to money that can (on the basis of hoarding) act like commodity 
money of old, following no particular path back to its issuer. 
For now, in the case of the gold drain considered by the Currency School, the argument 
was that since the drain was motivated by a real mispricing, the extra issuance of currency 
by the Bank of England could only have an inflationary effect (at least over anything other 
than the shortest of time periods) since it would immediately be forced into circulation and 
bid up the prices of commodities. This was opposed by both the Banking School and Marx, 
who argued that the attempt to restrict the reissuance of notes returned to the Bank of 
England simply artificially restricted the supply of means of payment in circulation, relative 
to demand, and therefore simply bid up the price of money.  
Where Marx differed from the Banking School was in his insistence that the solution to a 
crisis of money and banking could not be solved purely through monetary means alone. 
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The crisis and its monetary expression were distinct. “An expansion of money-capital, 
which arises out of the fact that, in view of the expansion of banking… what was formerly a 
private hoard or coin reserve is always converted into loanable capital for a definite time, 
does not indicate a growth in productive capital any more than the increasing deposits with 
the London stock banks when the latter began to pay interest on deposits. As long as the 
scale of production remains the same, this expansion leads only to an abundance of 
loanable money-capital as compared with the productive.” (Marx 1894: ch.30) The price of 
“industrial” (productive) capital and loanable capital tend to move inversely to each other, 
as shown through the rate of interest, and most dramatically in the aftermath of a crisis 
during which time loanable capital is superabundant. The rate of interest on loan capital, 
and the return on productive capital match only coincidentally during the course of the 
business cycle.  
So when a crisis emerges, principally (in Marx’s view) through the overproduction of 
commodities, the monetary appearance of a crisis is exactly that – only its appearance. As 
the overproduction becomes apparent, forcing a collapse in commodity values, the over-
extension of credit becomes apparent. A shortage of means of payment emerges, as a 
“tremendous rush for means of payment” occurs, credit collapses, and only cash is 
acceptable as a means of settling bills. This, in turn, reveals the largely fictitious structure of 
much of the earlier overexpansion of credit. The underlying movement, however, is in the 
real prices of commodities and their circulation – including that of commodity capital – 
from which the circulation of credit and means of payment is an amplification, but not the 
cause. Insisting, in the face of a crisis that would itself have been worsened by the presence 
of the credit system, that the credit system alone can be used to resolve the crisis, in effect, 
pushing on a string. At most, the Banking School was correct in insisting that the actual 
production and circulation of commodities – on which rested real employment and 
incomes – should not be sacrificed for the good of apparently restoring notional harmony 
in the market for money. But it erred if, on the basis that the effects of a crisis should not 
be worsened by poor monetary policy, but that the crisis could itself be resolved or 
circumvented with monetary policy alone. Since the crisis, whatever its monetary 
appearance, was the presence of a real disorder amongst the circulation of commodities – 
and only secondarily a disorder in the circulation of money – it required the restoration of 
something approaching order amongst that sphere of commodity circulation ahead of 
order being restored in the sphere of monetary circulation. 
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Put differently, although the anti-Quantity Theory holds true for the circulation of 
monetary values, it holds an asymmetry: the line of causality from the prices determined 
by the real production, distribution and circulation of commodities towards the monetary 
system overdetermines the potential for money circulation to decide the structure of the 
commodity sphere, outside of the most immediate period of time. Monetary policy would 
be at its most effective in the teeth of a crisis, when the general disorder prevailing in the 
real economy could at least be stemmed by the correct application of monetary policy, but 
monetary policy alone could not provide the conditions by which circulation could be 
assured over the longer term. 
SFC, to this extent, represents an actual retrogression from the Banking School in that it 
does not follow through on the anti-Quantity Theory. Similarly to Keynes himself, who by 
the General Theory had adopted an (at best) quasi-endogenous theory of money 
determination, maintaining a fixed stock of money around which portfolio decisions were 
then taken (rather than allowing, as in a genuinely endogenous system, the creation of 
money determining portfolio holding decisions), the post-Keynesian representation of 
money contained inside SFC reproduces elements of the Quantity Theory precisely by, as 
Lapavitsas suggests of Keynes, not “even consider*ing+ the way in which money mediates 
the realisation of total output.” (Lapavitsas 1992: 15) It is the presumption that a global 
stability prevails in the financial representations of the underlying (real) movements of 
value that forces SFC representations back into something that, in the aggregate, looks 
perilously like a Quantity Theory. While at the start of the modelling period, money 
appears to be endogenous – created as credit money within the banking system – at the 
end of the modelled period, once all flows have been netted off, it re-emerges as a 
seemingly exogenous element. It appears exogenous, in the sense of existing as a stock 
separate from the rest of the economy, because it must ensure the stability of all totals 
decreed, after the modelling period has closed, to be stable “stocks”. This forces money to 
take on the appearance of an external factor: it is unaffected, outside of the modelling 
period and once, ex post, a balance exists across the social accounting matrix, by any 
elements within the model itself. 
 
Double-entry accounting means zero net flows 
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This result is the direct outcome of the accounting approach SFC uses. It follows from the 
double-entry approach that is integral to SFC that the sum of flows within a given period, 
for the whole matrix, must equate to zero. It is only the stocks that shift, at the end of a 
period. Implicit beneath this appeal to the logic of accountancy is the need for money to 
represent a stable value within each period. If monetary value can vary within a period, it 
would be possible for flows to fail to equate over the period.  
Partly the problem can be solved by assuming, as SFC generally does, that each period is 
complete and self-contained, for whatever length it exists. By definition, then, we can claim 
that the period starts and closes over period during which the monetary value of the flows 
is itself fixed. Yet if the monetary value can be plausibly seen to vary, the representation 
would break down. 
This is where the contradiction between the strictly social representation of money and 
credit behaviour that the SFC representation assumes, and its manifestation as the product 
of distinct decisions is most obvious. With only general, social form of money created 
through the banks, the hoarding behaviour that can take place separately from the circuit 
of inside money – as breaks within that circuit – is overlooked. Capital-in-general, the social 
form of the circuit as represented in the social accounting matrix, cannot simply subsume 
the distinct forms of capital accumulation, and the distinct parts of the circuit, that exist in 
reality. Hoarding can, in practice, occur at any point along the circuit - and it will, precisely 
because of the issue of uncertainty. 
And since, as discussed, this uncertainty exists separately to the issue of timing, the 
periodisation imposed on the circuit is not sufficient to overcome the presence of hoarding 
behaviour. Since uncertainty is a general feature of the existence of the circuit as such, it 
can occur, at the level of the individual elements (as a manifestation of capital-in-particular) 
at any point throughout the circuit, irrespective of the periodisation that is modelled. It 
therefore breaks with the periodisation imposed in the circuit: it is something quite distinct, 
and cannot be captured fully by the social accounting matrix approach of SFC. 
Therefore the circuit is regularly subject to breakdowns. Instead of a stable monetary form 
and value, that stably constitutes the medium of the flows that are assumed to occur 
within each period, the flows themselves may break in erratic and unplanned ways, 
unobserved in the social accounting matrix. Indeed, since uncertainty prevails the circuit, 
and is separate from the issue of timing and periodisation within the circuit, these breaks 
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will occur in an a priori undetermined fashion; they are a further manifestation of the 
contradiction between capital-in-general, existing at the level of the circuit, and the 
particular forms that capital takes as we move away from this most abstract representation.  
Money, within the circuit, is a necessarily social creation: it cannot exist as truly private or 
autonomous money, but must appear as its social function if it is to exist at all. Central to 
its functioning, however, is its capacity to be used autonomously by private agents: no part 
of any amount of money is predetermined in its use, and it is this very generality of use 
that defines it as money. It is this contradictory aspect of money – that its generality 
implies its private, undetermined use – that SFC has the most significant problems with. 
Time periods cannot be defined completely within the circuit because, at any point, the 
circuit may be broken by the removal of money from its circulation – by its disappearance 
from the flow and translation into a hoarded stock, over however brief a period of time. 
The presence of uncertainty, as the conditioning feature of money held as a hoard, will 
determine that this occurs; it is the presence of uncertainty, then, that means time periods 
within the circuit of money cannot be defined a priori, although of course the pure 
technical conditions of production may define the useful turnover time of capital more 
generally. By starting with money, however, the circuit and the periodisation becomes 
indeterminate, since the presence of uncertainty, as mediated by money, now dominates 
the activity of those using money. 
This means that the standard Quantity Theory of the determination of prices by reference 
to a stock of money does not function. Given the presence of uncertainty within the 
circulation of money and capital, and given the use of money as barrier against that social 
uncertainty as privately experienced, generating hoards, the stable “velocity of circulation” 
that the Quantity Theory depends upon cannot hold (Friedman 1956; Friedman and 
Schwartz 1963). The evidence, particularly since the 1970s – coinciding precisely with the 
period during which Friedman’s restatement of the Theory gained ground – suggests that 
the relationship is not at all stable, observed velocity tending to decline and the “extrinsic 
econometric relationships” tending to “breakdown” (Goodhart 1989). But this is a deeper 
problem than simply that the velocity of circulation may itself be subject to change over 
time, a factor generally identified by even the more crude Keynesian models (Werner 2005: 
ch.7). The relationship between what we observe as the “stock” of money, and financial 
balances more generally, and what we derive as the “velocity” of that money stock is in fact 
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a far more porous and indeterminate relationship than even allowing a variable velocity 
can model for.  
Moreover, because we assume that at the end of the modelling period the stocks of money 
and the observed financial balances are all net of within-period flows, we in fact end up 
with something very similar to a Say’s Law version of equilibrium: because we have insisted 
that the balance sheet does, in fact, match up to the reality of economic decisions 
underneath it, and because we insist that the stocks observed at the end of the period are, 
in fact, stable stocks of value, we implicitly allow a variant of Say’s Law, in which net excess 
demands are zero, to come into being. It is only the presence, ex ante, of the creation of 
credit money that drives the dynamic of the system; ex post, at the end of the modelling 
period, the system is closed and stable.  
 
III. THE EXCESS OF MONEY 
The monetary “excess” 
This collision between the presumed stability of the monetary forms at the end of the 
period, and their actual instability within and without the period - to the point of breaking 
the periodisation imposed – produces a distinct outcome within the operation of the model. 
We have suggested already that the presence of capital as a residual element within the 
system is one form of this, and that this forced exit of the real movement of capital from 
the modelled system represents a failure of the representation as such. But this 
representation of capital as a residual disguises the other real manifestation of the 
breakdown of the SFC representation, which is the necessary presence of a monetary 
“excess”, given the flow of money across the circuit.  
SFC, being a monetary theory of production, assumes that the presence of (symbolic, credit) 
money is sufficient to call into existence the presence of real processes of capital 
accumulation. This money appears, and is assumed to be sufficient to inspire the process of 
accumulation that generates the necessary balancing at the other end of the time-period: 
with all gross flows netted off, the stocks remaining are assumed to contain both the 
necessary and the sufficient representation of holdings of wealth within the economy. As 
we have seen, in practice this simply leaves the real process of accumulation as a residual 
upon the flows that SFC purports to capture; but in addition, as the discussion of Keynes’ 
financial motive indicated, we cannot (given the presence of uncertainty) be sure that 
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mobilised holdings of money will be sufficient to call into existence the real capital and 
productive forces necessary to actually secure the balance of flows and value that the SFC 
system purports to represent. 
In other words, the SFC representation assumes that which needs to be demonstrated: that 
the movement of the total output can be realised – returned back to the circuit of capital – 
ahead of its reinvestment within the cycle. This has to be demonstrated precisely because 
of the existence of the necessary monetary excess: that the presence of money as such, in a 
form that is amenable to be hoarded at the discretion of individual agents (which is to say, 
all plausible forms of money that exist), necessarily creates an excess of the quantity of the 
money form ahead of the amount that would actually be needed to meet the demands of 
realisation. This necessary excess is not fully realised in the post-Keynesian version of 
monetary circulation precisely because it obscures the distinction between capital-in-
general and capital at the level of individual capitals. It aggregates, but it presumes a 
smooth aggregation in which the layers of mediation between the circulation of money and 
the realities of production can be flattened out into a simple representation of financial 
flows. It therefore misses the necessarily particularised decisions to hoard – whether 
momentary or of a longer duration – by focusing only on the ultimate social form of the 
hoard, the banking and credit system itself, and then further assuming that this description 
of the movement of money actually captures every possible movement of money within 
the system.  
In a similar fashion, it is this presence of the necessary monetary excess that undermines 
the arguments, repeated from an earlier period of pronounced crisis, concerning the 
possibility of imposing full-reserve banking of a modern monetary economy (Dyson, 
Greenham et al. 2010). The confusion here is between the presentation of the money 
system as complete, and the reality of its incompleteness, relative to the actuality of 
hoarding and money that is otherwise abstracted and frozen out of the complete circuit. 
Full-reserve banking presumes that the excess is unnecessary: that all money produced can 
be simply matched to existing deposits, rather than allowing that the banking and 
monetary system produces a necessary excess precisely because the circuit of capital (at 
the level of capital-in-general) and individual behaviour (at the level of capital-in-particular) 
contradict: there is no point, within the circuit, at which the “correct” stock of money can 
be reliably posited, as indeed the earlier monetarists discovered. Similarly, proposals to 
restrict the production of money, via credit creation, to that which is necessarily 
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“productive” (however defined; Werner (2005) suggests tying directly investments 
productive of GDP) suffer from the same problem. 
Keynes himself, as we have seen in the discussion of the financial motive, recognised 
something of this after the publication of the General Theory. But the debates here were 
inconclusive, and failed to identify the extent to which the necessary presence of the 
monetary excess in fact undermined the General Theory system. This excess is a genuine 
surplus to the immediate requirements of investment and the realisation of investments: it 
is not, for instance, equivalent to the necessary ex ante use of money holdings in order to 
bring forward investment, as identified by Keynes (and latterly indicated by Steve Keen in 
his well-publicised debate with Paul Krugman (Campiglio and Bernardo 2012)). Instead, this 
is an ex post monetary excess: it exists after the fact, given the presence of uncertainty 
within the circuit of capital and the ability of individual elements within that circuit to cope 
with uncertainty through their hoarding decisions.  
 
The “paradox of profit” reconsidered 
Were it to be only an ex ante problem, the monetary excess – that element of the total 
stock of money needed ahead of the planned investment – would not present an 
insurmountable difficulty. The “paradox of profit”, considered earlier, in which, for a credit 
economy, firm revenues can at most equal the initial financing of production costs, is a 
manifestation of this initial excess (Bellofiore, Davanzati et al. 2000). Steve Keen, amongst 
others, has demonstrated that the paradox can be resolved, by allowing for variations in 
the turnover time during which “same money can be spent several times in one year” 
because the initial loan of money generates flows of variable lengths that, in turn, can be 
spent and respent during the production period (Keen 2009: 6). 
The presence of an ex ante “excess”, then, can be reconciled with the presence of both 
positive profits for capitalists and with the more general claims of post-Keynesian SFC 
treatments to represent a complete macroeconomy, with all stocks and flows at all times 
accounted for. It cannot, however, be reconciled with the presence of an ex post excess of 
money, since this ex post stock exists (in effect) outside of the realm of flows that the SFC 
representation purports to contain. Its presence is a tribute to the capacity of particular 
elements of the system (principally those concerned directly with the capital accumulation) 
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to withhold money from wider circulation, in addition to those stocks withheld as a 
necessary part of the accumulation process, ex ante. 
We have encountered something like this before, in noting, back in chapter 3, that the 
existence of outside money in DSGE models cannot be reconciled with the claim that debts 
held by the “representative agent” cannot accelerate forever: outside money always 
imposes itself as the necessary means by which debts could, in theory, eventually be repaid. 
Here, we have a determinedly inside money system that suffers from a parallel problem, 
precisely because (in a certain sense) the existence of hoarding activity in excess of that 
captured within the banking system – as must necessarily exist, given the presence of social 
uncertainty but individual procedures to deal with this uncertainty – a form of “outside” 
money is permanently being created and re-created through the actions of hoarding and 
dishoarding. 
We have, of course, moved a very long way from the days of commodity money, when the 
formation of an “outside” money was inherent to the creation of money as such. Virtually 
all money created now, within a national economy – within, that is, the sphere of 
representation that SFC claims to account for – is a form of inside money, created by and 
within the banking system and returning, as is typical for credit money, back into the 
banking system after it has traversed the wider economy. Credit money, as we have noted, 
observes a circular path: created by banks, it provokes and motivates wider economic 
activity for as long as it does not return to its creator, and can follow a course across 
multiple deposit accounts and between multiple hands before it does so. But because it is 
created, overwhelmingly, in parallel to the creation of a loan demanding repayment, it will 
– outside of those periods of deep crisis – in the generality always return to its source. 
The exception to this, however, is where a form of national credit (or semi-credit) money 
has taken on the characteristics of world money (Marx 1867: ch.3). World money, created 
as essentially credit money within a national economy, can take on characteristics more 
commonly associated with commodity money when it moves outside of the immediate 
banking system of its creation. The ubiquitous presence of dollar bills, for example, across 
much of the world, functions as precisely a form of commodity money as far as the non-
dollar economies are concerned: a reliable store of value that can exist quite independently 
of its banking system, with no requirement, at any point for the bills to return to their 
source. They can, therefore, constitute a form “outside money” relative to the national 
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monetary system, precisely because they represent the most developed form of money 
relative to the less developed national money form in operation in any particular economy. 
 
Financialisation, outside money, and the monetary excess 
This presence of a world money, developed as a national means of payment but then 
operating, in effect, as a form of outside (commodity-equivalent) money outside of its 
national economy birthplace, is essential to understanding the progress of financialisaiton 
over the last three decades. The development of an excess, and of hoards that exist outside 
of the conventional banking system, have been central to the development and expansion 
of the financial system, centred on the US dollar, from at least the point at which the US 
essentially abandoned its own attempts to regulate and control the use and circulation of 
dollars within the global system: that is, from at least Nixon’s abandonment of the Bretton 
Woods agreements in 1971, although of course the appearance on non-US circulations of 
dollar holdings substantially pre-date that, most notably in the creation of the Eurodollar 
markets in the 1950s. 
But it was the acceleration of non-bank, external hoardings that was decisive, allied to the 
much-noted acceleration of “financial innovation” throughout the decades since the 1970s. 
We want, however, to turn attention away from the supply-side issues that occupied 
enormous theoretical and policymaking attention since the financial crash of 2007-8, not 
least in ongoing debates about the appropriate forms and degrees of regulation to be 
applied to financial markets. Instead, we will draw on the conclusions in this chapter 
regarding the appearance of private hoards and the necessary monetary excess this entails 
to consider, in the next, the appearance and growth of an immense (and immensely 
complex) set of quasi-banking institutions that constitute the principal form that this 
monetary excess has taken. 
For SFC representations of the economy, and for post-Keynesianism more generally, the 
appearance of the so-called “shadow banking system” makes manifest the more 
theoretical of the necessary monetary excess. If under the classic period of “Keynesian” 
regulation, and in particular the relatively controlled circulation of global money forms that 
Bretton Woods imposed, this excess was (in practice) managed and regulated, it has now 
far outstripped the boundaries within which a national economy can plausibly attempt to 
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regulate its movements. The world has become increasingly less “Keynesian”, both in 
practice and at the level of theory. 
 
Leaks and the contradictions of the circuit 
This chapter has looked at Keynes’ attempts to resolve some of the problems opened up by 
the General Theory’s core discussion of the balance between savings-investment and the 
demand for money. The discussion both in the book and immediately afterwards is 
fundamental to the subsequent development of macroeconomic theory but, as we have 
attempted to show, it opens up some irreconcilable differences between some of Keynes’ 
insights – partially developed by him and others – and the standard approach to 
macroeconomics, dependent on a quantity theory of money and with an “irreducible 
psychological dimension” (Brunhoff 1976: 41) motivating the flows of money around the 
circuit. In particular, we attempt to show that Keynes’ own attempts to overcome the 
contradictions of the General Theory through the financial demand for money demonstrate 
the incompatibility of money seen as a flow around a circuit, and money as a stock that 
determines prices. Leaks from the system can occur, in the form of hoarding, driven by the 
uncertainty and sequencing of processes that inherent to a genuinely dynamic capitalist 
economy. 
These leaks, in turn, undermine any presentation of the economy as only a single set of 
flow relationships. Once the monetary circuit is open-ended and indeterminate, as we 
suggest above, it cannot be reliably presented as a single system. Stock-flow consistent 
models, by the nature, attempt to present the entire economy as just that: a single system 
of stocks and flows mediated by money. But once the forms of money become unstable, as 
they do when leaks of indeterminate duration appear in the system, the stock-flow 
representation can no longer be said to be consistent: it will balance only under 
exceptional circumstances, reducing it from a general representation of a “monetary 
production economy” to one that functions only in the particular case where uncertainty a 
priori has no impact on the flow of the money circuit. Since, however, this at least implies 
an economy without money, and probably one in which perfect planning is possible, SFC is 
weakened as a convincing modelling strategy. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
BANKS, SHADOW BANKS, AND INCONSISTENCIES 
 
Introduction 
The preceding chapters have introduced the SFC presentation of the world, and attempted 
to tease out some of the anomalies this causes. Two have been outstanding: the first is the 
need to identify production as a sequence of events known ex ante, as in the circuitist 
literature, rather than as the ex post financial presentation that SFC relies on; the second is 
the presence of uncertainty and the consequences this has for the functioning of money 
within the circuit of capital. 
The SFC representation we have discussed so far makes some strong institutional claims 
about the role of banks and financial institutions within the macroeconomy. In stark 
contrast to orthodox, neoclassical treatments, SFC (at least as in the main strand that has 
developed, post-Tobin) draws on a longstanding literature within post-Keynesianism to 
present banks as not the passive intermediaries of an exogenous money supply, but active 
agents in the creation and supply of money. Banks then take on an absolutely core function 
within the wider economy, supplying the necessary funding without which (in SFC 
representations) wider activity cannot take place. 
But this strong claim about the role and function of banks can be challenged. While few 
would seriously dispute the centrality of banking – even if conventional macro models tend 
to exclude a meaningful role for them – it is not necessarily the case that banks are the 
critical driver of capital accumulation and the wider circuits of money and capital. In 
particular, financialisation over the last thirty or so years has tended to drive banking 
functions away from the representation presumed as central in conventional SFC accounts. 
And the underlying theory of money needed to sustain the SFC representation can, in turn, 
be challenged.  
As the third chapter suggested, neoclassical economics has a specific understandings of 
uncertainty and money that lead to derive clear theoretical conclusions: the intermediary 
role of banks, the passive role of money, and the separability of uncertainty from 
institutions chief amongst them. SFC models, in their standard form, have much to say on 
money; much to say on banks; but little directly on uncertainty. We have attempted to 
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resolve some of that, with a presentation of banks as endogenous money creators (as in 
SFC); uncertainty as prevalent in any plausible monetary circuit of production; and of the 
excess of financing, relative to assumed needs, that recurs repeatedly once uncertainty is 
introduced as a feature of the circuit as such, and of firms’ decisionmaking in particular. 
This, in turn, has led, following those theories of credit influenced by Marx, into a 
consideration of the anti-Quantity Theory of money as the best means to reconcile the 
separate elements in a clear and consistent fashion. The appearance of a “monetary excess” 
– of money in existence over and above its apparent need to finance production – has been 
stressed throughout. 
At present, the analysis has been conducted at high level of abstraction. We have not 
looked in more detail at the forms of the institutions that have developed to handle these 
different elements within the economy. This chapter attempts to provide a “thicker” 
description of the appearance of this “monetary excess” in its modern form: of the 
hoarding that has occurred over the last decade or so, taking a very particular form that 
presents a direct challenge (we argue) to simple SFC presentations. We introduce a few 
new elements to the outline to help explain this, returning to some of the themes about 
social norms and wider social institutions introduced at the start of the thesis. 
This chapter first examines briefly neoclassical theories of banking, and how these fail to 
stand up to the observed institutional and functional changes that the financial system has 
undergone over the last few decades. We explore here, in particular, the suggested role 
banks play in the management of risk, and how neoclassical theories of risk have failed to 
account for the transformation of banking. The chapter looks in detail at the functioning of 
the so-called “shadow banking system”, proposing that financialisation has led to the 
development of a non-depository banking function. This banking function conflicts with the 
representation claimed for banks inside conventional SFC models, and we develop a brief 
account of how an SFC representation cannot adequately capture shadow banking 
behaviour. We conclude with a brief summary of the theory of credit money underlying the 
post-Keynesian SFC model, and indicate ways in which this can be improved – to be 
considered more fully in the subsequent chapter.  
 
I. BANKS, UNCERTAINTY, AND INSTITUTIONS 
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Banks’ risk management functions 
A strong prediction of the neoclassical theory of banking, where banks essentially appear 
only to overcome information asymmetries amongst agents, is that the proliferation of 
information technologies and their falling cost should act to reduce the need for banks as 
institutions.  Yet recent history directly contradicts this prediction, as Allen and Santomero 
(2001) indicate. The costs of acquiring and processing information have dropped sharply as 
a result of improvements in information technology. But this has occurred at the same time 
as financial intermediaries have massively expanded – exactly the opposite of the 
prediction. Some alternative explanation is needed, if the core neoclassical system is to be 
kept in place. Allen and Santomero (1998, 2001) have proposed that we broaden the 
neoclassical theory consider financial intermediaries as institutions that specialise in the 
management of risk. They claim (Allen and Santomero 1998) that a “functional perspective” 
(Merton 1989) of the financial system, analysing its activities by considering the functions it 
performs, provides a better way to understand its transformation over the last few years 
than the “institutional perspective” provided by the information-theoretic approach. 
Institutions change substantially, in ways not related to the economics of information, but 
functions are far more stable. (Allen and Santomero 1998: 1465-1466). This focus on 
functions, rather than institutions, helps account for the changing balance of banking 
activities in the period of globalisation – away, Allen and Santomero argue, from traditional 
information-management favoured by neoclassical theory, and towards risk management. 
Scholtens and van Wensveen (2000) argue to the contrary that banks have always been the 
management of risk, citing “merchant bankers in the Italian Renaissance”, the first “true 
investment bankers” of the Dutch Republic, and “even the seemingly dull business of 
savings and loan associations and credit unions in the US in the 1950s” as examples of 
financial intermediaries deeply concerned with the management of risk. In a similar vein, 
(Haug and Taleb 2008) propose that the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing formula, 
developed in the 1970s as supposedly a new means to manage risk, is merely a scholastic 
rewriting of longstanding practice amongst option traders – and that this and other 
academic formulae are largely irrelevant to the actual business of trading. Options were 
actively traded in the pre-modern financial world and, moreover, attempts to formalise the 
practices – what Haug and Taleb refer to as the techne of trading – simply introduced 
unnecessary tail risks and fragilities. 
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Much of this seems true, and obviously so. Financial institutions have always had to deal 
with risk to some extent. Derivatives existed for many years before their academic pricing 
models. However, the argument that there exists nothing new under the financial sun 
cannot account for the similarly obvious shift in banks’ activities, as seen in their balance 
sheets, over the decades since the 1970s. For most of banks’ existence, they did not earn 
the majority of their accounting profits on the basis of fees income and off-balance sheet 
activities. Similarly, the majority of transactions by major banks were not between other 
major banks, as approximately 70 per cent of banking transactions now are. Under these 
circumstances, the character of major banks themselves has changed. 
Allen and Santamero propose a cross-section test for what they argue is a “fundamental” 
importance of risk-management in explaining differences in banking systems across 
economies. Banks in Japan, Germany and France are under less pressure from financial 
markets than those in the US and UK. As a result, they have been able to manage risk 
through intertemporal smoothing, building up reserves of safe, low yielding assets when 
returns are high to be drawn upon when returns elsewhere are low. US and UK banks, by 
contrast, can no longer rely on intertemporal smoothing as competition amongst assets 
leads to a high level of withdrawals from their reserves by households. They cannot use 
reserves to manage risk, and so rely on derivatives and similar techniques (Allen and 
Santomero 2001). The pace of financial innovation is faster in the Anglo-Saxon economies. 
Supporting evidence is provided by Tsai, Chang et al. (2011), who find a correlation 
between the quality of private credit reporting systems in a country, and the entry of 
foreign banks. Banks are more likely to enter countries where credit reporting is robust. 
Tsai et al., sticking to the standard neoclassical frame, attribute this to information 
asymmetries for new entrant banks – akin to their bias towards own-language economies 
when entering new markets (Buch 2000). 
 
Risk management challenged 
Lapavitsas and dos Santos (2008) dismiss Allen and Santomero’s focus on risk, claiming that 
since bank’s risk management functions were demonstrably inadequate during the 2007-9 
financial crisis, the theory does not hold up. Risks that developed particularly around 
housing loans were hopelessly mispriced and badly managed, and so “*t+here seems to be 
little mileage in an analytical framework founded on the presumed ability of financial 
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intermediaries to manage risk.” (34) But this is a weak objection. The fact that an 
institution apparently performs its tasks badly does not mean that those tasks are not part 
of its functions. dos Santos elsewhere notes banks’ risk-management activities are an 
adjunct to their more fundamental purpose of credit creation, perhaps underplaying the 
overwhelming importance of non-standard activities to banks’ functioning (Dos Santos 
2011). 
Where they are on stronger grounds is noting the theoretical deficiencies of Allen and 
Santomero’s analysis, which they view as inferior even to the information-theoretic 
approach. Allen and Santomero do not define closely their meaning of risk, relying heavily 
on empirical evidence in both the papers under discussion (1998; 2001); but as we have 
argued earlier, a failure to theoretically apprehend risk is at the heart of the failure of the 
neoclassical approach to understand the development of financial markets and institutions 
over the last twenty years or more. Simply noting a change is not good enough, and 
theoretical hole at the centre of Allen and Santomero’s work leaves them open to the 
charge presented by Lapavitsas and dos Santos. 
The two approaches directly contradict. Information is the opposite of trust, since if it was 
possible to have complete information – including information about all future states of the 
world, based on future actions – trust would be unnecessary. This is, at heart, Hayek’s 
insight into the functioning of a market society: collective organisation, of any sort – from 
trade unions to the nation-state – were a throwback to a pre-modern social order. The 
market order had to be constructed against collectivism, offering a rational means to 
organise an increasingly complex society that did not depend upon – indeed, was explicitly 
destructive of – collectivities and trust. 
Information, in this world, is not just opposed to trust: it is the enemy of trust. Trust 
matters only where information cannot be properly organised; and information is only 
properly organised through the “extended order” of market relations against the 
collectivism of our distant past (Hayek 1991). A guard is necessary against these collective 
urges, for which a state is required, but a limited state that seeks to preserve property 
relations and break up trusts and combines where these threaten the functioning of the 
law (Hayek 1960). A well-organised market society would have no need for trust, as 
conceived here. Market relations and enforced property rights would suffice. 
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Yet the presence of trust points directly to the presence of the necessarily social and 
historically determined character of banking: just as Allen and Santomero, adapting a 
broadly neoclassical frame, fail to develop a notion of risk or uncertainty beyond empirical 
observation, in a similar fashion the Hayekian theory of social development fails to develop 
a notion of trust as anything other than the property of individual relationships. But it is 
money’s character as the pre-eminent form of social relationships within the economy – its 
necessary role as the universal equivalent, against which all other relationships are judged, 
measured, and valued – that demands foundations of social trust. Money is not, and to 
function as money cannot, be solely a relationship between privately-contracting 
individuals. It must come with society attached. The failure of information-based theories 
of banking and bank development is exactly that this necessary property of money as such 
is lost. 
 
Trust and banking 
Lapavitsas is correct to indicate the importance of the development of trust amongst banks. 
Where he errs somewhat is in claiming that this trust emerges only spontaneously, as part 
of the general transactions that banks perform amongst themselves. Banks, as he notes, 
are distinct from other capitalist enterprises: the division of labour amongst industrial 
capitalists gives a material basis for the development of trust, as firms occupy different 
locations within the production process and so come to rely on each other for materials 
and markets. Commercial credit, offered on a “buy now, pay later” basis, therefore has a 
solid material footing.  
Banks, on the other hand, do not use and exploit labour in the same way. Their strength or 
fragility depends not their success in mobilizing and organizing their capital and labour, but 
on their own balance sheets. Trust matters insofar as those balance sheets can be 
respected. Banks loaning to industrial capital can attempt to assess the creditworthiness of 
individual enterprises, using their own knowledge of the concern or the industry, or 
through the development of credit-scoring techniques. In all cases the aim is to mitigate 
the uncertainty that necessarily attaches itself to credit relations extended through time.  
Depositors into banks, in comparison, operate in a dense fog of uncertainty. Knowledge of 
a banks’ balance sheet at any given point in time, given the complexity of any bank’s 
relationship to its creditors and debtors, may not be a reliable guide to its true stability. As 
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Lapavitsas says, the “truly remarkable aspect of financial intermediation is not the lending 
of money by banks; rather it is the action of capitalists to deposit idle money with banks on 
the basis of mere promises to pay.” (Lapavitsas 2003: 82) The inherent instability of 
fractional reserve banking, with the ever-present threat of bank runs, is due to this heavy 
dependence on trust. A certain suspension of disbelief is required for the system to 
function at all. It is precisely on this basis that the regulation of bank deposits began to 
emerge, first through the appearance of lenders of last resort, and later through legal 
means such as the provision of deposit insurance. The deposit and loan functions of banks, 
in relation to wider society, came to enjoy a comparatively secure foundation on the state. 
Once again, we are brought back to the convoluted relationship between state debt, and 
private credit. The state was present at the birth of the modern credit system and if it acted 
more as midwife than mother, pace chartalism, it has taken a keen interest in the child ever 
since. It was the expansion of state expenditure, most obviously for war, that compelled 
the initial creation of a monopoly central bank capable of managing the state’s burgeoning 
finances – first, unsuccessfully in the Dutch Republic in 1609, and then later, more 
dramatically, through the formation of the Swedish Riksbank in 1664 and the Bank of 
England in 1694. The state, with its immense ideological reserves and – more pertinently – 
its powers of taxation provides the necessary basis of trust – even faith – in the functioning 
of financial markets that competitive private capital, alone, cannot engender. “Public credit 
becomes the credo of capital. And with the rise of national debt-making, want of faith in 
the national debt takes the place of the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, which may not 
be forgiven.” (Marx 1976: vol 1., ch.31) 
Lapavitsas then ascribes the same process to the development of interbank money markets, 
with private institutions founded on trust inducing state support. Bank reserves require 
management, as the timing of deposits and withdrawals for any one institution is uncertain. 
They therefore look to manage their reserves through trade with other banks. Banks 
continually assess each others’ own abilities to pay through the institution of the money 
market, upon which an interest rate, applicable to the whole of society, can emerge. It 
standardizes and makes “homogenous” the private uncertainties present on individual 
banks balance sheets, and in doing so makes a social property of the systems’ perceived 
stability (Lapavitsas 2003: 83). But the appearance of this stability is not dependent on the 
banking system itself: it is a property of the wider credit system and, in particular, the 
capacity of the lender of last resort, the central bank, to mobilise its own powers through 
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the provision of a discount window and other short-term credit facilities, priced at a 
discount rate that remains (largely) under its own control. The sequencing of this is 
important: modern interbank markets began to operate only after the state had secured a 
central bank as an effective lender of last resort.  
On one side, the state appears after private banks’ own initiative in becoming modern 
deposit-taking, loan-making institutions reliant on fractional reserves. On the other, it 
appears before the creation of the interbank market that banks, now expanded enormously, 
rely upon to manage their own reserves. The relationship is, in neither case, purely in one 
direction – states leading banks, or banks leading states; it is dependent on the nature of 
the specific function being performed.  
The asymmetry here is crucial to the state-bank relationship, and in particular to the ability 
of the banks (collectively) to act as a general repository for capital. SFC models highlight the 
ability of banks to provide a “buffer” for capital accumulation more generally, their balance 
sheets acting as the “flexible component” on which other accumulating sectors can rely to 
overcome the uncertainties inherent to the process of capital accumulation (Godley 2004a: 
6). The buffer itself is a combination of both the banks’ great flexibility in being able to 
provide credit, essentially as demanded, and the overwhelming need to maintain social 
trust in themselves as providers of that credit. Maintaining this delicate balance between 
two, clearly conflicting, interests has been treated as the pre-eminent role of the state, and 
of regulation, within the banking system. It is precisely because this relationship cannot be 
a priori determined that active regulation as such, rather than merely passive rules and 
private contracts (as Hayek’s theory would suggest), have been so essential to banking. 
Although disguised somewhat during the so-called Great Moderation, this essential feature 
of a capitalist banking system has reasserted itself with a vengeance since, as debates 
around macro-prudential regulation, post-crash, attest (Clement 2010). 
 
Regulation as the mediator for uncertainty 
Regulation is the counterpoint to the uneasy dance between state and private capital. It is 
the capacity to apply norms, distinct from binding laws, that delineates the relationship as 
it has evolved in the development of capitalism. Different national capitalisms have 
adopted different balances between formal law and informal regulations: from the 
purportedly “gentlemanly capitalism” of the Victorian City of London (Cain and Hopkins 
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1993), to the subordinate role of private banks to state credit creation in Wilhelmine 
Germany (Gerschenkron 1962) or twentieth century Japan (Johnson 1982).  This broad-
brush picture obviously obscures much of the detail; but it is not controversial to arrange 
national capitalisms, throughout their development, on a regulatory spectrum of credit 
systems, from law-bound and state-controlled to more laissez-faire.  
The period since the 1970s has seen deep changes in the structures of financial markets, 
relationships between financial institutions and the real economy, and relationships 
between states and financial institutions. Collectively, these sets of transformations are 
often referred to as “financialisation”: the widening and the deepening of financial 
activities across economy and society, assisted by a process of state-led transformation of 
financial relationships (Helleiner 1994) and the dramatic internationalisation of finance. 
A popular view holds that the period since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and 
the dominance of neoliberal policymaking, is one solely (or very largely) by deregulation 
alone – by the steady removal of state and regulatory controls over how finance operates 
(Eatwell and Taylor 2000). While this captures an important element of the truth, it is more 
accurate to indicate the ways in which state and regulators have shaped the development 
of finance over time: that, far from withdrawing and allowing a completely autonomous 
process of “financial innovation” to occur, the presence of states and regulators have 
helped determine the shape of financial processes and institutions. Even if negatively, 
through a process of “regulatory arbitrage”, it is the presence of regulations that 
determined outcomes.  
For the so-called “shadow banking system”, consisting of an immense range of off-balance 
sheet financial processes, regulatory arbitrage has been an important (arguably the most 
important determinant) in their development (FSB 2011: 5). The presence, for instance, of 
limited insurance for conventional deposits helped drive demand for non-bank deposits 
(Gorton and Metrick 2010). And it has been suggested that reactions to the US Dodd-Frank 
act (alongside Basel III) have helped sustain demand for non-bank banking processes 
(Poszar and Singh 2011: 15). But regulations have impacted on these activities in a positive 
sense: the provisions of the Basel II agreement on capital adequacy ratios helped drive 
demand in banks for (allegedly) sophisticated risk management. Nor does regulation have 
to be driven by states, or agreements between states: the credit rating agencies performed 
an effective regulatory function, in providing credit assurances for complex new financial 
products, despite the major CRAs being wholly private concerns. 
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II. THE SHADOW BANKING SYSTEM 
 
New institutions and the shadow banking system 
The set of institutions and relationships that collectively are known as the shadow banking 
system requires careful attention.  But the system itself somewhat ill-defined, at least at 
the level of determining its component parts. Gorton and Metrick (2010) attempt to 
delineate the term in their discussion of banking regulation following the financial crisis. 
They provide a rather mixed bag of off-balance sheet, non-traditional banking activities: the 
growth of money market mutual funds, securitization, repo agreements, and a rising 
demand for collateral. It is not, unfortunately, clear what would link all these elements, 
beyond the obvious case that they are all activities now undertaken by banks. There is no 
analytical case made to regard this (or any other) list as a definitive description, or anything 
like it. And the list of options can vary, often depending on the preferred focus of the 
observer: BIS’ Financial Stability Board have defined shadow banking as a “system of credit 
intermediation” that, typically for a regulator, “raises concerns” (FSB 2011); from Harvard 
Law School’s “Forum on Corporate Governance”, we find that shadow banking is “maturity 
transformation… outside the terms of the banking social contract” (Ricks 2010). All of this is 
true, in its own terms, but does not get us much closer to answering the question. 
The “bucket” approach to definition has been correctly described as an obstacle to clarity 
(Schwarz 2012: 620).  Deloitte’s more recent estimates for the size of the sector have 
attempted to impose a little more clarity, defining what they claim is a consensus on 
activities that encompass credit intermediation using market – not bank – mechanisms; 
funds raised without state guarantees; and no privileged access to a central bank in the 
event of liquidity problems (Kocjan, Ogilvie et al. 2012: 5). They exclude from the list both 
leverage, noting that it is not necessary to shadow bank-like activities, and, interestingly, 
whether a procedure or institution is off or on the formal balance sheet – the result of 
regulatory changes, as “*w+ith new accounting treatments issued in 2009, many such 
entities are now consolidated” (Kocjan, Ogilvie et al. 2012: 5). This last point will prove to 
be important to stock-flow representations of financial flows, as we will see shortly. 
Yet clearly the question of definition matters: off-balance sheet activities, on some 
estimates for recent years, have dominated banks’ total, conventional assets, and clearly 
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remain both enormously large – and potentially dangerous. By any reasonable measure, 
the mixture of non-depository activities and institutions that are generally held to make up 
the shadow banking system have grown exponentially over the last decade. It is likely that 
off-balance sheet activities by banks, and non-depository credit creation, are now at least 
as large as the traditional deposit-based banking system (Turner 2011). One estimate 
placed the total value of assets under management in US shadow banks at $10.5tr in early 
2007, or slightly larger than the conventional banking system at the time (Geithner 2008). It 
has shrunk significantly since then, with Deloitte estimating around $9.5tr assets under 
management in the US by the last quarter of 2012 (Kocjan, Ogilvie et al. 2012). 
Defining what these activities are, why they are undertaken, and how they relate to the 
more conventional financial and monetary system is of importance. The period of 
financialisation has created an innovative new form of credit-creation that, by itself, poses 
a challenge to conventional understandings of that process. The neoclassical theorisation 
we have briefly dealt with, and largely found wanting; but while we have noted the post-
Keynesian SFC alternative, as we attempt to show below it cannot properly understand the 
operations of what is by now a crucial part of the financial system globally – and one that, 
moreover, played an obvious and immediate role in the crash of 2007-8. 
 
The demand for shadow banking 
In practice, the best route to understanding the appearance and role of the shadow 
banking system is less through attempts to pull apart the intricacies of its operations.14 
Rather, it is in understanding the drivers of demand for shadow banking operations, and 
how this (in turn) shaped the context in which shadow banking emerged. The supply-side 
matters here, of course, with the wider processes of deregulation and computerisation 
(allied to a growing sophistication of technique) allowing shadow banking operations to 
emerge. But it was demand for these operations that pulled the individual elements of the 
system into a truly systemic shape.  
Demand for its operations arose as a result of what is sometimes labelled a “global savings 
glut” (Bernanke 2005) but which can more accurately be thought of as the product of 
financialisation itself in creating immense concentrations of wealth, like corporate cash 
                                                          
14 One particularly ambitious example of this is the extraordinarily intricate schematic “map” of the shadow banking system 
presented in Pozsar, Z., T. Adrian, et al. (2010). Shadow banking. Staff reports. New York, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
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holdings, searching for a safe home (Borio and Disyata 2011). Financialisation, by both 
promoting a turn towards financial operations amongst corporations alongside a secular 
decline in tangible investment, and by driving an dramatic increase in inequality, created 
huge pools of wealth held in private hands (Poszar 2011: 5). These pools generally had little 
to do with traditional household savings, which remained broadly flat (and, in net terms, 
turned sharply negative in the heavily financialised Anglo-Saxon economies). Instead, 
corporations and asset managers dominated the demand for the more exotic forms of 
asset – with the crucial proviso that these new instruments were both safe, and liquid  
(Caballero 2010; Poszar 2011). Indeed, Caballero argues convincingly that the well-known 
international imbalances between surplus and deficit economies (often reduced to just US 
vs. China) had little to do with the crisis of 2007-8, when it arrived: far from the “sudden 
stop” that the “global savings glut” would predict, when the system crashed net inflows to 
the US had a “stabilising character”. The biggest element of weakness in the system turned 
out not to be the public accumulation of reserves, driven by the imbalances and deliberate 
sterilisation policy (with China as the particular villain), as the privately-generated demand 
pressure for assets that were both seemingly safe and liquid. Once the system shook, these 
synthetic, seemingly safe assets disintegrated rapidly, fuelling further collapse and a rush 
towards safety – facilitated ultimately by government-led bailouts (Caballero 2010). 
This particular asset demand relates directly to financialisation. Corporate savings, on one 
side, grew globally from $50bn in 1990, to $750bn immediately before the crash, in 2007. 
They have  continued to rise, albeit at a slower rate, topping $1.2tr by the close of 2010 
(Poszar 2011). As in the earlier expansion of the bond market (Warburton 1999: 13) over 
the 1980s and 1990s, requirements from government for borrowing – especially in the US – 
helped mop up some of the demand for safe, but comparatively liquid, assets. As has 
received wide attention, much of the demand for these US government assets was soaked 
up by the reserve requirements of surplus countries, with longer-term T-bills and other 
government bonds being particularly favoured by reserve managers. But there remained 
huge potential reserves of demand for short-term safe assets, driven by the pools of private, 
non-government wealth now extant.  Securitisation provided an apparently reliable means 
to create assets that could be used in this way.  
In other words, the expansion of finance and the processes of financialisation itself – 
particularly if considered in the context of diminishing investment opportunities elsewhere 
in the economy – helped create the market for the shadow banking system, pulling it into 
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shape over the 2000s. Alongside this, as wealth became increasingly concentrated towards 
the top end of income distribution – reversing a previous, post-war trend, at least in the 
West, towards greater equality – the new concentrations of private wealth imposed their 
own asset management problems. By creating assets that were seemingly as liquid (or 
nearly as liquid) as cash holdings, but that offered comparatively high, secure rates of 
return, securitisation helped in turn sustain the plentiful creation of credit back into the 
real economy. Barwell and Burrows (2011), provide a stylised example of the process by 
which global imbalances could translate, indirectly through the choices of the financial 
system – rather than directly, in real terms, through supposedly neutral intermediaries - 
into the expansion of assets and liabilities in the wider economy. Once the technical 
capacities were in place to generate synthetic, seemingly safe and definitively liquid assets, 
it required the mobilisation of demand for financing of this kind that financialisaiton had 
generated to pull the shadow banking system into operation. 
 
Shadow banking operations described 
A singular feature of the shadow banking system is precisely its complexity. A great mass of 
functions, otherwise relatively tractably executed inside conventional banking institutions, 
are combined across institutional boundaries to enable the process of non-depository 
credit creation to function. Pozsar, Adrian et al. (2010) have attempted to completely “map” 
the separate elements of the system, describing both the units involved and the 
relationships between them: the resulting diagram is of startling complexity, and functions 
best when blown up to wall-poster size (Tett 2010). Nonetheless, at a suitably high level of 
abstraction, it is possible to derive four main elements, the specific sequencing of which 
defines the whole system. Securitisation, and the development and extension of 
securitisation techniques, allowed the formation of an “intermediation chain”, with assets 
passed from process to process in response to demand for credit (Pozsar, Adrian et al. 2010: 
1). Securitisation allowed the conversion, at its most abstract, of income streams into 
financial assets that could, in turn, be traded, used as collateral, or accumulated. The 
shadow banking system is a privately-organised network, quite distinct from – and indeed 
often in simple opposition to – the tightly-regulated official banking system. Each element 
within the network has its own requirements for profitability, and none of the separate 
elements, taken by itself, constitutes the entire system: it is only their appearance within 
the system that forms them as part of the shadow banking system.  
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This last point is germane. While the conventional banks had, in effect, a very strong 
integration of intermediation processes, centralising within themselves the process of 
credit creation and subject to immediate regulation by the state, the shadow banking 
system operates to a wholly different principle: it is its very separatedness that allows it to 
operate, since every distinct part of the system can function independently of the system 
as a whole; yet the operation of each element, privately-determined and pursuing its own 
goals of maximising revenues, creates the system as a whole. These are market-led, not 
institution-led, processes. We take, in other words, a functional approach to understanding 
the shadow banking system: it is best understood precisely as a system, containing defined 
functions, than as a complex set of institutions.  
The core elements within this system are securitisation of income streams arising from 
credit elsewhere in the economy – typically, but not necessarily, housing loans; and the 
development of repurchase agreements as the distinctive form of non-depository credit 
creation, dependent on the use of securitised assets (Claessens, Pozsar et al. 2012). Given 
the presence of securitisation, and the ability to manufacture, essentially on demand – at 
least during the years of the boom – assets capable of acting as collateral within loan 
transaction, the potential was in place to allow the enormous expansion of forms of credit 
creation that did not rely, at any point, on either the presence or the creation of deposits 
as such. Conventional banking theory, of course, stresses the need for prior deposits to 
allow the creation of further credit, under the presumption of the money multiplier and 
fractional reserve banking. The endogenous money systems we have considered so far in 
relation to SFC modelling create deposits as a result of the making of loans. 
The need for collateral is substantial because, unlike the traditional depository banking 
system, the shadow banking system has no form of deposit insurance. Collateral is instead 
offered as a means to provide additional security against the failure of loans. But once the 
means to generate cheap and (apparently) robust collateral was delivered, as through the 
process of securitisation (of home loans especially), the system could expand immensely. 
With credit ratings agencies as the overseers of the process, and notoriously willing to 
grant top ratings to fundamentally dubious synthetic financial instruments, this expansion 
could appear entirely robust until it was overtaken by the debacle of 2007-8. 
Securitisation mimics conventional banking procedures insofar as it involves maturity 
transformation. However, whereas conventional banks seek to transform long-term assets 
(loans) into short-term liabilities (deposits) – a process that creates credit risk when new 
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deposits are made – the shadow banking system seeks instead to manage and spread the 
risk of an already-existing income stream. This is done through the tranching of flows of 
income into streams arranged by risk, using a first, off-balance sheet, special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) allowing the risks attached to be (theoretically) managed, and a new, long-
term security to be created. Tranching allowed the creation of a developed hierarchy of 
cash flow, with those holding subordinate (junior) tranches of the security not entitled to 
repayments until the more senior holders had been paid in full. This more complex 
structure of repayment, suitably risk-managed, allowed the creation of more complex 
forms of structured financial assets. 
This security is then sold off-balance sheet into a second SPV, acting as a repository for the 
assets, that can, in turn, issue short-term, seemingly safe, assets off the back of the long-
term security. By (seemingly) managing risks, and through creating separate structures 
capable of issuing securities, income streams and assets can be transformed. These short-
term assets can then be made liquid through either the banks’ guarantees for the 
underlying asset values, or through the use of an MMMF holding these assets and seeking 
to maintain its own book value and issuing shares as needed (Claessens, Pozsar et al. 2012: 
6). Typically, these newly-created assets would be either very short-term (and relatively 
less sophisticated) Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP), or, somewhat longer-term, 
tranched assets like Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) based on complex combinations 
of risk-adjusted streams of future income. And, notoriously, in the belief that tranching and 
risk-managed rendered securitised assets more safe than conventional financial products, 
these newly-created synthetic securities could, in turn, be fed back through the procedure, 
creating such exotic products as CDO-squared or even (briefly) CDO-cubed and higher 
powers.  
These could reach achieve a quite staggering complexity: Haldane (2009) suggests that a 
typical CDO-squared prospectus would run to 300 pages, containing 125 CDOs. Each CDO 
would typically 150 Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS), and each RMBS itself 
held 5,000 mortgages. Since the fundamental principle of pricing and adjusting for risk 
requires an understanding of the correlations in estimated probabilities of joint default, 
and since each of these mortgages’ joint-default probabilities would need to be estimated 
for every other mortgage, the sheer size of the computational task ideally required here 
should be obvious: in practice, it cannot be plausibly performed on a suitable time-scale, 
and so short-cuts of various kinds (notoriously, the Gaussian copula function implying 
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correlations can be reduced a simple normal distribution) would be used instead (Li 2000). 
The presence of this complexity, and the deeply reductionist assumptions needed to skirt 
round it, has been frequently criticized as a contributory factor in the crash.  
Of course, complexity did not help; but this complexity was itself only the by-product of the 
expansion of credit in the first place. It was the plasiticity of the deregulated shadow-
banking environment that allowed such complexity to be produced, but it was the 
expansion of credit that drove the demand for this level of complexity. “Systemic risk” is 
not systemic because systems are complex and poorly-understood by their users; a true 
systemic risk emerges when the procedures of the system as such are at fault.  
Once (seemingly) safe, short-term, and liquid assets where available for collateral, the 
second part of the core shadow banking operations can come in. Where a traditional bank 
would take deposits from and make loans to its customers, utilising its ability to expand its 
balance sheet to generate credit, the shadow banking system operates under a quite 
different principle for the generation of credit. Typically, an institution (say a large 
investment bank) would generate additional financing by selling a collateral asset to an 
institutional investor (typically a money market mutual fund, MMMF) in return for a 
promise to buy back the asset at a future date, for a higher price. This would create a form 
of loan, typically very short term, and significant demand for collateral was created. What, 
in conventional credit relationships (and particularly those of the banking system) was a 
process of liability and asset creation unified within a single institution were now separated: 
on the liability side, shadow banks provided (seemingly) safe claims through securitisation; 
on the asset side, it provided credit to borrowers. The two were mutually dependent, just 
as their equivalents in the more conventional bank credit creation process (Claessens, 
Pozsar et al. 2012: 6). 
This entire process would take place away from traditional balance sheets, and would 
generate credit in a wholly new, non-traditional form. To function, a high degree of (non-
regulatory) trust was required: in the mathematical models underlying the synthetic assets; 
in the ability of the credit rating agencies to truly rate credit; and in the ability of the 
“debtor” side of the repo transactions to make good their promises to repurchase. 
 
Repurchase agreements and non-deposit credit creation 
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Integral, then, to the shadow banking system is its ability to mobilise off-balance sheet 
credit in novel new forms. The development of repo agreements is perhaps most striking. 
In its simplest form, a repo agreement is a contract under which one party sells a security 
to another, with an agreement to repurchase the security at a higher price later. The 
buying party, in effect, acts as a lender, with the higher repurchase price acting like interest 
on a loan. Governments and corporations began using them seriously in the 1960s and 
1970s, but it was standardisation of contracts in the late 1980s that helped pave the way 
for their astronomical private sector expansion over the last few decades (Garbade 2006). 
The global repo market is estimated to have grown by 19 per cent per annum from 2001 to 
2007 (Gorton and Metrick 2010: 15), while the US market alone was estimated to cover 
$10tr of assets annually at its peak (Hördahl and King 2008). The IMF estimate that by 
November 2007, it accounted for about half of the activity of the shadow banking system. 
While the US (in theory) limits rehypothecation to 140 per cent of a clients’ debit balance, 
the UK places no restrictions on the size of rehypothecated assets. Assets were ‘churned’ – 
reused in parallel trades – four times over, on average. Accounting for rehypothecation 
increases the total size of the shadow banking system, measured by assets under 
management, by at least 50 per cent. The financial crisis has made banks substantially 
more cautious about its use, but over $2tr remained rehypothecated as of mid-2010 (Singh 
and Aitken 2010). And given its evident, easy money appeal, it is likely to expand once 
more. 
It is important to note that this is a process of credit creation that is quite distinct from the 
norm. There is no need for a deposit account to exist from which credit can be created; 
there is no immediate need for any reserves at all, since the entire operation depends on 
the provision of suitable collateral in the form of the exchanged security. Gorton and 
Mettrick describe repo on this basis as “a form of privately created money” (2010: 21). The 
Federal Reserve previously counted it as part of its M3 measure of the money supply, prior 
to M3’s discontinuation in 2006. However, it is a form of private money that is peculiar to 
certain institutions: Hordahl and King (2008: 39) note that the top US investment banks 
funded roughly half their assets using repo markets, compared to very little use by the 
(tightly regulated) commercial banks. It is the pre-eminent form of credit money creation 
inside the shadow banking system. 
The critical feature here is the way in which the repo market can allow the creation of 
credit money on the basis of securitisation. And the process of securitisation is one of the 
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principle ways in which the risk commodity is created and distributed. But the reliance on 
fictitious values in the specific form (securitisation) of a fictitious general commodity is 
itself dangerously unstable. The crisis demonstrated the rapidity with which securities 
could disintegrate, leaving banks clutching essentially valueless assets. With the repo 
market both central to investment banks operations, and absolutely dependent on rapid 
securitisation, the slump in values was catastrophic for the banks. New issuance of asset-
backed securities in the US collapsed, on a month-on-month basis, from $300bn peak in 
November 2006 to essentially zero by October  2008 (Adrian and Shin 2009). Rapid 
government intervention was required to prevent the disintegration of the shadow banking 
system – forcible replacing fictitious values the real value of simple cash. 
All this is important for our analytical frame as follows. It hinges, in particular, on two 
critical sets of relationships in the circuit of capital: that between money and commodity 
exchange, described by C-M-C, and that between money-capital and expanded money-
capital, M-M’, with M’ representing (as ever) the expansion of value in money form. The 
credit creation process is conventionally represented by the self-expansion of value, M-M’, 
in which the creation of increased values in the production process itself is hidden: money-
capital is advanced, and then returned later in time with additional value. This can appear 
conventionally in the form of interest-bearing capital, in which money takes on the direct 
appearance of self-expansion through the interest rate. Or it can, as we have indicated, 
appear unconventionally in the repo market, through the repurchasing of commodities. 
It is this repurchase of commodities that provides the link into commodity circulation in 
general. Commodity exchange, C-M-C, is necessarily the exchange of equal values; as a 
simple statement of fact, without formally equal exchange, mediated in this instance by 
money, no exchange would occur: there is no direct compulsion to exchange, and so 
equality prevails in the action of exchange. Yet this is the simulated transfer of values: in 
practice, it is merely a species of convention that defines the transfer as one of 
commodities. The commodities are, in a very specific sense, “fictitious”: at best, they are 
representations of value, dependent on accounting conventions, that may be flowing 
elsewhere within the system.  
It is this fictitious quality that makes the apparent exchange of commodities, in turn 
mobilising the apparent expansion of monetary values, so readily subject to disruption. This 
instability in measured value the direct result of the commodity’s fictitious nature – it can 
be duplicated and reproduced, in identical form, without a costly production process. This 
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can be seen most obviously in the process of rehypothecation, in which the same security 
could be used repeatedly for different repo agreements. There is no real exchange of value 
here, since this would imply single, sequential trades, with the collateral security moving 
from agent to agent; instead, the fictitious nature of the commodity is exploited to provide 
apparently stable collateral in parallel trades. This is a distinct operation from using the 
same asset as collateral for a conventional loan arrangement, since the asset is in fact 
exchanged to engender the repo agreement and unlock the credit. Rehypothecation 
involves the parallel use of the same asset in multiple trades. 
The effect, however, is to allow the creation of greater and greater volumes of private 
credit money. This duplication is quite distinct from the usual circulation of commodities, 
which do not have the feature of being open for use in parallel transactions: they have to 
be used, by definition, sequentially, exchanged from agent to agent. However, we should 
note that the standard rule of commodity exchange – that it is value-preserving – remains 
in place under securitisation. Trading and re-trading the same security does not create new 
value: the same value embodied, underneath the layers of complexity that securitisation 
creates, is traded. There is no reason to grant this new exchange mysterious new 
properties. That, in turn, implies that the relationship between the creation of credit and 
the underlying asset values, expressed in money, must become increasingly tenuous. And 
there is very clearly a Ponzi element to the process, since no new value is entering the 
exchange. The fragility of the arrangement should be clear, as in Minsky’s (1993) 
description of financial fragility.  
Note that this process is itself dependent on the representation of the process, and on the 
trust in that representation, rather than on anything approaching a genuine exchange of 
equal values. It is this dependency on representation and on convention that makes 
shadow banking – and key processes like securitisation and rehypothecation in particular – 
so difficult for SFC models to handle. They, too, depend on an accounting convention for 
their consistency: that of the double-entry book-keeping principle, expanded (under SFC 
conditions) to quadruple-entry. Assets and liabilities must balance because that is how a 
balance sheet functions. Yet we have in the shadow banking system the expansion of 
(apparent) value and the creation of credit money in a process that subverts the formal 
rules of accounting that SFC depends upon to function.  
It is precisely this attempt to circumvent what are otherwise the well-defined procedures 
of public trust, and state-led regulation, through the creation and use of an artificial 
234 
 
commodity, that opens the shadow banking system up to such gross instability. The trade 
of commodities, ideally, does not depend on public intervention: there is no necessary 
third force that intervenes in any individual exchange, and his much is key to the principle 
of the exchange of equal values: the exchanged is not forced, is freely entered into, and is 
decentralised in a fundamental sense.  
This does not, however, apply to banking. Banking is pre-eminently, as we have discussed, a 
creature of both trust and therefore of regulation. The closest it has got historically to a 
form of privatised, decentralised credit relation is in the periods of relatively free banking, 
prior to the creation of a (state recognised) central-bank: in the US, this period was closed 
with the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1912, and then ended definitively with the 
appearance of deposit protection. It is precisely because banks cannot, in practice, 
decentralise the procedures of trust necessary to sustain their own operations that they 
end u, again in practice, reliant on the state or at least some external form of regulator. 
This helps explain the absolute centrality of government’s own lending to the rest of the 
system: a state’s borrowing can appear as the stable, zero-risk point for the rest of the 
structure of credit transactions. 
It is precisely because there is no immediate exchange of equivalents that credit 
transactions contain this riskiness. At the same time, it is fundamental to credit 
transactions that this exchange of equivalents should not exist: or else the transaction 
would not be a true credit transaction, since there would be no gain of value by the debtor. 
Yet this fundamental principle is seemingly violated by the operations of the shadow 
banking system: there is, in a repo transaction, an exchange of (seemingly) equivalents. 
Collateral is offered in exchange for a payment; the same collateral is then repurchased, by 
prior agreement, creating what appears to be (in effect) a rate of interest. This apparent 
rate of interest can be shown as the difference between the initial purchase price (Y), and 
the repurchase price (X), expressed as a ratio to the initial price: (Y-X)/X. This “repo rate” 
approximates the operation of the rate of interest in the more conventional bond markets. 
It is not, however, the same. Whereas a conventional credit transaction contains no 
exchange of equivalents, a repo transaction seemingly contains a trade: a valuable asset is 
exchanged in return for cash. The twist here is the offer of a repurchase agreement – an 
offer to (usually very rapidly) trade the asset back at a somewhat increased rate. For this to 
function, it is necessary for the asset to be sold (and repurchased) only at less than its 
market value; if this is not done, there is no incentive for the creditor to repurchase. 
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Similarly, given the risk of a default (failure to repurchase), the haircut represents a hedge 
for the debtor. This “haircut”, expressing the difference between the initial sale price of the 
asset and its mark-to-market value, then, is absolutely critical to the operation of the 
procedure. 
The haircut expresses the instability of the whole procedure. In the first instance this arises 
because it is required to perform two, distinct, tasks: to both ensure the purchase-
repurchase trade will occur; and to safeguard the initial purchaser against risk. The first is 
determined by the willingness of counterparties to trade, and can be dependent on supply-
side factors; the second depends, more directly, on perceptions of risk. While it can clearly 
by seen that, in situations of market distress, haircuts demanded rise precipitously (as 
occurred over 2007-8), in more stable times it is not clear which element will dominate. In 
practice, there are no commonly accepted frameworks for pricing haircuts, and there has 
been a proliferation of different techniques. Dang and Holmstrom (2011) find that haircuts 
for the same type of collateral will vary depending on the counterparty, although 
elsewhere ratings agency Fitch has discovered no correlation (Fitch 2012).  
But the instability runs deeper than this problem at the level of knowledge; that is, the 
epistemological issue that arises when confronting an unknown future, and, therefore, the 
difficulties in rationally pricing it. Repo embodies a deeper form of instability since to 
function as a credit transaction it depends, at its heart, on the creation of an absence: on 
the appearance of a “gap” between what the market actually will bear for a commodity, 
and what the putative borrower will be willing to accept for the privilege of being able to 
generate the credit. This differs from secured, collateralised lending more generally – 
whether on small-scale, as in pawnbroking, or in very large property transactions – since 
the collateral itself must be traded for the credit to exist – rather than, as is more usually 
the case, the collateral to be traded only when the loan fails. But the trade cannot occur as 
an exchange of equals, because the inequality in the exchange (stretched over time) 
generates the credit. Because there is no equality of exchange, and because the trade 
occurs with a necessary absence – enforced by those trading, in effect, agreeing to suspend 
the usual rules of trade – repo must always present a form of risk to the system as a whole. 
Securitised, fictitious assets were hugely useful to this process: since they embodied a 
market value that was itself constructed by institutional procedures, rather than through 
the process of exchange directly, their very plasticity made them very desirable for the 
processes of exchange as such.  
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This construction took place through private procedures, operating in broadly competitive 
conditions. It was not, and is not, the more conventional mode in which prices can be 
artificially restricted or altered by cartel, monopoly, or government decree: no third agent 
intervened. Financialisation has thrown up any number of examples of rigged and 
manipulated markets and prices, from individual frauds to institutional failures like LIBOR-
rigging. Stenfors (2012) provides a valuable discussion of the latter. But the subversion of 
the exchange-determined price entailed in the process of repo credit is different to these 
essentially contingent factors; it was essential to the process of price-formation, not the 
obvious undermining of the procedure. And it could come into existence precisely because 
of the absence of more conventional regulatory forms that determine the structure of 
markets for interest rates: from government lending, particularly of T-bills, to establish the 
“risk-free” rate, to the specific forms of regulation created in an attempt to stabilise 
conventional banking. Shadow banking relies on both: it requires the plastic form of credit 
money, operating elsewhere in the system, to enable the generation of new forms of credit; 
and it requires the operation of interest rates elsewhere in the system to act as its own 
reference point. It does not, however, directly rely on either.  
For this operation to succeed, although the form of it was entirely private and taking place 
in sphere quite distinct from the conventional, regulated, on-balance sheet financial, it 
demanded a level of functioning trust between institutions. The risk of malfeasance, in the 
absence of trust, was too great otherwise: the shadow banking system, as a system, could 
not come into operation without some stability of its component parts. That stability is 
precisely why the shadow banking system could not create purely its own, new, form of 
money: it demanded the presence of an existing form of money as precisely the stable 
mechanism that could, in turn, take its own (inherently unstable) procedures and turn 
them into a stable, systemic set of functions. Shadow banking, then, operates against the 
fundamental principles of credit creation as is conventionally understood, and with those 
procedures through its reliance on the general form that credit money takes for its 
operations. It is exactly because of this necessary basis of privatised (non-state, non-
regulated) trust, as manifested in money, that makes world money so suitable for the 
operation of the shadow banking system. The dollar is the favoured instrument precisely 
because it can operate as something approaching a universal equivalent, globally – with the 
pound and the euro very much secondary. Shadow banking was both the product of 
concentrations of cash holdings, built up during the period of financialisation, and could 
best operate where those cash holdings were held in the form of the global currency, as a 
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manifestation of the systemic confidence in that currency’s continued operation as a store 
of value. In other words, those two features made it a form of global hoard, but of an 
unusual kind. 
The usual M-M’ process, central (at the highest level of abstraction) to all credit markets, is 
therefore doubly undermined by shadow banking. First, it is not just the creation of what is 
sometimes labelled “fictitious capital”: the capacity of developed credit market to be able 
to supply a Net Present Value (NPV) to a flow of future incomes. Rather, it uses the creation 
of a wholly fictitious commodity form, via securitisation, to form a rate of interest: the 
procedure is reversed. Second, the generation of these flows of new credit are not just 
potentially disassociated from the circuit of capital and the generation of an eventual 
return via (ultimately) the production of value: they are necessarily disassociated from 
them, and can stand in direct opposition to them, to the extent that they represent a pure 
financial claim within the financial system that can even stand prior to claims made 
elsewhere. The potential for instability, as has been previously indicated, is not just a 
contingent risk that might become realised: unlike conventional “systemic” risk, this is not 
risk appearing as a result of the system’s complexity or scale relative to the scale of the 
wider economy. This is a genuinely systemic risk in the sense that it is a necessary part of 
the system’s direct functioning. 
 
No shadow banking run 
This form of systemic risk has manifested itself in a very specific form. Elsewhere, the 2007-
8 crisis has been described as a run on the shadow banking system (Gorton 2010; Gorton 
and Metrick 2010).  While an appealing comparison, we are clearly not talking about the 
standard, self-sustaining run on a bank that are a recurring feature of fractional reserve 
banking, and which have been modelled in the neoclassical tradition by Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983). It is difficult to describe the run as the product of collapsing depositor 
confidence when there were no deposits to speak of. The fundamental confusion emerges 
in that a conventional bank run is, as the Diamond-Dybvig model illustrates, inherent to the 
functioning of deposit banking: it is impossible to run a fractional reserve banking system, 
creating credit on the basis of limited deposits, without also creating the possibility of a run. 
The combination of liquid liabilities (deposits) and illiquid assets (loans) is always at risk. 
Policies have developed, certainly since the 1930s, on the basis of maintaining confidence 
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in the banking system: for instance through deposit insurance, introduced in the US in 1934, 
or capital adequacy ratios and minimum reserve requirements. In all cases it is the 
maintenance of trust and confidence about the system that, in turn, allows the system to 
function. Should that depositor confidence disappear – for any reason, even the most 
spurious – a run always remains a possibility. 
The shadow banking system specifically does not use deposits, relying instead on market-
based mechanisms to create credit. It cannot, therefore, lead to a run as conventionally 
described. Confidence about the institution does not matter, in the first instance; 
confidence in the market, however, may do. This distinction matters, since it better 
describes the process observed inside the before and during the financial crisis of 2007-9. It 
began as a crisis of the markets, most obviously in the initial ‘credit crunch’ from mid-2007 
onwards, when liquidity began drying up in the interbank markets. At least one genuine, 
old-fashioned bank run began, as minor British bank Northern Rock, heavily dependent on 
the interbank loan market, was forced to request government assistance. Crowds of 
depositors queued to remove their deposits: an authentic crisis of confidence, in this case 
driven by the act of appealing for assistance – rather than the bank’s fundamentals. But 
otherwise major financial institutions, while beginning to report large losses and value 
write-offs often associated with their holdings of sub-prime mortgages, apparently retained 
investor confidence. It was their market financing operations, not deposit financing 
operations that were in trouble. As the market-based, securitised assets driving credit 
creation collapsed in value, banks suffered mounting losses. Bear Stearns, faced with 
bankruptcy in early 2008, was forced into a merger with Bank of America; and of course 
Lehman Bros filed for bankruptcy in September 2008. None of this, however, involved a run: 
banks’ assets, not their liabilities, were the source of the problem. It was a genuine crisis of 
solvency, brought on by falling asset values, not a crisis of confidence in the institution. 
Similarly, in the wider shadow banking system, encompassing insurance companies and 
hedge funds, no run occurred – and nor could it. Clearly, the rising fear of counterparty risk 
spread the crisis, but this is counterparty risk, not risk associated with the institution itself. 
In other words, distinct from the stock-flow balance-sheet representation of banking 
institutions, and from the neoclassical representation of a bank run as fundamentally the 
product confidence within institutions, we have here a process largely determined and 
driven by the markets themselves; and, in particular, the sets of relationships developed 
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around the management of money within the market – a crisis between rather than within 
institutions, at least in the first instance. 
 
Plastic accounts 
As we have seen earlier, there is a substantial slipperiness in defining the shadow banking 
system if we consider it as a matter of on- or off-balance sheet activity. This is over and 
above the difficulties in ascertaining the scale of “shadow” operations, which can be of an 
immense complexity. It is a fundamental feature of the shadow system itself: not just that 
it operates off-balance sheet, but that large sections of it can (in practice) migrate on- and 
off-balance sheet. The Deloitte redefinition of the shadow system, after the 2008 US 
government protection was offered to MMMFs, shows exactly the problem: a change in 
the regulatory regime produced an apparently immediate shift in the size and scope of the 
US shadow banking operation.  
Obviously, the introduction of the government protection changed the nature of the assets 
and liabilities involved, with a corresponding change in the balance sheet position of the 
sectors – the government, in effect, taking on substantial new contingent liabilities. But the 
fact that this shift could be completed so easily points to a deeper issue than simply one of 
definition. It is fundamental to the operation of the shadow banking system that its 
component elements maintain a “plastic”, malleable relationship with other balance sheets.  
It is this feature that undermines the SFC claim to provide a complete representation of the 
macroeconomy at the level of finance. It is essential to the coherence of SFC that every 
stock, or flow, must be accounted for within the frame; for a closed national economy, this 
means that every stock or flow of the national unit of account must be accounted for; for 
an open economy, this can expand to include transfers to and from abroad; for multiple 
national economies, the balance of financial transfers must equate across both; and, finally, 
if we could imagine a modelling of the entire world of national economies, this would 
necessarily balance – the world is itself a complete economy against which no external 
balances can be held.15 There is a logic to this that, as a first pass representation of the 
functioning of an economy (or set of linked economies) is appealing, and follows naturally 
from the definitions of both double-entry bookkeeping and the national income accounts. 
                                                          
15 Although see Krugman, P. (1978). The theory of interplanetary trade, Yale University. 
 for one challenge to this conventional wisdom.  
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Shadow banking challenges this. It operates in opposition to the functioning of the balance 
sheet: it is precisely because it is not on the balance sheet that it can function at all. It 
therefore constitutes a “leak” of a fairly grand order from the presentation made under SFC 
conditions. It further indicates the institutional limitations of SFC: what SFC presents as a 
general representation of a capitalist economy is, in fact, one strictly delimited by its 
institutional claims. Far from being “general”, in the sense of presenting the reality that 
would obtain in any conceivable capitalist economy considered at the necessary level of 
abstraction, what we have under SFC is something closely bound to the description of that 
economy offered by convention – in particular, the convention of the national income 
accounts – and not that offered by analysis or history. For the SBS, this gap between the 
claim of generality and the specific failing is especially pronounced; what SFC presents is, in 
fact, a representation of the macroeconomy that is tightly bound to the conventions 
established in successive revisions of the national income accounting procedures. These 
conventions, in turn, draw on a strongly (if “hydraulic”) “Keynesian” conception of the 
national economy: that institutions are stable and best considered precisely at the level of 
the national. Yet the world does not any longer (if it did ever) function like that: the circuits 
of national monetary flows that SFC purports to contain cannot exist solely at the level of 
nation and official monetary policy. Financialisation has produced the means by which this 
“Keynesianism” cannot any longer function, either in practice or in theory. 
 
Shadow banking and stock-flow consistency 
The presence of the shadow banking system as a (largely) off-balance sheet repository for 
financial assets and liabilities is of increasing importance to the wider circulation of capital, 
particularly when there are issues in the both the production and realisation of value within 
the circuit of production. It is because it is off balance-sheet that the issues of risk and risk 
management have taken on such an acute form: the processes of risk management, 
securitisation and related efforts to conceptualise risk provide the means by which the 
relationship between shadow banking (as non-bank hoard) and the wider banking and 
credit system can be managed.   
This presumed management of risk, in turn, allows a greater flexibility of accounting and 
representation within the circuit of capital. It is because the various component parts of the 
shadow banking system can act in the space created by the absence of regulation, and 
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within a circuit of money capital that is not immediately dependent on either a commodity 
base or state control, that it creates such a challenge for SFC representations of the 
economy. The whole system forms a siphon out of the accounting framework that SFC 
attempts to provide. It is because its functioning is so slippery, relative to formal 
accounting, that it cannot be adequately captured within an SFC representation of the 
world. 
It is exactly because these activities are occurring off-balance sheet, as a vast “leak” from 
the balance sheet that stock-flow consistent modelling cannot be treated as a general 
representation of a modern, money-based and capitalist economy. The presence of the 
shadow banking system, particularly on this vast scale, presents a direct challenge to 
representations of the economy as solely determined by monetary flows within sets of 
balance sheets. In fact, it is the potential for flows away from balance sheets, and outside 
of the circuits that the balance sheets contain that causes most difficulties for the SFC 
representation of financial flows. Fundamentally, the otherwise hard distinction between 
definite stocks, and definite flows, begins to break down here. 
 
Endogenous money creation of a special kind 
SFC representations, particularly those rooted within a broadly post-Keynesian 
understanding of money creation, place the creation and circulation of inside money at the 
centre of their analysis. They present a “monetary theory of production”, in which the 
initial mobilisation of money in turn generates the financial activity. This generation of 
money could, in principle, be provided by the state (a point stressed by the latter-day 
school of Chartalists: see Wray (2000) for a prominent example), or (as is more typically 
assumed) through the private banking system. The process of money creation is, in either 
case, endogenous to economic activity, rather than presumed (fundamentally) exogenous 
to the same activity. 
This is not, as we have seen, the same as the process of endogenous credit creation that 
occurs inside the shadow banking system, dependent on the trading and re-trading of 
constructed financial commodities. It cannot be plausibly represent this process because, in 
the end, it expects each stock and each flow it represents to have only one plausible 
interpretation: every asset is assigned correctly, every liability likewise, and every 
movement between the identified sectors can be specified uniquely. What the shadow 
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banking system does is to undermine the uniqueness of that specification, by setting 
mechanisms of credit generation that depend precisely on non-uniqueness to function: the 
same transaction, in effect, is reproduced over and over again in a way that is not easily 
captured by the balance sheet representation proposed.  
 
A stylised SFC representation of shadow banking activity 
Attempts have been made to attempt to capture at least of the shadow banks’ functioning, 
however. A recent paper by Barwell and Burrows (2011) presented a “balance sheet 
perspective on the Great Moderation” in the UK, and included a substantial appendix on 
the stylised representation of securitisation through a series of linked balance-sheet 
changes. The paper as a whole has the immense advantage, as is typical of SFC 
representations, of drawing attention to gross rather than net financial flows, and of 
displaying both assets and liabilities within the complete macroeconomy. It therefore 
indicates, broadly correctly, that the development of immense holdings of financial assets 
during the so-called “Great Moderation” of the 2000s contained, in reality, the seeds of its 
own destruction in the Great Financial Crash of 2007-8. The discussions of the acceleration 
in household lending, the effects of corporate restructuring, and the concomitant 
expansion of bank balances, in particular, are invaluable. 
Where the authors are less successful, however, is in their efforts to display the 
relationship between this expansion of balance sheets and the development of a 
securitised and non-depository shadow banking sector. Although never as a large, either in 
absolute or proportional terms, as in the US, securitised lending to UK households 
accounted for over 20% of all loans made by the time of the crash (Barwell and Burrows 
2011: 29). There stylised presentation of securitisation only involves the creation of a new 
UK mortgage that is, in turn, funded through a UK-based SPV lending to a European 
pension fund, shown as a system of (graphical) balance sheets. The fundamental problem, 
of course, is that once the new asset has been created and sold by the SPV, it does not 
simply reside in the purchasers’ balance sheet; it could, for instance, be used multiple times 
to generate still further credit, elsewhere within the shadow-banking system, through 
rehypothecation. A balance sheet representation alone does not adequately capture this 
problem of multiplicity, inherent to the shadow banking systems’ operations, since it 
presents each stock and each flow as representing a single, joint operation: the movement 
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of assets (on one side) and liabilities (on the other). Financial products failing to correspond 
to this clear delineation fall outside of what can be plausibly represented; this can be seen, 
already, at the level of the national accounts. The UK’s own accounting framework rightly 
identifies derivatives products as an important part of the financial system, but then also – 
quite correctly – realises that contingent financial products with uncertain structures 
cannot easily be accounted for within the national accounting framework.16 
The critical problem, then, is that although the SFC representation claims to be complete 
(to whatever degree of generality), it is, in fact, potentially otherwise. The presence of 
credit money, otherwise correctly identified within SFC, is precisely where it can end up 
misapplied. It exists in a world in which the rules of “Keynesianism” still exist; but 
financialisation, over the last few decades, has thrown up increasingly complex ways in 
which Keynesianism is challenged, both at the level of policy and at the level of theory. The 
shadow banking system is simply the most comprehensive edition of that challenge, and, as 
such, presents one of the biggest empirical obstacles for SFC representations to overcome. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has taken a more empirical approach than the preceding, and attempted to 
draw on a wider range of literature to develop the point that the presumed generality of 
the SFC presentation in fact does not hold: it represents a world that is, in a sense, too 
“Keynesian” relative to what we actually see, most particularly in the form of the shadow 
banking system. This challenge to pure accounting matrices, and the kind of claims SFC 
makes about the world, can be reconciled with an understanding of money as endogenous; 
of money as a form of hoard against uncertainty, therefore implying an anti-Quantity 
Theory, relative to prices; and of the social institutions needed to handle monetary 
operations as in fact central understanding how those operations are performed – rather 
than an afterthought. 
The failure of SFC to properly encompass the types of new, and often wildly complex 
operations that we see in shadow banking, can be traced directly back to some of its 
theoretical failures. We have, throughout, stressed that the impact of structural 
uncertainty on SFC models produces a breakdown of the accounting and economic systems 
contained within its matrices. The zero-sum condition will no longer hold; the money 
                                                          
16 See notes on the treatment of derivatives in Blue Book 2012, ch. four. 
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markets, assumed in balance by the (n-1) closure rule, in fact are no longer in balance; a 
“monetary excess” can, and most likely will appear, representing the desire for excess 
funding relative to that apparently required for the maintenance of the whole circuit. This 
monetary excess has, in recent years, taken the spectacular form of the shadow banking 
system: an immense, off balance-sheet complex of money management operations that 
can trace its origins directly back to growing demands for liquidity that arrived with the 
onset of financialisaiton. 
To develop some of the issues raised here would require us not just to further develop the 
social accounting matrix approach of SFC, so as to encompass better the encompassing role 
of uncertainty, but to push, too, in the other direction, towards an understanding of 
financial institutions – and their representations in theory – as bounded by social rules and 
history. “Thick description”, alongside model building, is required, even where this comes 
at the expense of formalisation. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has offered a critique of stock-flow consistent modelling as an approach to 
understanding and modelling the macroeconomy. While it is in general sympathetic to the 
attempt made by SFC to reassert some “old-fashioned” (in Krugman’s phrase) theoretical 
claims about the economy, including particularly the treatment of money as central, and of 
the aggregate as distinct from the micro-level, it suggests that there is still further work to 
be done. 
In particular, the treatment of time and therefore of uncertainty within the textbook SFC 
model, that of Godley and Lavoie (2007), is inconsistent. Inventories were shown to be 
treated in a manner that was either inconsistent with profit-maximising behaviour on the 
part of firms, or inconsistent with the claim of coherency for the whole model; yet, despite 
this, inventories form a core part of the Godley-Lavoie claim that SFC can represent a viable 
link between monetary factors and real production. On the basis of this inconsistency, our 
proposed (and consistent) resolution to the problem in turn suggests that an imbalance is 
created in the money system: that uncertainty, in impacting on real production, produces a 
financial imbalance that then manifests itself as an imbalance in the market for money. 
This theme is developed further in the following chapter, where we note that the issues of 
pricing and valuation of capital as a stock (rather than merely inventories) that have beset 
neoclassical economics apply in somewhat reduced form to SFC. The claim, by Godley and 
Lavoie, that they can move “smoothly” from monetary factors to real production, or vice 
versa, is belied by some of the clear difficulties they run into in attempting to value capital 
– and to value capital relative to the inventories, already considered. We highlight that the 
economy’s net worth, even in this simplified presentation, cannot be equated to the value 
of the capital stock, and suggest further that the description of the financing of investment 
appears to be incomplete. 
The following chapter picks up on these two themes, and explores the motivation to invest 
(or fail to invest) on the part of entrepreneurs requiring additional initial financing. We 
consider the presence of uncertainty, following Kinght, as fundamental to how 
entrepreneurs behave, but note also the presence of a “paradox of profits” that comes into 
existence once the necessity for initial financing is accepted, as in Keynes’ “financial 
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motive”. This chapter then looks at how the circuitist school, which offers to rigorously 
develop models centred on the provision of this initial investment financing, has attempted 
to overcome the paradox of profits, and note that given the role of entrepreneurs, if they 
require additional initial financing, the presence of uncertainty implies the overprovision of 
credit-money into the circuit. 
Chapter seven looks to integrate the insights from the previous chapters into a coherent 
account of the relationship between credit-money, the credit system, and uncertainty. It 
uses the work of Marx and later writers in the marxist tradition to build up this account of 
the centrality of hoarding within the whole economy, and the presence of a credit-system 
built upon it. This hoarding, and the need for money to act as a real store of value, implies 
that both quantity theories of money and theories of money as a purely symbolic value 
cannot function properly: we need, instead, a return to the anti-quantity tradition, in which 
the operations of hoarding and dishoarding regulate the money system over the course of 
the economic cycle. The final chapter explores some of these relationships further, in a 
more empirical setting, examining the development of the shadow banking system and the 
challenge this poses to both neoclassical and SFC accounts of banking and monetary 
behaviour. We suggest that the development of a more thorough account of hoarding and 
the different functions of money may help better develop our understanding of this. 
There are, as would be expected, a number of lines of enquiry even within this limited 
account left open. Future lines of research could be extended backwards, into SFC models, 
to look more closely at the behaviour of firms. It has, so far, been touched on as far as firms 
are considered to be impacted by social uncertainty. But we have not particularly 
developed or explored some of the distinctive claims of post-Keynesian SFC regarding 
mark-up pricing and investment behaviour. Both of these could be immediate lines to 
pursue, in light of the discussion of uncertainty as profoundly tied to the experience of 
firms, and of the line of causality suggested back to its monetary impact. 
Prices, in general, have made little appearance, and we have touched on them only in 
relation to the very theoretical discussion of quantity theory and anti-quantity theory. 
Godley and Lavoie devote many pages to the determination of general price levels, and it is 
perhaps the sheer length of their notes here that suggests deeper problems to be explored. 
The interest rate, especially, and its determination would warrant a far deeper 
consideration: the singular merit of SFC, motivating Tobin and other neoclassicals’ research 
some decades ago, is the possibility of providing a more nuanced account of interest rates 
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and rates of return across a range of assets, with a more detailed understanding of the 
spread and subsequent monetary transmission mechanisms open to the researcher. While 
we have noted the creation, in general, of a credit system, we have left the determination 
of interest rates alone. Subsequent research could usefully develop the relationship 
between systemic uncertainty and interest rates, along the lines of the Dafermos (2012) 
paper considered in the literature review, but perhaps with a focus on its impacts on real 
production. The arguments offered in chapter seven, on hoarding and dishoarding in 
relation to systemic uncertainty might offer a pointer to more empirical research on the 
balance of hoarded and non-circulating money in relation to the real economy.  
And while we have raised a number of issues from marxist political economy as perhaps 
helping resolve problems encountered in SFC, these are open to be developed more 
formally. Marx was, as noted, one of the pioneers of the monetary circuit of production, 
developing a series of “reproduction schemes” in volume two of his Capital. With a more 
sophisticated mathematical treatment than Marx had at the time, these can be usefully 
developed, as indeed Foley (1982) has attempted. Integration between these marxian 
reproduction schemes, and the kind of analysis SFC (and, for that matter, the circuitists) 
could open up very useful insights into the nature and development of the financial system, 
in particular.  
In a similar vein, the temporal single system interpretation (TSSI) of Marx’s reproduction 
schemes has gained ground in recent years, following in particular the work of Andrew 
Kilman (2007; 2011). The former book laid out, in detail, the case for treating Marx’s own 
resolution to the longstanding “transformation problem” as not being flawed or 
“inconsistent”, as often claimed, but of being fundamentally misunderstood, summarising 
previous work and providing a canonical statement of the TSSI case. Freeman (2010) has 
provided a useful summary of this research history, with Ernst (1982), Mandel and Freeman 
(1984) and Kliman (1988) as particularly notable early contributions. By revising Marx to 
include an explicit identification of the economy process as a single dynamic system, TSSI’s 
proponents claim to resolved the problem of relating Marx’s value-production system 
consistently to the observed price-output system. At the same time, TSSI offers a critique of 
the common simultaneous equations approaches to Marx, popularised particularly after 
the work of Nobuo Okishio (1961) claimed to demonstrate that the tendential law of the 
falling rate of profit no longer held in simultaneous equations solution to Marx’s 
transformation problem. Ian Steedman (1977) synthesised the neo-Ricardian case for 
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solving Marx’s system as a set of simultaneous equations, thereby seemingly resolving the 
transformation problem (in the sense of rendering it redundant), but at the cost of losing 
the falling rate of profit.  
TSSI is of interest here in that, like the post-Keynesian stock-flow consistent models this 
thesis has considered, it attempts to offer a modelling of an economy that is properly 
dynamic, in the sense of considering time as a sequence of events rather than an index 
(hence “temporal”). Where it differs sharply is, according to at least some of its critics, in 
underplaying the monetary aspects of the economy in favour of a focus on value 
movements, with monetary expressions of variables (it is claimed) arbitrarily created 
(Veneziani 2004; Mohun and Veneziani 2009). If post-Keynesian SFC of the Godley-Lavoie 
type considered here has problems dealing with real foundations of monetary values, TSSI, 
it can be charged, has problems dealing with the monetary expressions of real values. (See, 
however, Freeman and Kliman 2009 for a reply to Mohun and Veneziani.)  
We have at least implied the need for an understanding not of a single money only circuit, 
but of several, interlocking circuits able to account for the complete set of hoarded and 
circulating funds, circuits of credit money, and circuits of real production – to pick the three 
most obvious choices. The relationships here would be complex, although not conceptually 
impossible to define and operationalise, perhaps as Shaikh (1984) has indicated. 
Uncertainty, we would suggest, can act as the critical link between the different sets of 
literature: moving away from a purely deterministic classical system (as in Marx), and more 
towards the monetary and non-deterministic systems that Farjoun and Machover (1983) 
have attempted to describe. Cockshott et al. (2007) are another potential avenue to 
explore, in reasserting the potential utility of an objective measure of value in resolving 
some of the conundrums of valuation touched on elsewhere in this thesis. 
Our general conclusion, then, is that by adopting a relatively high-level and theoretical 
approach to the issues raised in SFC modelling, we have attempted to show how some of 
its broad claims to universality and coherency do not necessarily hold. We propose a 
number of resolutions to this, using both an internal and a distinctive, Marxian critique to 
do so. The presence of uncertainty, and the problems this causes for a monetary economy 
based on the circulation of credit money only, are the two we highlight in this setting. The 
disguising of the real, productive economy behind balance sheets and accountancy rules is 
part of this problem: uncertainty, as we have suggested throughout, has real impacts; 
money cannot be treated separately from it. Developing more sophisticated macro models 
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will require breaking with the more “hydraulic” of the Keynesian elements within SFC, and 
extending the representation to include the multiple circuits highlighted above. 
We do not think SFC provides the level of generality and consistency necessary to offer a 
completely convincing account of the totality of economic relationships within the 
macroeconomy; nonetheless, it represents both a distinct improvement over general 
equilibrium modelling in its explicit treatment of money and the aggregate as a meaningful 
capacity and, with further refinements, can help to offer valuable insights for the 
development of effective macroeconomic models – and, on that basis, provide a guide for 
better policymaking. 
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APPENDIX: SOLVING THE GODLEY-LAVOIE SIM MODEL 
Godley and Lavoie present a very early version of their model, SIM, in chapter three of their 
textbook. It includes a government sector, but excludes fixed investment, overseas trade 
and private banking, so we can consider it here as the barest minimum model with a 
financial asset (government-issued credit money). The analytical solution shown here is 
intended as an illustration of the more general principles and issues involved in solving SFC 
models, as the main text in chapter four describes in more detail. Working from the 
balance sheet matrix, the system’s equations are: 
      
      
      
      
          
        
               
                  
                  
        
   
 
 
 
Where C is household consumption, G is government consumption, H is household wealth, 
held here as government-issued money, T is taxes, N is labour (supply or demand, 
depending on subscript), W is the wage rate and YD is household disposable income. The 
subscripts s and d indicate “supply” and “demand” respectively, enabling flows to and from 
sectors to be properly identified. Subscript h is intended to indicate a holding of household 
wealth at the end of a period. Finally, the parameters: theta is a tax rate, set as a fraction of 
income by government, and alphas 1 and 2 are the marginal propensities to consumer from 
disposable income and household stocks of wealth, respectively. Godley and Lavoie assume 
that the MPC for disposable income is higher than that for stocks of wealth, and that 
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government expenditure not covered by taxes is met through the creation of more money, 
   . The final equation expresses the demand for labour, given a level of output and the 
wage rate. The “quasi-Walrasian” redundant equation, that appears as a result of the other 
equations being balanced, is here that the money supply is equal to the money demanded. 
This is of no economic relevance in this instance, but is an artefact of the system’s 
construction. 
A steady-state solution, defined by Godley and Lavoie as the point where the variables 
remain in a constant relationship to each other (as in the Solow balanced growth path), can 
be found as follows. For a model without growth (as in the simple case shown here), the 
not only the ratios between variables will be constant – so, too, will be the levels, the 
model finding a stationary stable point. 
 In the current model, without growth and with only a government sector in addition to the 
private sector (that is, without private banks), stability of the main ratios (here, 
consumption:income) implies that government must be running a budget balance, or else 
be either continually drawing down on income, or running a permanently larger and larger 
debt. Setting the budget to balance, G=T, and noting therefore that the change in the 
money supply will be zero, the government requiring no additional financing, we can 
rearrange the relevant sections of the above (via the consumption function) to find: 
            
(Omitting subscripts since we are in equilibrium.) This shows a steady-state level of income 
at Y*, dependent on the level of taxation and the level of government spending, 
   
 
 
 
This “ratio of government expenditure to its fiscal share” (Godley and Cripps 1983: 111) is 
fundamental to the model, in the sense that it determines entirely the steady-state level of 
income. It illustrates immediately the demand-led nature of the stock-flow consistent 
modelling, in which a government’s fiscal stance can be assumed to determine not just 
income in the short-run, but over the long-run, too. As Godley and Lavoie note (2007: 72), 
it is fundamental to any of their models with a government sector.  
Savings by households will be zero, the average propensity to consume rising to unity, and 
disposable income and consumption will necessarily be equal to each other. Using the 
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above result on steady state income and government spending, and setting YD*=C*, we 
can rearrange through the definition of national income above to find the steady-state 
level of household disposable income and consumption: 
       
 (   )
 
 
This reflects the joint impact of government spending with a balanced budget: both 
positive, through the multiplier effect, and negative, due to additional taxes. Household 
consumption is overall positive with government spending, even if this is fiscally neutral, as 
a result of its impact on the wider economy – a result familiar from conventional 
macroeconomics as the balanced budget multiplier.  
Introducing further elements, like fixed capital, private banking, and an open economy, 
complicates the analysis significantly. It is not generally possible to derive an analytical 
solution once accumulated assets like inventories are introduced, since there are possibly 
multiple stable states strongly dependent on the initial values of the system.  
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